

1999-03-02

Handl: Mats Foyer

(EC)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Lundvik)✓

Kopia: Amb Hans Magnusson, p.t. Stockholm

BRÅDSKANDE

**Raoul Wallenberg - Susan Mesinais genomgång av
Lubjankafängelsets alfabetiska register för 1945-52**

Susan Mesinai, som till den 10 mars fått tid av FSB att genomföra den överenskomna genomgången av Lubjankafängelsets alfabetiska register 1945-52, har skrivit bifogade utkast till brev till MID:s andra europeiska avdelning.

I brevet föreslår Mesinai viss modifiering av villkoret att inte göra några noteringar i samband med genomgången. Innebörden är i korthet att Mesinai under övervakning skall kunna göra vissa noteringar, vilka dock inte skall lämna FSB:s arkiv utan förvaras där. Brevet innehåller i övrigt en ganska utförlig motivering till varför ett sådana förfarande är nödvändigt.

Tacksam Ert ställningstagande, och eventuella klar-
tecken, till att brevet avsänds (i vilket fall det
dessförinnan kommer att översättas till ryska).

HIRDMAN

0/EC / J Lundvik
990302
kryfax t. amb.
Moskva
4

March 2, 1999

Mr. Nikolai Korchunov, First Secretary
Section, Finland and Sweden
Second European Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
32/34 Smolenskaya Sennaya Square
Moscow 121200

Dear Mr. Korchunov:

I am writing in regard to the invitation to review the alphabetical registry for Lubyanka Prison for 1945 - 1952. I understand that this work will take place next Wednesday, March 10th at the archives at Kuznetsky Most. Please extend my thanks to the FSB for their generous invitation which is a most fitting 'first step' in our mutual efforts to conclude this work.

An itemized discussion of the remaining steps resulting from our recent meeting on February 22nd, my Preliminary Report and previous agreements, will be forthcoming next week. This will show our intention to focus as much as possible on retrieving the most essential data in order to put forth our Final Report. I think you will find that this will honor the emphasis placed on a 'practical investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg'. In each case, as with the alphabetical registry mentioned above, I have made an effort to define not only the importance but use of this information leading toward additional 'follow up' steps. All of this is being done with the desired time schedule in mind. This makes us all the more dependent on your efforts and that of the various agencies involved in this work to provide us with access to the necessary data in a serious and timely manner.

In order however to achieve a correct or as precise as possible result, I would like to ask the Russian side to consider a slight amendment to their condition that I review the alphabetical registry without taking notes. My sole goal in looking at this registry -- at least in terms of 1945 -- is to derive the registration numbers for Internal Prison for Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder who arrived, according to Wallenberg's prisoner of war card, on February 6th. If I were being presented with the incoming registry for that date, I could easily scan the names of the prisoners who arrived at that time and determine their numbers.

However, evidently this incoming registry either does not exist or does not fall within the conditions of providing access. Therefore, the FSB is allowing me to see an alphabetical registry for that year and/or a series of years. This book or books obviously was/were compiled at a later date, possibly from the kartotecha. If Wallenberg and Langfelder's names are not immediately accessible by turning to the appropriate place in the alphabet in years where we know that they were brought to Internal Prison -- namely 1945 and 1947 -- then we can assume that their cards/names had already been previously removed.

If such is the case, it will be necessary for me to calculate as best possible these registration numbers by reviewing the numbers of all those brought to Lubyanka on or around that date (meaning that the prisoner, for example, could arrive on the 6th and be registered for the 7th or other such discrepancies if there is a weekend in between). I am prepared to do this arduous work, without taking notes -- meaning without taking any information out of the archive with me. I cannot achieve the much desired result without at least noting down those who fall within this range of numbers -- that is their names, dates of birth (to distinguish them from others with the same name), date and possibly hour of arrival, registration number and -- in the case of the prisoners in question -- outgoing. In the event that the numbers are separated according to the arresting body or those under whose jurisdiction the prisoners are immediately placed, I would have to note that as well.

I am prepared to do all of these calculations on the premises of the Special Archives at Kuznetsky Most, openly where I can be watched. If more time is required to complete this work, I would propose to leave my notes for calculation purposes in the safe. Once the final calculations have been made, these pages can be destroyed or perhaps retained until the conclusion of the Final Report in case there is any further debate or need for them.

As this registration number is not simply a memorabilia of Raoul Wallenberg's existence but offers a very important key for any moves he may have made to and from Internal Prison at any time, may I ask that such a request be honored or that FSB suggest a means to provide us with this information that is even less cumbersome. I also ask that this concession be made for both Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder.

I would also like to request that, if the registries are separated by year, I be shown comparable registries for 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952 to scan for the names of Wallenberg and Langfelder. In terms of 1947, I would also like to study the alphabetical registry -- presumably the same -- which enabled the FSB to respond to my questions on Schlitter's cell occupancy in 1947 that Akikusa, Roedl, and Wallenberg were all in Internal Prison during that time (but not Langfelder, about whom I had specifically asked whether Schlitter had been placed in a cell with him in and around July 22, 1947).

Finally, I would like to request, as I do not read Russian except to sound out the letters, that my translator Andrey Allahverdov be permitted to accompany me in this work. We look forward to seeing the archivists again who have already made such helpful contributions to our efforts. If by next week a counterpart has been found to facilitate this investigation, he may care to join us in order to acquaint himself with the nature of our work.

Again, my deepest thanks for this offer to review the registry and I look forward -- on behalf of the Swedish Russian Working Group -- to the results which will be of mutual benefit to all of us.

Sincerely yours, Susan Ellen Mesinai



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Handl: Mats Foyer

TELEFAX

1999-03-01

Sid. 1 (5)

Dnr 110

aa
n

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: Ambassaden Riga (Magnusson)

EC

1999-03-02		
Avd. P	Gr 2	Mål Eu1

**Raoul Wallenberg - troféundersökningen. Brev från
Susanne Berger med Susan Mesinais kommentarer**

(1 bil.)

Insänder på Susan Mesinais begäran ett faxbrev från
Susanne Berger om troféundersökningen försett med
Susan Mesinais kommentarer.

HIRDMAN

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MD

MOSKVA 100-00-01

URGENT
FOR YOUR THOUGHT / 4
4 Pages

To: Susan Mesina c/o
Embassy of Sweden, Moscow

cc: Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Embassy of Sweden, Riga

From: S. Berger
1 703 237 0946 Tel/Fax

Date: February 28, 1999

Dear Susan,

Some comments about your letter re the "Trophy" proposal.

Dear Ambassador Lundvik: SB faxed me this in response to my comment on the Trophy which Anders urged me to forward to her even as I sent them to you. I have underlined what I consider to be significant issues. As it stands, this does not "supplement" the existing investigation. It does however make a contribution to the much deeper knowledge on the former Soviet archives. Don't know what else to say - as I have my own work. Yours truly SH

1. Very clearly the Russians are sensitive to any efforts to unnecessarily widen the scope of the investigation. The Trophy request therefore was focused very narrowly on the as of yet unresolved question of the possible reasons for RW's arrest and their potential implications for his later fate. While this goes somewhat beyond the basic task of establishing what happened to RW, it certainly was *not* designed to alter the focus of the ongoing investigation. As I have always said: "what" and "where" come first, but we need to keep the "why" in mind (as it applies at different stages). It is stated clearly in the proposal that the "Trophy" request is intended as a supplemental effort, intended to aid the other already begun investigations. This point should be clearly emphasized to the Russian side: That our investigation into one aspect of the "why" - the reasons (real or imagined) for RW's arrest - is intended to extract information that would be helpful with the prisoner file review and the Vladimir analysis. With that the focus remains squarely on establishing RW's whereabouts through the years and his ultimate fate.

We - for ourselves - should bear in mind that interest in the "Why" is *not* limited purely to "historical interest": Investigating certain aspects of the "Why" can serve as an important additional tool to unravel the question of RW's fate, especially when we are confronted with the type of difficulties we face in Russia. But I agree fully that we have to be mindful about how the Russians might perceive our approach. That is why we should downplay the "Why"-aspects of the "Trophy" request and emphasize its potential usefulness for the existing approach.

About adding a paragraph about the "Trophy" collection, as you suggest: As I have pointed out repeatedly, this request does not address a collection (in the Russian archives) which currently formally exists or is recognized as such. As a matter of fact, we *know* that ninety percent of the material we ask for does not officially exist in any accessible captured records collections of any Russian archive. That is why I have repeatedly emphasized that the request be not addressed simply to ROSarchive, but that it be phrased to concern "Captured (German) Records", most of which remain somewhere away from the beaten path. This approach was chosen after careful consideration of historical sources which identify what materials were captured by Red Army Forces and which of these records in turn probably ended up in Moscow. In addition, I consulted with Patricia Grimsted who has been very interested in identifying and finding these "missing" captured records in Moscow. In her studies she has had several opportunities to have direct access to Russian archival stacks. From years and years of

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ARE WE? *

(2) 4

gathering bits and pieces of information she has been able to draw up a list of those materials for which there exists evidence that they were withdrawn or separated from officially acknowledged collections. These withdrawn collections is what we are after, since they most likely contain the information we require. The "Trophy" request is in that regard quite bold, since it asks - for the most part - for materials that are known to exist, but have not been acknowledged.

The Russians can respond to this request by stating that nothing can be found in the "official" collections. If that is the case, then we will follow up with Grimsted's itemized list which should give enough evidence that the request material was at least at one point part of existing collections. The Russian side would then be asked to clarify where these missing parts have ended up. Or the Russian side makes some of the material available, in which case we will gratefully set to work.

This background scenario is the reason why I shied away from a more detailed paragraph on "Trophy" records as such.

2. Technically, of course, there is a distinction between Hungarian and German records. And I agree we should be as precise as possible. Even though as of March 1944 Hungary was German-occupied we should emphasize that we wish to study "Soviet captured records from Hungary" - both original Hungarian documentation as well as German records on these subjects. Much of the Hungarian material remained in Hungary, but important collections were forwarded to the Soviet Union - as far as the so-called experts can tell.

Another reason this point has remained sketchy is because we wanted to guard against making the proposal too long (which has been remedied by pursuing some original points under separate headings). I think the point on Separate Peace Initiatives could use some detail, such as precise date of the visits of the Hungarian delegation to Moscow, specific names, etc. The agencies and departments listed under the records of the various Hungarian governments were limited to those institutions which had direct contacts with RW and his organization or with the Swedish Legation, Budapest. Here we can be even more precise, if so desired.

3. Actually, I thought we had agreed to have you request access to the collection of 200,000 personnel files. Even though these are clearly captured records, this material is of direct interest to the prisoner file review and would be best studied by you (especially the finding aid). The wording of the point in this copy is unchanged from my original proposal which included the reference to "identifying foreign agents abroad" as an explanation to Hans why this collection was of interest to the Russians and where it was found (Werningerode). I thought that these types of references would be removed from the final draft but I guess we both overlooked them. The importance of this collection for your review is of course not the identification of (German) foreign agents abroad (although that might provide for a few surprises) but rather the fact that these are the full personnel files of 200,000 SS officials, some of whom served as agents abroad. Hopefully some of the individuals who were held captive with RW are part of these records - the index will tell. You can either hand in a list of names to be checked by Russian officials against the index or you can ask access to the index directly - whatever you consider best.

The problem is that this is something which evidently DOES exist in the Trophy and which could be of direct benefit - at least where the "Why" involves the "Who," we must see the index ASAP.

Hungarian papers under German administration could only possibly work up until mid-December. Given that the Hungarian government continued to function throughout the occupation - the daily real confiscation

4. Again, we have Hungarian papers under German administration. As stated earlier, even though this is GARF, the "Trophy" request is supposed to address captured records in general, not limited to those in ROSarchive. Beyond that, I agree with a separate request to GARF, concerning requests in addition to captured records. Let me know if you are preparing such a request - I have a few items for the list

⊗ Soviet,

These
the
basic
prisoner
list -
she has
a
copy.

5. I am not sure what you are talking about here. I have never seen the list of names that you handed in. As far as I understand it the names listed here refer to individuals who have some connection - directly or indirectly - to the RW case. Materials on these individuals was undoubtedly captured by the Red Army in Germany, in Hungary, and elsewhere. So send me your list of names. I agree that Olsen should be on the list (especially since there even appeared newspaper articles on him in Russia), and the other individuals you mention. I do not understand why Hatz would be taken off the list. The request concerns captured documentation on individuals, regardless of their "occupation". Unless you want to limit the requested material to specific categories, such as Jewish rescue.

6. and 7. I do not really know what you are referring to because I did not receive your full fax, but only pages 1-4 (there were seven pages altogether?)

8. About the intercepts: It is very clear that this is a rather sensitive issue. From the articles in the Canadian press it appears that the material to which the three Russian archivists in question had access were OKW field cables. The location of this find was supposedly the Presidential Archives. I tried to get more detail about the documentation in question as well as the individuals involved, but it was very difficult. One of the historians was definitely Volkogonov and from the description of one of the other men I believe another one was Besymenski.

We know that second-hand information like this has to be taken with a grain of salt, but at the very least it appeared to me that the issue of OKW field cables deserved to be further explored. I have pointed out to Hans that (Soviet) intercepts of German field cables are technically not a captured record and that a separate request to the Military Archives should be placed. We all agree that the Russians will be quite reluctant to hand over their own intercepts, although - it should be pointed out - that as a country that supposedly subscribes to international archive conventions such materials from 55 years ago are (with some limitations) is today standard part of other international archive collections. But never mind, that will get us nowhere.

However, there are other options; a) There may exist Russian reports on the information gathered from intercepted cables; b) actual copies of the texts of field cables may have been captured by advancing troops; and c) German intercepts of communication must be considered and those should be emphasized to the Russian side, together with point b).

Why can't she retrieve this material from Germany. The Germans as Mosgraffor stated copied almost everything and took it back. They are part of the archival exchange loop =

FEB-28-99 08:06 PM BERGER SUSANNE

703+237+0946

4/

Some general points about related issues:

It is very clear that the Russians had collected SOME information about RW at the time of his arrest. This information must have been in some way collected and analysed, and finally forwarded to the authorities who issued RW's arrest warrant. While the arrest of RW was probably due to a mix of real and imagined information, topped off with a good portion of paranoia, it nevertheless must be possible to determine to some extent what was known about RW, when it was known and by whom. Agent reports from Budapest may have mentioned him and reports containing this information must have been forwarded to certain places in the Soviet Bureaucracy. RW's arrest order was found in the Soviet Defense Ministry's Central Archive. (Fond 240, opis 2769). How thoroughly has the Working Group been able to analyse the surrounding context of that collection?

I will
not be
recomp
her

X I received a letter from Mr. P. from Moscow which includes, among other things, some additional information concerning our famous Fond 451. I have forwarded a copy of the letter by mail to Hans and I will give you a copy when we see each other. Based on what is outlined there, I think it may well be useful to ask the Russian side for follow-up on some specific "missing" items or incomplete answers to your questions in this Fond and related collections.

The request on materials concerning the Wallenberg family is currently limited to captured materials (by the Russians from occupied territories). We had discussed earlier a request for the Wallenberg family file as such. We should discuss if we want to limit ourselves currently to the captured material, to see what comes out of that. Right now this seems to me the best solution. If no material is turned over, however, we have the option to request the Family file as such, since we have quite a bit of evidence that such a collection does indeed exist. We would then have to decide on our argument of relevance to the investigation (which should not be too complicated).

This is one of the most DIRECT roads to what they know about Wallenberg + should be employed ASAP

→ You can reach me here in the U.S. until Wednesday. I am juggling scheduling difficulties with my four interviews in Germany and a (somewhat) unexpected job offer which I am seriously considering. This involves some soul searching, as you can imagine. I would be able - with some adjustments - to fulfill my planned research over the coming months, but it is nevertheless a big decision. Sometimes it is like that - Be careful what you wish for, you might get it!

Best wishes,

Susanne

* P.S. Just to "presumptively" calm you. P. knows nothing about your research or the other ongoing projects from me. My discussions with him are of a much more general nature.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-1

Sid. 1 (1)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

P 2 Eu¹

(EC)

Ambassaden Moskva

EXP 990302 CJ

BRÅDSKANDE

RW: Mesinai's genomgång av Lubjankas register

1999-03-02

Mesinai's begäran är sakligt väl motiverad, och ett försök att få gehör för den bör därför inte underlåtas. Tekniskt sett är det en komplicerad materia, och översättningen bör därför granskas noga och utnyttjas till att göra framställningen så tydlig som överhuvudtaget är möjligt.

Cabinet

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Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

February 25, 1999

Mr. Lage Olson, Ambassadrad
Ministry of Foreign Affairs -EI/ESEK
Government of Sweden
103 39 Stockholm

Delges:

Exp. chef, UD - EXPCH

Haggård, P-L

Billner, R S

56/006

exp. 99-02-26

g

Ew¹

VIA POUCH AND VIA FACSIMILE

Dear Lage:

I want to thank you for forwarding to me in New York the decision of the Financial/Legal Departments concerning my Consultancy on behalf of the Government of Sweden regarding the case of Raoul Wallenberg. I know that a great deal of work on your part and that of others has gone into defining my role and specifying the amount and manner in which I am to be paid for these services.

However, after conferring in Moscow with Ambassador Lundvik and Maj Anderssen, Office Manager of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, I have been urged to contact you immediately to request that this understanding be re-negotiated slightly and that certain amendments be introduced to this decision. For this reason, I would like to place three concerns before you and those in charge for your consideration.

The first is that the figure of 3000 U.S. dollars should be a net figure, as it was originally when I negotiated terms in early 1998. The introduction of taxes to the American government in July 1998, which was not a factor when we first agreed, diminished this net amount to 2250 US Dollars per month. I must ask that the net figure be restored to its original full value by raising the total salary and withholding the appropriate taxes to meet the requirements of the Swedish-American agreement. It would also be most helpful if this could extend retroactively to the beginning of the year 1999.

Secondly, the per diems -- for which I am most grateful -- are evidently also to be retroactive. I am preparing the necessary forms as far back as July 1998. Please let me know if this is sufficient or if you wish me to do all of 1998, in which case the receipts will have to be returned from Stockholm.

Thirdly, I would like to point out that while the agreement states that it extends only until June 30, 1999; in our official meetings in Stockholm (January 8, 1999) and Moscow (February 21-23, 1999) as well as in the letter from State Secretary Eliasson, the understanding is quite clearly that this work is expected to extend up until December 31, 1999. Even if I complete my data gathering by October 1st, I will still be completing computer studies and preparing my own final report during the rest of the Fall and until the New Year. Therefore, I think for the sake of unity of purpose it should be stated that the time period can be extended at the appropriate point.

Mr. Lage Olson/February 25, 1999

I think this will prove quite helpful in establishing the structure needed to enable me to complete my work successfully on behalf of the Government of Sweden. As always, I thank you for the special opportunity afforded me by this Consultancy and I will do my best to provide you with the results anticipated from my various proposals which have been approved by the Government of Russia.

With best wishes,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

Susan Ellen Mesinai

123 Bank Street (110)
New York, New York 10014-2188
U.S.A.

cc: Ambassador Jan Lundvik
Ambassador Hans Magnusson



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-04

1999 03 04

P 2 Eu¹

EC

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Moskva

exp 990304al

Eventuellt RW-minnesmärke

För Foyer och Wallberg

Jag har för Nina och Gunnar Lagergren redovisat vad som vid mötet på MID från rysk sida sades i fråga om ett minnesmärke, inklusive att avgörandet låg i familjens händer. Deras reaktion var följande:
Ett minnesmärke i Moskva ägnat Raoul Wallenbergs gärning som förkämpe för de mänskliga rättigheterna skulle vara välkommet. Det får emellertid inte ge intryck av att hans död betraktas som ett etablerat faktum. Så länge inte klarhet kring hans öde skapats är en minnessten på Donskojkyrkogården av typ István Bethlen därför inte önskvärd.

Tacksam detta framföres till MID som vår reaktion på Vinogradovs propå.

Cabinet

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Jul. 11 99-03-08

(Kopim as for 65m (new))

Lage Olson, EI/ESEK

To: LAGE OLSON
EI/ESEK

From: S. Berger
1 703 237 0946 Tel/Fax

Arlington, USA

Date: March 3, 1999

3 pages

Delges:

Magnusson, Rose 1/3

Mesinaï, Moskva

Lundvik, EC

Olson, EU-ESEK

exp-99-03-08

INF LTR 7 2

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1999 03 11

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Ho

Dear Mr. Olson,

P 2 Eu'

enclosed I am sending a fax addressed to Susan Mesinaï, which I for some reason was unable to fax to Moscow (the line failed continuously). The fax contains some additional comments about the recently ensued discussion of the "Trophy" material and you may want to give Hans Magnusson a copy, so he can see the full discussion (I believe Susan has forwarded the other communications to him).

I had to delay my departure for Europe due to scheduling difficulties with one of my prospective interview persons (he lives in the South of Germany; one of two interviews to be conducted there). I also have decided to accept a job offer here in Washington, D.C. The position starts full-time August 15, 1999, with some part time work to be concluded in the meantime. This means I will be able to conduct my research for the Working Group as planned, with limited follow-up after the month of August.

I still have not received payments of the invoices handed in some time ago. Could you check on what is holding up the payment? I have finally mailed to you partial invoices for the advance payment by the Foreign Offices for travel and research expenses. This covers the timeperiod of the January 1999 Working Group meeting in Stockholm. You can only reach me by fax or telephone, since our e-mail system has experienced a "catastrophic server failure" which will take some time to repair. Meanwhile we are unable to access e-mail messages.

Best wishes,

Susanne

Attention : Lage Olson, EI/ESEL

2/3

To: Susan Mesina **MESINA**
c/o Embassy of Sweden, Moscow

From: Susanne Berger
1 703 237 0946

Date: March 3, 1999

Re - "Trophy"

Dear Susan,

I have been thinking about the "Trophy" request. I think it is quite clear that Vinogradov is referring to the Foreign captured records in the "Special" Archives when he talks about the material being accessible in Germany. Quite a few groups of historians from different countries have been busy microfilming and copying the material. The problem is, that this material is merely the tip of the iceberg - and the wrong iceberg, for that matter.

Archives in Russia remind me of the Smithsonian - less than 10% of its holdings are on exhibit! Somehow in the next few days and in my travels I will sit down and outline for all of us what materials fall under the term "captured records", which materials we are interested in, which archives hold which captured records, etc. The problem that we are facing is that we are looking for what is considered "FOREIGN captured records", which are, in the words of Grimsted "displaced archives of other European nations, most of which had previously been seized by Nazi authorities. ..." According to a report by GAU NKVD Acquisition Department from August 1945 "documentary materials of foreign agencies" totaled half a million files and a million and a half special card files ... of agencies in Germany, Italy, Rumania, France, Poland and Hungary."

For most of these it is unclear where they are and what they contain to this day. There are no public finding aids, and in most cases no official acknowledgement that the material actually exists. Important material that had operational value was placed in special collections (such as the later so-called Special Archives), or was forwarded to the personal attention of certain individuals, such as in the case of the 200,000 personnel files which were sent to Beria. But even in the case of the Special Archives, we cannot remotely assume that we know everything that was ever held there.

As concerns the "Trophy" request specifically, one can start with some points which we definitely know exist, such as the 200,000 prisoner file collection. Also, oddly enough, the confiscated material on the Wallenberg family should be a relatively safe bet (in terms of existence of documentation), since that material must be contained in records confiscated from France and Eastern Germany (and there are strong rumors that such a collection indeed is available), probably in the Special Archives or in GA RF. That does not mean that the Russian side will happily turn the material over, but a good factual argument can be made here from our side.

Things get complicated when one heads to the German/Hungarian records, such as the records of Eichmann and his Staff. Much surely remained in Hungary, a great deal is available in Germany, yet clearly a great deal of important material was forwarded from Hungary to Russia. It is worthwhile to note that Russia was the only country which refused to hand over material on Eichmann for Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem.

313

Things become even more difficult with Kurt Becher and his Staff. We know that Becher's archive was confiscated in Budapest and there are witnesses who report that a large part of this archive was forwarded to Russia. Where are these records? These records can obviously not be duplicated elsewhere, so the Russians had an exclusive view on his dealings with those documents. The same thing is true for RW's confiscated materials. Etc., etc.

As I said, I think it will help all of us if I compile a precise list of what is officially available, of what is assumed/suspected to be available but not officially acknowledged and which collections appear to have been "removed" (Grimsted's list). I think too much was left to assumptions that each of us knew what the other person meant when we were discussing "captured records" / *trophy records*

I think the best thing will be to discuss the situation with Hans after his return, March 8, or so.

Until then,

Susanne

Attu : Lage Olson , EI / ESEU



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Sid. 1 (4)

1999-03-08

Utrikesdepartementet

EI-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Delges:

Lundvik, EC

P 2 Eu¹

(ESEK)

Ambassaden RIGA
Ambassaden MOSKV.

EX 990308/a

No

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

(1 bil.)

Den utomstående experten i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet Susanne Berger har översänt bifogade kommentarer avseende utkast till ansökan att få ta del av det tyska troféarkivet (ROS-arkiv) i Moskva.

Cabinet

Jul. 1999-03-08

(Kopieret for videresending)

2(4)

Lage Olson, EI/ESEK

To: LAGE OLSON
EI/ESEK

From: S. Berger
1 703 237 0946 Tel/Fax

Date: March 3, 1999

3 pages

Delges:

Magnusson, Rose

Mesinaï, Moskva

Lundvik, EC

Olson, EU-ESEK

exp-99-03-08

Dear Mr. Olson,

enclosed I am sending a fax addressed to Susan Mesinaï, which I for some reason was unable to fax to Moscow (the line failed continuously). The fax contains some additional comments about the recently ensued discussion of the "Trophy" material and you may want to give Hans Magnusson a copy, so he can see the full discussion (I believe Susan has forwarded the other communications to him).

I had to delay my departure for Europe due to scheduling difficulties with one of my prospective interview persons (he lives in the South of Germany; one of two interviews to be conducted there). I also have decided to accept a job offer here in Washington, D.C. The position starts full-time August 15, 1999, with some part time work to be concluded in the meantime. This means I will be able to conduct my research for the Working Group as planned, with limited follow-up after the month of August.

I still have not received payments of the invoices handed in some time ago. Could you check on what is holding up the payment? I have finally mailed to you partial invoices for the advance payment by the Foreign Offices for travel and research expenses. This covers the time period of the January 1999 Working Group meeting in Stockholm. You can only reach me by fax or telephone, since our e-mail system has experienced a "catastrophic server failure" which will take some time to repair. Meanwhile we are unable to access e-mail messages.

Best wishes,

Susanne

Attention : Lage Olson, EI / ESEL

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To: Susan Mesina **MESINA**
c/o Embassy of Sweden, ~~Moscow~~

From: Susanne Berger
1 703 237 0946

Date: March 3, 1999

re - "Trophy"

Dear Susan,

I have been thinking about the "Trophy" request. I think it is quite clear that Vinogradov is referring to the Foreign captured records in the "Special" Archives when he talks about the material being accessible in Germany. Quite a few groups of historians from different countries have been busy microfilming and copying the material. The problem is, that this material is merely the tip of the iceberg - and the wrong iceberg, for that matter.

Archives in Russia remind me of the Smithsonian - less than 10% of its holdings are on exhibit! Somehow in the next few days and in my travels I will sit down and outline for all of us what materials fall under the term "captured records", which materials we are interested in, which archives hold which captured records, etc. The problem that we are facing is that we are looking for what is considered "FOREIGN captured records", which are, in the words of Grimsted "displaced archives of other European nations, most of which had previously been seized by Nazi authorities. ..." According to a report by GAU NKVD Acquisition Department from August 1945 "documentary materials of foreign agencies" totaled half a million files and a million and a half special card files ... of agencies in Germany, Italy, Rumania, France, Poland and Hungary."

For most of these it is unclear where they are and what they contain to this day. There are no public finding aids, and in most cases no official acknowledgement that the material actual exists. Important material that had operational value was placed in special collections (such as the later so-called Special Archives), or was forwarded to the personal attention of certain individuals, such the in the case of the 200,000 personnel files which were sent to Beria. But even in the case of the Special Archives, we cannot remotely assume that we know everything that was ever held there.

As concerns the "Trophy" request specifically, one can start with some points which we definitely know exist, such as the 200,000 prisoner file collection. Also, oddly enough, the confiscated material on the Wallenberg family should be a relatively safe bet (in terms of existence of documentation), since that material must be contained in records confiscated from France and Eastern Germany (and there are strong rumors that such a collection indeed is available), probably in the Special Archives or in GA RF. That does not mean that the Russian side will happily turn the material over, but a good factual argument can be made here from our side.

Things get complicated when one heads to the German/Hungarian records, such as the records of Eichmann and his Staff. Much surely remained in Hungary, a great deal is available in Germany, yet clearly a great deal of important material was forwarded from Hungary to Russia. It is worthwhile to note that Russia was the only country which refused to hand over material on Eichmann for Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem.

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Things become even more difficult with Kurt Becher and his Staff. We know that Becher's archive was confiscated in Budapest and there are witnesses who report that a large part of this archive was forwarded to Russia. Where are these records? These records can obviously not be duplicated elsewhere, so the Russians had an exclusive view on his dealings with those documents. The same thing is true for RW's confiscated materials. Etc., etc.

As I said, I think it will help all of us if I compile a precise list of what is officially available, of what is assumed/suspected to be available but not officially acknowledged and which collections appear to have been "removed" (Grimsted's list). I think too much was left to assumptions that each of us knew what the other person meant when we were discussing "captured records" *Trophy records*

I think the best thing will be to discuss the situation with Hans after his return, March 8, or so.

Until then,

Susanne

Attu : Lage Olson , EI / ESEU

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (1)

1999-03-09

Aambs A. Wallberg

a a
R

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

EC

Kopia: UD-EI (Olson) rekryfax amb Riga

**Re Raoul Wallenberg - positivt besked rörande
Vladimir**

1. Kortjunov på MID ringde idag Wallberg och meddelade att det ryska justitieministeriet nu tagit ställning till ambassadens begäran från i december 1998 om tillstånd att avsluta arkivundersökningen avseende registerkorterna i Vladimir-fängelset, och att man beslutat att gå den svenska sidan till mötes.

Ett par praktiska frågor återstod emellertid att lösa. Till att börja förfogade den till Justitieministeriet överförda Huvudstyrelsen för kriminalvård (GUIN) inte över några för ändamålet lediga lokaler. Nikisjkin (MVD) var nu i färd med att undersöka möjligheterna att tillhandahålla ett rum vid MVD:s arkivcentrum där Prosofts personal skulle kunna genomföra bearbetningen av arkivmaterialet. Hyran för detta rum skulle enligt Nikisjkin uppgå till ca 1000 USD/månad. Anlitandet av vakter och övervakningspersonal skulle vidare medföra en kostnad på ca 250 USD/månad.

2. Wallberg kommer på fredag att träffa Prosofts representant Tjebanov för att utröna huruvida utgifterna för lokalhyra och övervakningspersonal täcks av det arvode ambassaden erlagt i förskott för arbetet eller om detta innebär merkostnader.

HIRDMAN



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Sid. 1

1999-03-09

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Budapest

P 2 Eu¹

EC

Exp 990309/HG

För ambassadören från Lundvik re samtal om Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest

Såsom tidigare aviserat kommer jag att ha hela vecka 12 (22-27.3) till förfogande för samtal om RW och hans verksamhet i Ungern. De ämnen jag är primärt intresserad av är följande:

1. István Bethlen och general Deseö och det sätt varpå de kunde spåras. Övriga ungerska fångar i sovjetiska fängelser.
2. Den verksamhet som övriga neutrala beskickningar bedrev 1944-45.
3. Den provisoriska regeringen i Debrecen vid denna tid och de radiosändningar (Kossuth Radio) som bedrevs därifrån.
4. Det första ungerska sändebudet i Stockholm efter kriget Vilmos Böhm.
5. Röda Korsets verksamhet inklusive Valdemar Langlet.
6. Géza Soos och den ungerska motståndsrörelsen.

Om Martonyi kan ta emot Dig och mig den veckan ger jag gärna en redovisning av den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppens verksamhet och framför en hemställan om generellt stöd från ungersk sida. I övrigt är jag som tidigare nämnts intresserad av att träffa Deseö, Nanofvszky och Pók (och ev. andra historiker som inriktat sig på denna tid), vidare Péter Bajtay, Ernő Lazarovits, nuntien för samtal om Angelo Rottas verksamhet (med Fernando talar jag om spanska legationens dito), Susan Cartwright och Higgie samt någon företrädare för de politiska fångarnas organisation (med den har jag haft vissa kontakter men namnen har fallit mig ur minnet). Om ni kan åstadkomma ett program i ungefärligen denna ordningsföljd vore jag mycket tacksam. Vi anländer den 20.3 kl 12.25 med MA 761.

Cabinet

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103 39 STOCKHOLM
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Telefon
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E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
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Telex
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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (11)

1999-03-10

Aambs A. Wallberg

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu 1

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia:

amb Riga

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds brev från Susan Mesinai avseende hennes delundersökning i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet.

HIRDMAN

March 8, 1999

10 Pages
More to follow

2

CIPHERFAX TO: Ambassador HANS MAGNUSSON in Riga
FROM: Susan Mesinai in Moscow

Dear Hans. I had mentioned to you at various meetings that BBC had aired a film showing documents from GARF related to correspondence between Vladimir and Moscow Central on Numbered Prisoners. When I came back and checked, I learned that the program has not yet been aired. Upon contacting the producer for permission to discuss this matter, he told me that for various reasons they have not used this footage and he is saving it for me for when I get to London.

Of even more interest he also sent me the message that while the filming was going in, he browsed around in that section of the archives and came across a registry of incoming prisoners from the end of the War. This registry was particularly directed to Beria. One of the archivists came, saw what he was doing and took it out of his hands, saying that it wasn't yet declassified.

He said he didn't have time to look through it enough to know if it was relevant to Wallenberg. But given our mutual interest in Beria and as a way of confirming how strong a hand/active interest he had in such prisoners, this would be very important. It would also be quite interesting to see who is reporting this to him...Is it Abakumov? Or a certain department of the Third Main Directorate? Or from the Second, etc.

I send this news to you by alternative communication system because I think we should understand that the documents we need to have a clearer understanding of not only numbered prisoners but the choice of special prisoners still exist. I say this also in terms of the Oggins. I was comparing the Oggins Russian document with the Smoltsov and with the Okulicki, for no particular reason. But when I look at the page numbers I now find it very hard to believe that these pages are being coughed up at random. Someone is making this selection and I would assume handing it down because I also find it hard to believe that anyone in the room is that knowledgeable about this case. But maybe I am wrong.

Anyway personally speaking I am going to proceed on the assumption that the materials needed do exist and not the opposite. This will not make any major difference in my outward performance -- I will still be doing my 'reconstruction' process (translate Perestroika, how funny) of compiling lists of only the most necessary elements needed. But I will not bend so readily or feel so sympathetic, when we already know that a portion of what we seek is sitting in GARF.

It goes without saying that access to this material in GARF is an immediate next step. But how shall we proceed with that? It would require special handling I think. What do you think?

Hope your holiday was a good one and not interrupted too much by my work. Best,
Susan.

Susan

① Attached please find my re-write of the remaining files on the original list and their current value.

Revised, revised list (shorter, stronger) and reconstructed Butyrka list to follow. Tomorrow Registration Data

FILES NOT SHOWN US FROM THE ORIGINAL LIST.

The following files, which we have not yet seen, were on the Original List of those agreed to between the Swedish and Russian sides. I have noted those who claim to be actual witnesses to Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the GULAG (W) or are alleged to be (AW), those who are secondary witnesses (2W), those who are known to have worked with him in some capacity during his mission in Budapest (C), and those whose names were submitted as analogues (A). While it was understood that I would not see all of the files, there was never any sense that I would see approximately only half. This is crippling to the results which could be achieved if we were given access to the personal files of the full body of witnesses.

The Russian side should be apprised of two things. The first is that I have been informed by State Secretary Jan Eliasson that during his meeting in December 1998 with Deputy Foreign Minister Alveyev, the Deputy Foreign Minister stated he was 'unaware that there was any problem regarding the prisoner files.' The Swedish side also was unaware until the meeting of last week -- when Mr. Nikishkin said quite categorically that we had 'seen all the files that we were going to see.'

As I mentioned at the meeting of February 22, Stefan Gullgren had specifically requested that we be informed of any file that we cannot see, in writing, with the reason why. Everyone looked to me to waive that consideration which, of course, I am inclined to do because of the immense work load we all face over the next several months. However, in view of such high level assurances and specific diplomatic requests, not to mention the fact that I and my entire team were asked to put in writing the names of the files we had seen -- I do not think that this matter can be resolved satisfactorily by a conversation between Mr. Nikishkin and myself. It must be dealt with on a much higher level. This is all the more the case since the jurisdiction over these files may now have shifted in their entirety to the Ministry of Justice.

I would like to state that I am prepared to review these files one by one as they are found, but given the large number of witnesses involved, it would be a tragic mistake to attempt to ignore their importance to this work. The comments below are in addition to the information presented originally in January of 1996.

ANGELIS, Maxmillian (1889). Appears on a number of significant lists, including the FSB recent answer that he was among those sent to Butyrka on March 30/31, 1950, and therefore cannot be discarded.

ALTER, Viktor. Analogous case to a prisoner declared dead prior to his actual execution date. Also involved with the Joint. As in the case of Oggins, we need to know place and time of death, method of execution, by whose decision and so on.

BAJ, Bagoslav (sp?). Of the Polish prisoners in Bratsk who claim to have met with Raoul Wallenberg in a camp near Angara in the late 40s, early 50s, the testimony of BAJ is the most known in the West. The failure to produce this file which completes the series has been regarded with some suspicion.

BAYER, Friedrich. 2W. Information as to his camp and prison history has been given us from SAPO (See attached) He was held from July 1944 until March 1945 in Camp 53, Tula, from April 1945 - December 1946 in Camp 27/III Krasnogorskö from December 1946 - 48 in a special camp near Suchumi; from December 1948 to May 1949 in Lefortova; from May 1949 to June 1951 in Karaganda and from then until his release in December 1953 was held in Karabas. Bayer is a witness to the report of Tank Commander Helmut Schneider that he sat with Wallenberg in a Moscow prison at the turn of the year when allegedly Wallenberg refused to accept or sign his sentence and was beaten. Bayer reported this information when released to the West. This report has been confirmed also from other sources. (Both prison and camp history please).

BENTIVEGNI, Franz. As cellmate to Hatz from whom he claims to have learned of Wallenberg, as counterpart to Gerstenberg, important Abwehr chief potentially connected to and apprised of all Balkans operations, suffered some form of nervous breakdown -- therefore significant in terms of combined prison and medical records.

BERGER, Lazar. Witness. Ukrainian Jew who claims to have met Wallenberg in the bath house of Vladimir Prison at a time when in an emergency fire prisoners were let out into a more common area. Berger also knew who were the other prisoners with knowledge of Wallenberg, which tallies with information given to Marvin Makinen while at Vladimir. This witness has re emerged as important through testimony recently given over directly to Ambassador Magnusson in Riga.

BETHLEN, Istavan. C, A, W, 2W. The MVD claims that they do not have this file. Does the FSB? If it is reported missing, what does that mean and what are the possibilities of finding it? Was it given over -- in the original or as a copy -- to the Hungarians? Please note that Bethlen was in many respects a colleague of Wallenberg in Budapest. As Bethlen reportedly died in 1946, this file is also very important in a positive sense to evaluating the Soviet claim that Wallenberg died in 1947. It has again become an issue because of the re-reading of certain interviews by Otto Danielsson, SAPO Chief, regarding Barratt, Katona, etc. in which a certain Karoly-Katona reported that Bethlen and Wallenberg were both held in a camp within 100 kilometers of Moscow, which was not Krasnogorsk. This fact must be verified or denied.

BOGDANOS, Antonas. AW. Lithuanian Fascist held in camp, possibly near Perm, in Kazan and for many years in Sychovka whose name has been associated with early reports of Wallenberg in mental hospitals. Ms. Mesinai and team has seen his prisoner patient card at Sychovka and can attest to Bogdanos' long term detention in that facility near Smolensk. This file is important also because of a new sighting related to Baltic prisoners, many of them Fascists, held in a special camp which was eventually closed because of an uprising. The witness states that Wallenberg was there along with certain Baltic diplomats. This new report from an inmate there verifies earlier reports from a completely different source that say Wallenberg and

5

Bogdanos were shipped to Kazan after this uprising. Requesting: prisoner and medical files

DEMESCO, Michael. 2W. Mr. Vinogradov is of the misconception that the only reason we have been requesting this file is that he was a friend of Marvin Makinen in labor camp in the early 60s. The Russian side should be informed that I was the first to hear through Michael Demesco's son that his father had told him information regarding Wallenberg's detention in the Soviet Gulag in the 40s. Follow up conversations with others whom Demesco met in the Gulag later repatriated have proven fruitful enough that it is imperative to review this file. I should point out that we now have even stronger reasons to believe that Demesco worked in some capacity for the OSS during the War, which as a dual national could have placed him under some suspicion as a possible American agent in the USSR. Furthermore, Demesco was held in Moscow prisons approximately at the same time as Wallenberg and yet went on to be held captive in a number of labor camps where others considered American spies were detained. This route is of importance to us. Finally, Demesco died in an internat outside Kursk. As we face the possibility that Wallenberg under another name, essentially 'lost in the Gulag', may have been processed into the 80s with a fate that could include an internat, we need to acquaint ourselves with the kind of paper work which is used to effect that. This case will enable us to do that.

Please note that I have been given a power of attorney by Mrs. Yelena Demesco, wife of Michael Demesco, whom I assisted in bringing to the United States as a refugee to review this file. I have received the same from her son Victor.

HAMMERSCHMIDT, Franz. As this prisoner died in the Leningrad Special Prison Hospital, his file must be there. We are requesting it both through the Ministry of Health and the MVD as it is unclear who controls the file. **Analogous. File useful to establish routing in such a case. Important also because his name appears on certain short lists in response to queries on our part.**

HJELD, Harold. (1916) **Witness or Alleged Witness**. Swedish Finn held in Verchne Uralsk, 1952, either claiming or alleged to claim that he met Raoul Wallenberg there.

HOCHLI, Jakob. 2dary **Witness**. Swiss citizen also known as . Worked with Emil Brugger for the CIC, and arrested and processed with him. One source of the eyewitness report that Wallenberg was brought to Vladimir Prison at the same time as Shulgin and held in the medical ward with him, an event which occurred July 22, 1947. Also speaks of discussions between the various prisoners on Wallenberg in one of the larger cells. Trying to recreate this group to follow the line of reporting....

JAKOBSSON, Rafael Saulovich . AW. Estonian doctor and prisoner, treated at Magnitogorsk Hospital where he reportedly encountered Wallenberg, told by a fellow prisoner from Verchne Uralsk.. Later Jakobssen was a prisoner at Vladimir, arriving at approximately the same time as the so called Kupryanov sighting of Wallenberg returning from Verchne Uralsk

KALINSKI, Abram M. (1912). AW, 2W. Mr. Vinogradov has described Kalinski as a false witness, a view many share. However, it is noted that in all of his reports there is at least 1/3 truth, sometimes as much as 2/3. It is therefore necessary to put his claims to the 'acid test' -- not to eliminate them all together but to see if what portion of these reports can be useful. Also, it should be noted that Heinz Pannwitz, in his debriefing upon his release to the West, refers to Kalinski with whom he shared a cell in Moscow in 1951 as an agent provocateur for the Soviet intelligence services. Is this in fact why I cannot see his file?

KAPLAN, Jan. Witness. This eyewitness report is from the Seventies and deemed credible by a number of officials in the West, independent of any role Kalinski and others may have had in stirring up trouble through the use of it. There can be no completed investigation without a careful evaluation of the claim brought forth by Jan Kaplan. As published in the West, this claim mistakenly referred to Butyrka medical services. Conversations with members of the family would indicate that Kaplan was in Kholm-Yu at the time the encounter was to have taken place. Nothing can be done until we see his file and ascertain his whereabouts throughout his sojourn in the Gulag.

KRUMINSCH, Zigurds Ernestovich (1927). Witness and 2ndary Witness, that is he reported to Marvin Makinen during his detention in Vladimir that there was an elderly Swede down the hall. He also knew who else was aware of the presence of this prisoner. Kruminsch was said by another prisoner to 'have sat with all the important prisoners, including Powers.' These sightings date from the late 50s, early 60s and therefore potentially cross-reference with the Myasnikow/Svartz discussion about Wallenberg's health, with some allusion to Vladimir. **IMPORTANT NOTE:** Ambassador Magnusson and/or his colleague have checked with the authorities of Kruminsch's mother country and has been informed that Kruminsch's file is not with them.

CUMISH, Wilfred. American. Witness. Held in Vladimir in the 50s where he reportedly shared an isolation cell with Langfelder from time to time. Besides describing Langfelder quite accurately, physically speaking, he made the comment -- according to recently noted materials in the Swedish files -- that whenever Voss came into the cell, Langfelder went out....This happened evidently more than once, to such a degree that the prisoner found it noteworthy. We are therefore requesting the file of Voss, Erich Hans (a cellmate in Lefortovo and Internal with Schlitter and Kitschmann and possibly at some point with Langfelder as well. See Below) in conjunction with this. (NOTE: While this name did not appear on the Original List, it has appeared on subsequent requests to the archivists along with that of Voss. Technically speaking, it belongs on the Revised List).

KUPRYANOV, Gennadi N. (1905). Alleged witness. Said by others to have seen Wallenberg, both in the dental facilities at Vladimir and en route from Verchne Uralsk to Vladimir. This could apply to dates in 1952 and in 1954 both. **Possible Contact:** Noting the signature on the Top Secret cipher regarding Wallenberg's arrest in

Budapest stating that there should be no further contact between him and the outside world., we would like to determine whether or not this is the same Kupryanov.

LAUFER, Franz. W or 2W. Claims to be witness in Verchne Uralsk. Also, possible contact through Budapest.

MAREK, Ferdinand. **Analogy** unless he had similar intelligence contacts in the Balkans to Raoul Wallenberg, Gflorener or others. Originally this file was chosen because Marek was an Austrian diplomat to Czechoslovakia, arrested by Smersh presumably on similar charges as Wallenberg -- namely Nazi collaboration. It was said that he had provided the Germans with certain forms of information as a favor to protect his Jewish wife and daughter. It is however of concern that Marek may have been helping the Western Allied intelligence even as he gathered information for the Germans from contacts in the Balkans. Given that Marek is said to have died in May of 1947, we wish to see his file and medical history to determine the real charges against him, his cell occupancy and cell mates, under whose jurisdiction he was kept, when he was interrogated and by whom, and the circumstances leading up to his death.

MAYR, Josef (1920). **Witness.** This file was requested because information which Otto Schoggl brought out to the West may have originated or apply rather to Mayr who told a similar story as coming from his own experience. Mayr was a prisoner at Vladimir. This file is also important to the study of the Corpus II Medical concerns for Vladimir.

MELTZER, Menachem (1907). **Witness.** Doctor who reported to the authorities that he treated a Raoul in Khalmer-Yu who was in good condition, not suffering from a heart attack. While this sighting is from before the Gromyko Memorandum, it nonetheless resonates with Kaplan's later claim of having met Wallenberg in a medical clinic, presumably -- judging from Kaplan's detention history as we understand it from his family -- from Khalmer Yu.

MENSHAGIN, Boris G. (1902 or 1909). **Analog and possible Witness.** Menshagin, witness to the truth of the Katyn Forest Massacre, was a numbered prisoner at Vladimir (Number) for decades and when finally released was sent to an internat in the Archangel region where he died. As Wallenberg was said to have been collecting information regarding atrocities, not only to Jews but all minorities, and as Victor Bondor has written in his book that Wallenberg received information from him and his associates on Katyn, this makes Wallenberg and Menshagin in a circle unto their own. Until we can resolve the question of whether or not Wallenberg was in Vladimir -- as has been indicated by the testimonies of Kruminsch, Berger, Vorovei, Makinen, Terelya, Razkalns, Brugger, and -- according to other parties -- Gogiberidse -- the file of Menshagin remains very important to us as a related prisoner and as a numbered prisoner.

MERKIS, Anton and his wife. While we have seen the file of Hedimin Merkis, son of Anton, this is of secondary importance since he was not an actual Baltic leader. We need to see the father's file also to achieve a clearer idea of the movements of the

Merkis family during the years between the point where they were taken into custody until their appearance in Vladimir in 1952. We have no sense whatsoever of their interrogation schedules as numbered prisoners. Are numbered prisoners subject to the same rules of prolongation of custody or can they in fact be permitted to languish for long periods of time without any investigative inquiry? Also, one of the many Prisoner Number One cards at Vladimir would suggest that it was Merkis? Was he Prisoner Number One at Lubyanka and at Ivanovo? This would be all the more important when we see that Merkis, on a card that both names him and lists him as Prisoner Number 4, and Prisoner Number One, presumably Hungarian 'American spy' came into Vladimir on the same date in May 1952. Were they processed together and if so, for how long?

MULLE HORST, Theodor (1911). I have lately seen this listed as MUELLER HORST, Theodor. 2ndary W to Wallenberg's presence at Vladimir.

MUNTHERS, Vilhelm (1898). **Analogous Case and Possible Witness.** As a Baltic leader and numbered prisoner, this case like that of Merkis may be analogous to the case of Wallenberg if he lived past his alleged death date of 1947. This case has become all the more important because we have recently received a sighting related to a camp where Balts were held, and RW, that specifically mentions Munthers as well. That is to say, Wallenberg was presented as a diplomat 'like Munthers.' This report is sufficiently detailed and credible to require checking.

RADO, SANDOR. FSB has been kind enough to state that the investigation file of Rado contains no information on Wallenberg. My interest in this case is, for the moment, twofold: 1) to determine if Rado is the Rado who met with Wallenberg in Budapest in October 1944, just before the fall of the Horthy government, and 2) to determine if Rado was linked with those Hungarians who did have a connection with British intelligence and who helped shape Wallenberg's mission, namely Vilmos Bohm and Andre Gellert.

In a 1956 debriefing of Heinz Pannwitz after his return from the GULAG, which I recently found in the American National Archives, there is a brief section on Rado which reads as follows: *'By tapping the wires the German radio counter intelligence received numerous messages which the radio agent of 'Red 3' had radioed from Switzerland to Moscow. A large number of these messages could be deciphered. Pannwitz asserted, however, that about 450 messages could not be deciphered because the applicable codebook could not be found....Pannwitz allegedly concluded from interrogations in Moscow that RADO, the head of 'Red 3', was a member of the British Royal Society for Geography' (a fact which is well known) 'According to the Russians' statements, RADO was in London on several occasions during the War.'*

If the Russian side would examine its investigation file for RADO or related materials for Red 3 and determine whether or not RADO made any secret or otherwise trips to Hungary during the German occupation and if so when and for what purpose; whether or not he made trips to London and when; and whether or not he had any relatives working in Hungary in connection with him and, if so, who and under what circumstances -- I would appreciate it. If Wallenberg is not mentioned, it would

be nonetheless helpful to establish who Rado's contacts were in England and in Hungary so that research can be conducted in the West to determine if there was a link between London and Stockholm, if not directly between Switzerland and Budapest.

It would also be relevant to study RADO's file for possible mention of NOEL FIELD, an American Communist refugee worker connected with Dulles and the OSS, who was making trips into Hungary during that time period.

RIVO, Zoltan (1921). **Witness.** While the MVD was so kind as to show me the file of Rivo in exile, they did not provide the information needed to help confirm Rivo's knowledge of Wallenberg's presence in either Lefortovo or Butyrka Prisons after 1947. The information which FSB gave to us that Rivo was interrogated on July 22, 1947 combined with later information that, like Di Mohr, he was among those to be transferred from Lefortovo Prison to Butyrka at the end of March or first week in April 1950 only adds to the seriousness of this request. In addition to his file, we would welcome the opportunity to reconstruct his cell history in Moscow prisons in any form.

RODE, Gunnar O. (1934). **2ndary Witness to Wallenberg in the early 70s.** It is my understanding however that Rode was arrested in the 40s and so was a long term prisoner, not repatriated before his term was complete as a result of amnesty, and therefore his movements would be of great assistance to us in understanding the routing of long term prisoners.

RODDE, Wilhelm. **Witness or Alleged Witness.** Rodde was a cellmate of Richter either just before or during the period when most of the witnesses were called in for interrogation regarding Wallenberg and Langfelder. He either was a witness or claimed to be a witness. CHECK THIS SUSAN.

SHIMKEVICH, Andre (alternatively _____). **Witness.** Check to see if this is who sat with in on This could provide us with the correct spelling.

SZAKACS, Janos. (1902). Alternatively, SOKETS according to Grossheim Krisko whose cellmate he was believed to be for many years. Hungarian Commercial Attache. The pairing of SOKETS and Grossheim-Krisko is of interest to us, inasmuch as Grossheim Krisko was an employee at the Swedish Legation in Budapest during the Wallenberg period, charged with economic and military connections with the Germans. Was his cellmate in the same or related business(es)? Did this have any bearing on Jewish rescue?

TERELYA, Josef. **Witness and 2ndary Witness.** Recent and earlier interviews of other witnesses would indicate that Terelya was already speaking of his alleged encounter with Wallenberg to other prisoners in the Gulag many years prior to his release. In addition, he -- like other prisoners with a deep interest in Wallenberg -- took it upon himself to collect other eyewitness reports. While Terelya has been discredited as 'crazy' and indeed he spent a sojourn in Serbsky among other facilities,

his testimony is proving more and more in keeping with other reports. This file is very important to us in terms of this case.

UEBEL, Adam. Witness who claims to have knocking contact with a prisoner who might have been Wallenberg in Vladimir. This report is needed to compare it also with that of Brugger, in order to check more precisely the facts.

VON DUFVING, Theodor. Witness to meeting a Swedish diplomat matching Wallenberg's description at a transit depot in Kirov in February of 1949. Besides the detail of description and interesting manner in which the report was put forth, this sighting conforms to that of two other sources that we know about and therefore must be checked.

WINTER VON SCHWAB, VON SCHWAB OR WINTER, Rudolph Heydrich. (1919) Witness was evidently arrested during the post-War period when he worked for American counter intelligence along lines similar to the work of Brugger, Hochli and one of the Helmut Schneiders. From the West it is now appearing that this prisoner was of a certain value and there are intimations that he was returned through an exchange of valuables for his person. Because he was arrested during the Post War period, he did not follow the same route as the German prisoners of war but like Brugger ended up in Verchne Uralsk as a remote prison for other special intelligence cases of interest. We do have a prisoner card for Winter von Schwab from Vladimir. Our primary interest in him is through the Verchne Uralsk period but as he has testified that he was sent back to Moscow during that time, the ins and outs of this would help us be more specific about the time period involved in his two reported meetings with Wallenberg. This sighting should be cross referenced with Kalinski, Hjeld, and Jacobsson.

VOROBEL, Vasilii Feodorovich. Witness. According to Mr. Nikishkin, Vorobei was sent to an internat in the Mordov Region where his file may also be. We urge the Russian side to pursue this lead to its fullest as Vorobei was acknowledged by a number of other witnesses and secondary witnesses to have direct knowledge of Wallenberg. In addition to tracking down Mr. Vorobei's file, we would like to know whether he was sent to the internat in Mordov directly from a camp in the Mordov region (where he was known to have been in the 60s and 70s ???) or was he sent there from the Vladimir Region, thus terminating his relation with the authorities of Vladimir. To which internat was he sent and through which office was this transfer made? Given that Jankowski, just prior to his death, was to have been sent to an internat in Mordov in 1953 as a form of exile, I would like to define the route of transfer of aging prisoners from Vladimir through the authorities of Mordov SSR to the appropriate internat.

WOLFIN, Isaac Markovitch (1913). Possible Witness and Possible Source of Eyewitness Sightings. While we are waiting for the file of Wolfin, Isaac to be found, I repeat the question placed in my Preliminary Report Number One. That is, did Wolfin emigrate from Russia to the United States as his family has indicated to us? If so, on what date did he turn in his internal passport? I need to know this in order to track him through the American immigration authorities. If he did not emigrate, was

11

he also sent to an internat type place for his retirement as in the case of Demesco, whose family was told he had left for America but ended up in an internat near Kursk? In short, what happened to Isaac Markovitch Wolfin? If he is alive, we want to speak with him.

WYNNE, Greville. **Witness.** Wynne who was released/exchanged claimed to have encountered a man on the exercise roof at Lubyanka which he reported to Marvin Makinen. At some point he concluded that this person must have been Wallenberg, or so he told John Bierman in his book on Wallenberg. We would like permission to use the registries to identify all the time periods that Wynne was held in Lubyanka during his detention, even if for a day and a night.

YAOSHA, Shun (1894). We are looking for the Japanese prisoner who sat with Roedl in an attempt to follow his fate.

VOLKOV. While we understand the authorities feels there is no reason for us to see Volkov's file at this point, I would be interested in a break down of his interrogation schedule -- date, prison, interrogator, jurisdiction body and times from his arrest until his sentencing -- to compare it with that of a few other prisoners whose files I have seen. I think one should also bear in mind the importance of Turkey as a neutral nation during the War and the various transactions, whether related to separate peace, the safe passage of Jews, the sale of critical materials and a very important exchange of intelligence information. Thank you.

REVISED LIST. INFORMATION ON NAMES.

KATON or KATONA, Alexander. **The FSB has acknowledged this to be a related case (as opposed to analogous) but have been unable to find files or materials related to this name, other than his appearance in the registry for July 1947.** Please be advised that Katon, A. is moved into Cell Number 156 Lefortovo to become a cellmate for Gerstenberg and Spalke on July 4 1945 per order 2nd Department Smersh. In the Gerstenberg file, Page 69, it states that the original order to move Katon into this cell in the file of Schmidt Durmond. Schmidt Durmond or Schmidt Dumond appears in the file of Beckerle, Pages 125 and 130, where he is mentioned during the December 1946 time period. It is our hope that the Russian side will make full use of this information to try to build some sort of profile for Katon's presence in the Moscow prisons.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (9)

1999-03-10

Aambs A. Wallberg

aa
fr

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu 1

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia:

amb Riga

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

1998-03-10

(1 D11.)

Bifogat översänds bilaga till åberopade
avseende Susan Mesinais delundersökning i
Wallenberg-ärendet.

HIRDMAN

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSING
BUTYRKA REGISTRY FOR THE DATES
March 30/31, 1950 - April 8, 1950

It has been established through our analysis of the prisoner files studied to date that almost all of the witnesses to Wallenberg during the 1945-47 Moscow prison period (who had not already been sentenced and forwarded to camp or to Vladimir) crossed over from Lefortovo Prison to Butyrka Prison on March 30/31 or on April 5, 1950. These include such Wallenberg or Langfelder cellmates as Richter, Schlitter, Huber, Loyda, Hille, Pelkonen, Kitschman, and Hofstetter as well as those who knew Wallenberg in Budapest (Hatz, Gfrorener, and Grossheim-Krisko -- then known as Tomson). These include or could include others who had wall tapping contact with Wallenberg in Lefortovo or who are said by others to have knowledge of Wallenberg or Langfelder in Moscow prisons (Jansci, Skozacs or Soket, Bentivegni, Rivo, Di Mohr, Rodde, and Bergmann, Shyler, among others.)

In those files which we were able to examine, we could determine the registration numbers appointed them upon arrival at Butyrka. These numbers are apparently part of a series which, from our limited data, seemed to include some fifty prisoners. However, since our discovery of this important transition point, a re-examination of the file of Grossheim-Krisko, then Tomson, showed that in his original testimony in German (attached), Grossheim-Krisko testified that on that date between 100 and 110 prisoners passed to Butyrka and that he was convinced that Raoul Wallenberg was among them.

For this reason, we have repeatedly asked the Russian side to produce the incoming registry for that period for Butyrka Prison, including this specific series of prisoner registration numbers so that we could with ease ascertain who exactly constituted this group. From such a registry we could readily see if Wallenberg was among them (if his name appeared) or if a name had been crossed off or if there remain registration numbers which have been skipped, indicating that Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder or another secret prisoner could have been sent across in enforced (or heavily isolated) convoy.

As the MVD has as yet failed to find this registry and while we await some documentation to verify the destruction of such an important journal, I have taken it upon myself to reconstruct as best possible a list of those who actually or whom we would expect to make up this special group whose investigation under the Third Main Directorate was now complete and they were being passed to the Second Main Directorate (MVD) for pre-sentencing and sentencing. (Most -- if not all -- of the prisoners known to us were sentenced in 1951 or 1952.)

Because time is of the essence, I am asking the Russian side to produce the incoming registration numbers for Butyrka prison for each of the parties whose name appears below if they arrived between the dates of March 30/31, 1950 and April 8th 1950. If they have died or were sentenced earlier or arrived at a later date, this should be noted. As some of these prisoners were first in Butyrka in 1944 or 1945, then went to

Lubyanka/Lefortovo, the earlier arrival is not of interest to us because it was under a different registration number. For the time being, we are only interested in those who constituted this particular series.

The names which appear below have been in large part compiled from the files we have seen or eyewitness testimony of those whom we know to have crossed from Lefortovo to Butyrka at that time. Most of these are cellmates or for other closely related reasons appear on lists, particularly (but not limited to) those of the 4th Department Third Main Directorate under Kartashov. For the most part, they either sat with or traded cells with such individuals. This proposed list constitutes names.

It goes without saying that if the Russian side could come up with an easier method of trying to determine who completed the numbers in this series, thereby showing which numbers are unaccounted for in order to determine if the missing are Wallenberg or Langfelder, this would be greatly appreciated.

POSSIBLE TRANSFERS TO BUTYRKA MARCH/APRIL 1950

ADELMAN, Rudiger - Verified by FSB as arriving on that date. Now requesting file.

ANGELIS, Maxmillian On original list. Requesting file again.

BARZIK, Franz or Johann Abwehr.

BART, Andreas Per Hoffstetter

BECKINGER;

BENTIVEGNI, Franz On original list. Cellmate or associate of Hatz, Beckerle, Gerstenberg among others. On Kartashov list of 9 September 1946 in Schlitter file. Please give us the file, including access to medical information and clarification of where he was held in Vladimir as his card initially has no cell history.

BERCH

BERGEMANN, Willi Number 1779

BERNAT, Nicholas Per Hatz

BIERMAN, Per Grossheim-Krisko and Beckerle.

BOHM, ----- Also knocking contact RW. Cell 56, probably Lefortovo Revised List, but first name is uncertain. Werner Bohm appears in conjunction with some of those of the Schlitter Kartashov list and is a likely candidate..

BRAUN, Max	Per Hoffstetter
BRETTHAUER, Edward	Per Gerstenberg
CLAUDIUS, Karl	Per Kartashov List of September 1946 in Schlitter file.
DERING, Arnold	Number 1857
DIETL, Albert	
DI MOHR, Claudio	On revised list. Confirmed by FSB as being sent to Butyrka at this time. Claims knowledge of Wallenberg in Lefortovo in 1948.
FREYMUTH,	German Wehrmacht, protection Embassy Sofia
FRICKE,	German General . Per Hille
GAMMON	
GENGSTENBERG, H.	Revised list. Witness to Langfelder.
GERRUM, Kurt	Cellmate of Gfrorener
GERSTENBERG, Albert	Crossed over but registration number not in File.
GEISLER, Kurt Karl	Processed with Jansci
GFRORENER, F-R	Number 1698
GUZE, Gunther	Per Gerstenberg p. 115.
HALFI, Miklosh	Per Hatz
HANSEN,	German General who sat with Monke.Gerstenberg.
HATZ, Otto	Number 1704
HILDEBRAND,	Per Beckerle and others.
HILLE, E. Paul	Number 1735
HOFFSTETTER, Hans	Number 1730
HORST MUELLER, T.	On original list. Witness to Case. Please give us the file
HORST-MULLE	

HUBER, Ernst	Number 1862
JANSCI, Heinz	Number 1722
KABHLER	Luftwaffe. In Butyrka with Hille
KATON(A), Alexdr.	Cell 156 Lefortovo with Stahel, Schmidt Durmond, and Gerstenberg per Gerstenberg p.69 Acknowledged by FSB as Wallenberg related.
KEITEL, Ernst	
KITSCHMAN, Horst	Number 1695
KLEIST, Ewald	
KLIER, Willi	In Butyrka with Hille
KOSCH, Karl	Processed with Jansci
KOSTENT, Maria	Per Hoffstetter
KRAFFT, Ernst	Cellmate of Langfelder. Revised List for file.
KRAUS, Peter C.	Per Kitschmann
KRENNER, Ernst	Per Kartashov List of September 1946 in Schlitter file.
KUHN, Joachim	Confirmed by FSB. On Kartashov list in Schlitter file.
KUNTZ, Helmut	Per Gerstenberg P. 115.
LAARMAN, Albert	(1898). 'Funker' per Bergmann
LANGHANS, Heinrich	Per Hatz
LANGMANN, Otto Langfelder.	Processed with Jansci, possible confusion with
LORENUCHUK, Anton	Processed with Jansci and Dering
LORKE, Paul	German Legation Sofia, Radio
LOYDA, Jan	Number 1729
MATTERN,	
MEYER, Hans	Lefortovo 159 in 1947 per Hofstetter

MOHRMANN,	German Legation in Sofia per Beckerle and others
MONKE,	General. German SS per Bergmn & Gerstnbg
ODENIGO, Armand witness among others.	Witness on Revised List. Rivo, Gflorener, Schoyer
ORLEIN,	Lefortovo 159 in 1947 per Hofstetter
OESTEREICH, Kurt Cellmate of Hofstetter among others	Kartashov list of September 1946 in Schlitter file.
PALTSO	Beckerle file, among others
PANZIGNER, or PANZINGER	
PELKONEN, Eno	Number 1740
PETER, Franz	Per Hoffstetter
PICKENBROK, Hans	Kartashov list of September 1946 in Schlitter file.
PORTZGOM	Beckerle, among others.
QUADE, Hauptman	Nephew of Fliegegeneral, worked in German Legation in Stockholm. RW related. Per Hille. Revised List.
RATTENHUBER, Hans	Confirmed by FSB. On Kartashov list of September 1946 in Schlitter file. Please show us this file.
RICHTER, Gustav	Number 1692
RIVO, Zoltan	On original list and confirmed by FSB. File shown does not include prison history. Please show us prison file and/or corpus/ cell occupancy/interrogation history in Lefortovo and Butyrka.
RODDE, Wilhelm	Revised list. Cellmate of Richter in 47. Claims to have been called for interrogation July 22, 1947.
ROESSTEL, Hans J.	(1910) (in Russian Rostel, soft b) Gerst p. 113
ROISCHLE, Walter	Confirmed by FSB but no indication of when he arrived in Butyrka or registration number in his file. (This is an

H prisoner from Vladimir, isolated from Richter and Grossheim Krisko in transport. His file is obviously incomplete.)

SCHEUER, Otto	AST XVIII (Salzburg-Insbruck)
SCHILDKNECHT, Axel	per Bergmann
SCHILLER, E.	Internal Cell 166 in May of 1945
SCHLITTER, Walter	Butyrka Number not in File. Arrived 5 IV 50 with Huber.
SCHMIDT-DURMOND SCHMIDT-DUMOR	Sat with Gerstenberg, Spalke, Katona in July 45 Record of the above is in his file. Per Gers, p.69. Name also appears in Beckerle. Please show this file and please use it to try and find trace of Katona in any and all Moscow prisons.
SCHMITT, Dr.	Former Legionsrat/Moscow. REP to Struttgart in '55 Per testimony of Pannwitz in National Archives Washington.
SCHNURRE,	German Legation Chief Moscow. Per testimony of Pannwitz in National Archives, Washington.
SCHORENER, Ferdinand	Number 1697. On Kartashov list of September 1946 found in the Schlitter file.
SCHRODER, Erich	Per testimony of Pannwitz in National Archives, D.C.
SCHAEFER, Eugene	On Kartashov list of September 1946 in Schlitter file.
SCHUMACHER, Heinz	
SCHWAB, Alexander	This could conceivably also be Rudolph Winter von Schwab who went under the code name of 'Captain Alexander.' Post War arrest date however.
SCHWERIN,	General
SKAZACS, Janos SOKET. Janos	Tomsen's cellmate. Presence confirmed. (Alternative Name) On original list.
SPALKE, Karl	
SPALKE, Walter	

STAGEL, Reiner	Special List of Kartashov with Schlitter. Cellmate with Gerstenberg and Katona in 1945.
STARKE,	Per Grossheim-Krisko
STEINBOHM STRINBORN?	
STELTSER, H.	Legation Consular, Bucharest. IP Cell 166 in V 45
STLOUKA, Herman	Pannwitz' radio operator. Released 6 Dec 55
STOLTZE, Irvin	On the Kartashov September 1946 list in Schlitter file.
STRECKENBACH, B.	
STYLER, Helmut (1915)	German Consul in Budapest per Bergmann, cellmate. (could be STUYLER, Helmut) said to have important information on Wallenberg. Belongs on revised list as new testimony uncovered in SAPO files, attached. .
SZORKE,	Hungarian Mil. Attache, Sofia-Bergmann
THIEDE, Erich or Evald	Per Bergemann
TILLISSEN, Werner	Per Gerstenberg, Richter and others. .
TOMSEN, Heinrich	Number 1708. See testimony on crossing attached. alias GROSSHEIM-KRISKO
TRANDAFILO, Franz	per Grossheim-Krisko. See attached.
TRAUT	German General with Hille in Butyrka
TSIRFOGEL, Max	Per Gerstenberg.
TURKIN, A.N.	With Hofstetter in June 50 in Butyrka
von BREDOW	
von PRAMNITZ, Schip	(1895) German 6th Army in Rumania. Hille
von RANTZAU	Cultural Attache, German Leg, Bucharest.
von SCHULER	Captain.
von STRANSKY, Ritter	

VOIDIHOFSKII,

Per Kitschmann.

VOSS, Hans Erich

On Kartashov list of September 1947 in Schlitter file. Cellmate of Kitschmann and Schlitter in late 1946, returned to Internal in January 1947 with the departure of Spishak, Chatlosh, Turanets et al, prior to the swap of Kitschmann/Hatz and Roedl/Wallenberg from their respective cells in Internal and Lefortovo. Also H list Vladimir, where he is being isolated from a special prisoner believed to be either Langmann or Langfelder. Please show us this file.

(This name can also be written FOSS),

WALDSCHMIDT, Karl

Per Kitschmann

WALLENSTEIN, E.

Lefortovo 142 in June 48.

WARMBRUN, Franz

Could be also WARNBRUN

WEIDERMAIER

WEIDLUNG, Helmut

On Kartashov list of September 1946 found in Schlitter file. On revised list. Please give us this file.

WOLSTICK, Friedrich

Pcr Hatz

YANAVITA, Genzo

Pcr Hoffstetter

YEVELO, Irving

Per Kartashov List with Schlitter

ZALTZ, Hermann

Per Gerstenberg.

ZIMBACH

Thank you very much for your efforts in this work.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (2)

1999-03-10

Aambs A. Wallberg

aa
R

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Fu ¹

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

EC

Kopia:

amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds på Susan Mesinais begäran korrespondens mellan henne och Susanne Berger beträffande de s.k. trofé-fonderna.

Enligt Mesinai omfattar Bergers framställan i sin nuvarande version en stor mängd dossierer som varken hänför sig direkt eller indirekt till dessa fonder. Att under nuvarande omständigheter göra en sådan framställan riskerar enligt Mesinai att vara kontraproduktivt.

HIRDMAN

② 1/2

to Susan Friedman MESINA
c/o Embassy of Sweden, Riga

From: Susanne Berger
1 703 237 0946

Date March 1, 1992

Re - "Trophy"

Dear Susan,

I have been thinking about the "Trophy" request. I think it is quite clear that Vinogradov is referring to the Foreign captured records in the "Special" Archives when he talks about the material being accessible in Germany. Quite a few groups of historians from different countries have been busy microfilming and copying the material. The problem is, that this material is merely the tip of the iceberg - and the wrong iceberg, for that matter. Archives in Russia remind me of the Smithsonian - less than 10% of its holdings are on exhibit! Somehow in the next few days and in my travels I will sit down and outline for all of us what materials fall under the term "captured records", which materials we are interested in, which archives hold which captured records, etc. The problem that we are facing is that we are looking for what is considered "FOREIGN captured records", which are, in the words of Grimsted "displaced archives of other European nations, most of which had previously been seized by Nazi authorities. ..." According to a report by GAV NKVD Acquisition Department from August 1945 "documentary materials of foreign agencies" totaled half a million files and a million and a half special card files ... of agencies in Germany, Italy, Rumania, France, Poland and Hungary "

For most of these it is unclear where they are and what they contain to this day. There are no public finding aids, and in most cases no official acknowledgement that the material actual exists. Important material that had operational value was placed in special collections (such as the later so-called Special Archives), or was forwarded to the personal attention of certain individuals, such the in the case of the 200,000 personnel files which were sent to Beria. But even in the case of the Special Archives, we cannot remotely assume that we know everything that was ever held there

As concerns the "Trophy" request specifically, one can start with some points which we definitely know exist, such as the 200,000 prisoner file collection. Also, oddly enough, the confiscated material on the Wallenberg family should be a relatively safe bet (in terms of existence of documentation), since that material must be contained in records confiscated from France and Eastern Germany (and there are strong rumors that such a collection indeed is available), probably in the Special Archives or in GAF. That does not mean that the Russian side will happily turn the material over, but a good factual argument can be made here from our side.

Things get complicated when one heads to the German/Hungarian records, such as the records of Eichmann and his Staff. Much surely remained in Hungary, a great deal is available in Germany, yet clearly a great deal of important material was forwarded from Hungary to Russia. It is worthwhile to note that Russia was the only country which refused to hand over material on Eichmann for Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem

Why do you think? Maybe discuss with the Israelis.

* This should be the starting point I think - based on R. Winterrowd where INT said: "We know who you are, you are from a leading monopolist family." Note also that material went to EGRI, the boss, not Abakumov, etc.

1999-03-12

EC

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114

Delges:
Kabs
Fredriksson DOK
Olson ESEK
Magnusson Riga
Wallberg Moskva
Asp Helsingfors



Exp. 990312/PP

**Raoul Wallenberg: Finska UM:s dokumentation om kontakten Frey-Erzin
1956**

18 bil

Vid besök på utrikesministeriet i Helsingfors den 8 mars erhöll jag av arkivchefen Martti Favorin kopior av de i ministeriets arkiv befintliga handlingarna rörande dåvarande legationssekreteraren, sedermera byråchefen Åke Freys kontakter 1956 med sovjetiska diplomater i Ankara och Helsingfors i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet.

Handlingarna är följande:

1. Chiffertelegram Ankara - Helsingfors 9.3.56
2. Chiffertelegram Helsingfors - Ankara 10.3.56
3. Chiffertelegram Ankara - Helsingfors 11.3.56
4. Hbr min. Kivikoski, Ankara - ss Seppälä, Helsingfors 12.3.56
5. Hbr ss Seppälä, Helsingfors - amb. Gripenberg, Stockholm 13.3.56
6. Hbr min. Kivikoski, Ankara - ss Seppälä, Helsingfors 16.3.56
7. Chiffertelegram Ankara - Helsingfors 17.3.56
8. Chiffertelegram Helsingfors - Ankara 19.3.56
9. Chiffertelegram Helsingfors - Stockholm 19.3.56
10. Hbr ss Seppälä, Helsingfors - amb. Gripenberg, Stockholm 19.3.56
11. Chiffertelegram Ankara - Helsingfors 20.3.56
12. Hbr ss Seppälä, Helsingfors - amb. Gripenberg, Stockholm, 23.3.56
13. Hbr ss Seppälä, Helsingfors - leg.sek. Frey, Ankara 14.6.56
14. Hbr leg.sek. Frey, Ankara - ss Seppälä, Helsingfors 24.6.56
15. Hbr leg.sek. Frey, Ankara - ss Seppälä, Helsingfors 31.7.56
16. PM överlämnad av avd.ch. Enckell till ambassadrådet Petersén, Sveriges ambassad 10.8.56


1999-03-12

17. PM Frey 23.11.56

18. PM Frey 20.12.56

Samtliga dokument utom bilagan till nr 6 samt nr 16 är på finska. De bifogas här i min översättning till svenska.

Dokumenten tillför inte något egentligt nytt utan visar att vi 1956 av finska UM löpande hölls orienterade om alla väsentligheter i Freys kontakter med ryssarna.



Jan Lundvik

Ankara 9.3.1956

Ulkoasiat

Helsingfors

3 YTTERST HEMLIGT. Med anledning av ett enskilt initiativ från legationens sida förklarade rådet vid sovjetambassaden ERZIN igår för FREY att 1) Raoul WALLENBERG i Ryssland 2) villiga överlämna honom såvitt i livet 3) ERLANDER har anledning ta upp saken vid besöket i Moskva där på rysk önskan från finsk sida endast han personligen underrättas. På ryssarnas begäran skall saken hållas absolut hemlig.

(Ärende:enskilt initiativ)

Utrikesministern
Statssekreteraren
Pol.avd.

ark.

2.

Nr 152

Hemligt

10.3.1956

FINLANDIA

A n k a r a

Tu-5 Vad menar ni med enskilt initiativ hur motiverar ni det 3

(Ärende: Enskilt initiativ)

Enckell

Utrikesministern

Statssekreteraren

Pol.avd.

ark.

Chifferkopia

Från Ankara 11.3.1956

Ulkoasiat

Helsingfors

4 Då ryssarna visat intresse för de nordiska länderna särskilt Finland påpekade vi att frigivande av Wallenberg skulle främja samförstånd med Sverige. Fullständig redogörelse med flygkurir
5

(Ärende: Enskilt initiativ)

Utrikesministern
Statssekreteraren

Pol.avd.

ark.

FINLANDS LEGATION

Ankara, 12 mars 1956

Nr 202

Herr Statssekreterare R Seppälä
Utrikesministeriet
H e l s i n g f o r s

B.B.

Jag skickar härmed en promemoria av legationssekreterare Frey, som berör fallet Wallenberg. Därav framgår, hur saken kommit på tal mellan honom och Erzin och hur den senare då han varit i hemlandet tagit upp saken och fått ett löfte, att man skall söka Wallenberg, som finns i deras böcker. Det är naturligtvis möjligt, att han är död, eller att man inte finner honom. Därför vore det väl bäst att på lämpligt sätt anmäla saken för Erlander och samtidigt varna honom för överdriven optimism och betona att han inte bör tala om saken offentligt, innan den slutgiltigt klarläggs vid hans besök i Moskva, eller man eljest får ytterligare uppgifter.

Med bästa hälsningar

Tuus

(Bruno Kivikoski)

P.M.

För cirka ett år sedan började Sovjetunionens härvarande ambassad visa särskilt intresse för de nordiska beskickningarna. Särskilt aktiv med att organisera inbjudningar m m var ambassadrådet Pavel Erzin, en sympatisk, under kriget i London verksam diplomat som gjorde ett ärligt intryck. Mot mig och min hustru har han alltid varit mycket vänlig.

I augusti 1955, då legationen befann sig i Istanbul, besökte jag i ett handelsärende Ankara. Lördagen den 20.8 kom på en nordisk lunch frågan om Wallenberg upp, varvid flera av de närvarande uttryckte som sin uppfattning att det nu var ett lämpligt tillfälle att göra en ny demarche med tanke på att Genèveandan ännu var var aktuell.

Frågan fortsatte på något sätt att bekymra mig, och jag tog kontakt med Erzin och började försiktigt tala om saken. Han intog en överraskande positiv hållning och bad mig om så noggranna uppgifter som möjligt.

Under hösten besökte jag många gånger sovjetambassaden och fick så småningom intrycket, att ryssarna allvarligt övervägde att lämna ut Wallenberg. Jag talade alltid bara med Erzin, men enligt honom kände också ambassadör Podtserob till ärendet och såg positivt på det.

Erzin besökte i november Ryssland och återvände först för en vecka sedan, varvid han rapporterade det som vi meddelat med telegram.

Jag har inte kunnat rapportera om saken tidigare, utom naturligtvis till minister Kivikoski, ty ryssarna bad mig att inte säga något om saken, innan man hunnit undersöka den närmare. Vårt första telegram i ärendet skickades på ryssarnas direkta uppmaning.

Under hela denna tid fick jag uppfattningen att ryssarna inte hade någon riktigt klar uppfattning av vad Wallenbergs frigivning skulle betyda. Det är naturligt, att man i början inte medgav hans existens för mig, men man förnekade den inte heller.

Efter återkomsten från Moskva för några dagar sedan tog Erzin själv kontakt med mig och bad att få komma hem till mig. Sedan berättade han att han så snart han kommit till Moskva vänt sig till "vederbörande", som först ansett saken alldeles hopplös, men som senare förklarat sig vilja göra vad de kunde för att finna Wallenberg och lämna över honom till svenskarna.

I samband härmed hänvisade Erzin till Finlands, som han sade, osedvanliga goodwill i Ryssland och föreslog, att man skulle rapportera till Finlands regering, att det skulle finnas anledning för Erlander att ta upp saken då han inom kort begav sig till Moskva. Detta förslag upprepade han fyra gånger, varför jag fick uppfattningen att han ansåg det mycket viktigt. Under hela samtalets gång försökte han inte längre ens förneka, att Wallenberg var eller åtminstone hade varit i Ryssland, men sade att han möjligen redan var död. Han tillade att han själv sett dossiererna i ärendet och försäkrade att ryssarna verkligen försökte finna honom i syfte att överlämna honom lämpligen vid Erlanders besök i Moskva.

Därefter underströk han ytterligare, att uppgifterna skulle ges direkt till Erlander och inte till svenska UD.

Avslutningsvis må nämnas, att Sveriges härvarande legation inte har någon som helst aning om dessa samtal.

Ankara den 12 mars 1956.

Åke Frey

Legationssekreterare

Ytterst hemligt

Helsingfors den 13 mars 1956

B.B.

Vi har fått ett par absolut hemliga telegram från Ankara, vari följande sägs:

1. I samtal med Sovjetunionens därvarande ambassad har ryssarna visat särskilt intresse för Norden, vilket från vår sida givit anledning till påpekandet, att Wallenbergs frigivande skulle främja Sovjetunionens samförstånd med Sverige. Ett sovjetiskt ambassadråd sade den 8.3 till leg.sekr. Frey, att Raoul Wallenberg har funnits i Ryssland och att ryssarna skulle vara villiga att överlämna honom, såvida han är vid liv. Ryssen hade också sagt att Erlander har skäl att ta upp saken när han besöker Moskva, vilket från finsk sida endast skulle meddelas personligen till Erlander. Detta uttalande hade ryssen begärt skulle hållas absolut hemligt.

2. Jag har ovan sökt referera Ankara-legationens hittillsvarande rapportering så noggrant som möjligt, men jag medger, att framställningen är bristfällig. Det är sålunda svårt att bedöma, om nämnda ambassadråds uttalande har någon, och i så fall vilken, betydelse. Eftersom emellertid svenskarna är mycket intresserade av Wallenbergs öde, så underställer jag Dig för övervägande, om det finns anledning att redan ta ett samtal med Erlander för att berätta detta. Om det inte skulle vara någon annan nytta med meddelandet, så skulle det åtminstone bli ett slags tecken på att vi från vår sida försöker hjälpa svenskarna i detta tragiska fall.

3. Eftersom uppgifterna från Ankara är så bristfälliga har vi begärt en grundlig redovisning av ärendet, som Ankara-legationen lovade den 11.3 att skicka med flygkurir. I nuläget har vi inga säkra uppgifter om när den kommer fram.

Med bästa hälsningar

R.R. Seppälä

Ambassadör G.A.Gripenberg
S t o c k h o l m

Herr Statssekreterare R. Seppälä
Utrikesministeriet
Helsingfors.

B.B.

Återkommande ännu en gång till fallet R. Wallenberg närsluter jag här en avskrift av ambassadrådet Erzins skriftliga bekräftelse till Frey. Den är avskriven med alla sina skrivfel. Originalen behåller vi här till dess det kan förstöras, sedan ärendet på ett eller annat sätt blivit uppkärlat.

Denna brevavskrift skulle ni enligt min uppfattning kunna tillställa Erlander enskilt som bevis för att vederbörande seriöst och på allvar diskuterat ärendet, men samtidigt borde för Erlander påpekas, att han inte på något sätt fick visa sig medveten om Erzins intervention när och om han talar om saken med sovjetiska vederbörande.

Omnämmandet i brevets första stycke av att man hittills inte har några uppgifter om R. Wallenberg står i strid med ambassadrådet Erzins tidigare gjorda uttalande. Detta beror på att han helt enkelt inte vågat sätta på papper, att Wallenberg skulle vara eller åtminstone skulle ha varit i Sovjetunionen.

Ambassadrådet Erzins förklarade, då han överlämnade denna skriftliga bekräftelse, att sovjetregeringen i varje fall skulle ge ett sanningsenligt besked till Erlander också i det fall att Wallenberg skulle ha avlidit eller försvunnit.

På Sovjetunionens härvarande ambassad är det bara ambassadör Podtserob och ambassadrådet Erzins som känner till saken, och de vill att det hela förblir absolut hemligt, utom att på grund av sakens natur vissa personer måste förtroligt underrättas (Erlander själv samt Finlands regering och vissa företrädare för utrikesministeriet). Det bästa vore att inte nämna ambassadörens namn varken för Erlander eller andra. Även Frey hoppas att hans namn inte skall nämnas och att hans roll i ärendet förblir en hemlighet för alltid.

I enlighet härmed vore det bäst att också förstöra bifogade brevavskrift, när den tjänat sitt ändamål, så att den inte hamnar i utomstående händer, varvid den skulle kunna förorsaka tråkigheter för sin upphovsman, som har handlat med gott uppsåt utan själviska avsikter.

Tuus

Bruno Kivikoski

Chifferkopia
Ankara 17/3

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n g f o r s

7 Ryssarna skriftligt bekräftat sitt meddelande om Wallenberg. Vi kurirsänder en avskrift för överlämnande till Erlander som vid upptagande av ärendet inte får visa sig medveten om det härifrån tagna initiativet.

(Ärende: Enskilt initiativ)

Utrikesministern
Statssekreteraren
Pol.avd.
Ark.

8

Hemligt
Nr 152

19.3.1956

FINLANDIA
A n k a r a

Tu-10 Vem skrev till vem tela ordalydelsen 7

(Ärende: Enskilt initiativ)

Enckell

Republikens President
Utrikesministern
Statssekreteraren
Pol.avd.

ark.

Hemligt

Nr 152

19.3.1956

GRIPENBERG

FINLANDIA

Stockholm

Ru - 18 Rådets namn är Erzin promemoria i morgon bitti till Stockholm med första plan

Seppälä

Seppälä

Statssekreteraren

ark.

Ytterst hemligt

Helsingfors den 19 mars 1956

Nr 3650

B.B.

Närslutet skickar jag Dig en avskrift av leg.sekr. Freys promemoria, som inte innehåller något nämnvärt utöver det som jag redan delgivit Dig.

I morse kom emellertid ett nytt telegram, vari Ankara meddelar att ryssarna i ett brev bekräftat sitt meddelande om Wallenberg. Då det inte framgår mer av telegrammet har vi idag bett dem telegrafer ordalydelsen. Vi återkommer till detta, så snart vi får ytterligare uppgifter.

Jag vill i detta sammanhang nämna, att minister Törngren i fredags kväll kom till att nämna detta ärende också för ambassadör Engzell, som omedelbart vidarebefordrade det till UD, som har begärt ytterligare uppgifter. Då Engzell idag talade om detta med mig, påpekade jag för honom, att vi på sovjetisk önskan endast fick underrätta Erlander om saken. Engzell förstod detta och lovade varsko UD, att alla uppgifter lämnas till Erlander genom Din försorg. Också min. Törngren har godkänt detta förfarande, eftersom hans avsikt inte varit annan än att nämna saken för Engzell för kännedom. Sannolikt kommer inte UD att vända sig till Dig i den här saken, men om så skulle ske kan Du förklara för dem ryssarnas uttryckliga begäran avseende underrättelsesättet.

Med bästa hälsningar

R.R. Seppälä

Ambassadör G.A. Gripenberg

S t o c k h o l m

Salasähkejäljennös.

Ankara 20.3.1956 klo 12.00
Saap. " " " " 18.41
" min. " " " " 20.10
Avattu 21 " " " 11.00
Kirj. " " " " 13.45

11.

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ	
No 26	124 (ap) 56
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RUUMA	OLASTO
6	8 Ruotsi
KÄSITÖÖN: 1 19	

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n k i

8 ERZINE FREYlle 15. ^{K.U. Frey} ^{ja englantilainen} englanniksi. Confirming what I told you last thursday and to avoid any possible misinterpretation I would like to repeat that during my recent visit to Moscow I took up the case of Raoul WALLENBERG with the people concerned. They told me that the case was known and up to date there are no news of the man's whereabouts. They declared however that they would be only glad if they could trace him or some information about him. In case he will be found there would be no obstacle to deliver him to the Swedish authorities. It would be worthwhile for the Swedish Prime Minister to inquire about Mr. WALLENBERG during his visit to Moscow but you understand this is very preliminary and my own inquiries must in no case be mentioned by Mr. ERLANDER because I did it quite unofficially and it is no matter of my concern. I sincerely hope that the case will come to a successful end. 10

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Tasavallan Presidentti
Ulkoasiainministeri
Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

—ark.

Vakuudeksi: Eeva Korhonen

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

EK.

Ytterst hemligt.
Helsingfors den 23 mars 1956

Bäste Broder,

Närslutet skickar jag Dig en avskrift av min. Kivikoskis brev den 16 dennes i ärendet Wallenberg, eftersom det enligt min mening innehåller vissa tilläggsuppgifter, som Du skulle kunna bringa till statsminister Erlanders kännedom.

Sedan han av min. Törngren fått nys om saken har amb. Engzell försökt locka fram ytterligare uppgifter. Jag förklarade emellertid för honom, att korrektheten gentemot våra uppgiftslämnare kräver, att alla uppgifter i detta ärende lämnas personligen till statsmin. Erlander.

Vi har jämfört den till detta brev fogade texten till hr Erzins brev med den engelskspråkiga text som Enckell redan vidarebefordrat till Dig och funnit dem vara likalydande.

Med bästa hälsningar

R.R. Seppälä

Ambassadör G.A. Gripenberg
S t o c k h o l m

Ytterst hemligt

Helsingfors den 14 juni 1956.

B.B.

Sveriges ambassadör har varit hos mig och berättat, att Erlander under sitt besök i Moskva tagit upp ärendet Raoul Wallenberg, vilket ryssarna efter att inledningsvis ha motsatt sig det gick med på att undersöka och lovade att i sinom tid meddela resultatet av undersökningarna. Ambassadören berättade att trots att det nu gått ganska lång tid har det inte hörts någonting från Sovjetunionens sida i frågan. Eftersom svenskarna på alla sätt vill påskynda ett klarläggande, föreslog ambassadören att Du då Du träffar ambassadrådet Erzin skulle föra saken på tal med honom.

Utan att naturligtvis på något sätt nämna svenskarna skulle Du t ex kunna säga honom följande: "Jag har sett i den svenska pressen och eljest också hört, att Erlander tog upp ärendet Wallenberg i Moskva, och att ryssarna lovade undersöka saken. Att döma av den svenska pressen har det dock inte blivit någon ökad klarhet i saken, varför det skulle vara intressant att få veta hr Erzins bedömning om man kommer att få, och i så fall när, klarhet i saken."

Jag får be Dig att så snart Du fått detta svara huruvida Erzin är där numera och, om så är fallet, när Du bedömer att Du får tillfälle att tala med honom om saken. Du får naturligtvis inte gå rakt på honom och fråga utan bara när lämpligt tillfälle bjuds liksom i förbigående föra det på tal, när ni nu en gång på sin tid diskuterade frågan så utförligt.

Med bästa hälsningar

R.R. Seppälä

P.S.

Jag vill särskilt betona, att då Du samtalar med hr Erzin får det inte på något sätt framgå att Du gör det på uppdrag. Tvärtom bör Du helt ge det karaktär av privatintresse.

Om samtal kommer till stånd ber jag Dig göra mycket noggranna uppteckningar.

Detta brevs innehåll kan Du naturligtvis redovisa för Kivikoski.

Legationssekreterare Åke Frey

A n k a r a

FINLANDS LEGATION

Ankara den 24 juni 1956

Muntligt föredraget för
amb. Engzell 2.7.56
RS

Ärade Broder,

Med anledning av Ditt brev vill jag först göra några allmänna kommentarer. Då jag i mitten av april återvände till Ankara träffade jag mycket snart Erzin och hans medhjälpare Vladilen Fedorov, som tillhör samma "yrkeskår" som Erzin själv. Båda frågade nyfiket hurudant mottagande jag fått i Helsingfors, och jag konstaterade kortfattat att jag åtminstone inte blivit speciellt klandrad. Om själva Wallenberg och sovjetregeringens svar till Erlander var det inte tal, ty jag betraktade ärendet som avslutat för egen del.

Några veckor senare, då jag på nytt träffade Erzin – jag måste nämna att jag har ganska nära kontakter med honom – frågade han mig en smula bekymrat, vilket intryck jag ansåg att sovjetregeringens svar hade gjort i Sverige. Jag svarade då alldeles ärligt – än en gång särskilt betonande att jag talade som privatperson – att såvitt jag kunde bedöma av tidningarnas skrivelser hade svaret inte varit tillnärmelsevis tillfredsställande. Han frågade då om jag själv tyckte detsamma, varvid jag sade att det gjorde jag och tillade att för mig personligen hade svaret varit en stor besvikelse. Här slutade samtalet, men jag har varje gång jag träffat Erzin förhört mig om det hänt något nytt, varvid hans enda svar varit att ärendet befann sig i "goda händer". Eftersom ingenting nytt framkommit i dessa samtal har jag inte funnit skäl att besvara ministeriet med dem – jag har väntat på något konkret, i vilket fall jag naturligtvis skulle ha rapporterat omgående.

Ditt brev kom vid en lämplig tidpunkt, ty samma kväll träffade jag Erzin på polska ambassadens mottagning. Naturligtvis utan att säga något om Ditt brev började jag på nytt tala om fallet Wallenberg – och jag hade en god förevändning, ty ett par dagar tidigare hade jag skickat Erzin en artikel ur Newsweek, i vilken det påstods att Wallenberg avlidit redan 1953 och att sovjetregeringen skämdes för att erkänna detta.

Då berättade Erzin, att då han hört mina synpunkter i början av maj hade han bett ambassadör Podtserob skicka ett telegram till Moskva med påpekande av att det var utomordentligt viktigt att klarlägga gåtan Wallenberg, också i det fall att W. skulle ha avlidit för länge sedan. Sovjetunionens ambassad i Stockholm hade sedan – vilket också nämnts i pressen – bett UD om ytterligare uppgifter i fallet Wallenberg, vilka gavs den 12.5. Om detta berodde på Podtserobs telegram eller om det var sovjetregeringens eget oberoende initiativ, det visste inte Erzin. I vilket fall som helst har jag inte kunnat rapportera om detta tidigare, eftersom jag själv var okunnig om telegrammet ända till i fredags, då Ditt brev redan anlät.

Herr Statssekreterare R.R. Seppälä
Utrikesministeriet
H e l s i n g f o r s

Jag frågade Erzin om man avsåg att fortsätta med nuvarande hemlighetsmakeri, och om ett konkret svar överhuvudtaget var att vänta, varpå han svarade att det var svårt för honom att intervensera på nytt, om han inte fick någon särskild anledning till detta. Jag frågade vad han menade med särskild anledning (specific reason), varpå han svarade att om Finlands eller Sveriges regering inofficiellt, genom mig, lät förstå att tålamodet var slut skulle han kunna göra ett tredje försök. Enligt den allmänna tonen i Dina anvisningar svarade jag kort att jag inte såg någon möjlighet till dylikt, varpå han anmärkte att det kanske inte heller var nödvändigt. Han sade sig skola överväga saken och eventuellt göra ett nytt försök i vilket fall som helst i mitten av juli.

När jag frågade när ett slutligt svar kanske var att vänta, sade han sig ämna försöka allt för att det skulle ges till mig före min avresa från Ankara. Då jag förundrade mig över detta betonade han att initiativet varit mitt och att man också ville ge svar till mig.

Detta är läget. Jag vill än en gång särskilt understryka att jag inte haft någon anledning att besvara Dig med mina helt akademiska samtal med Erzin, eftersom det i dessa inte ens till namnet funnits något nytt ända till förra fredagen (22.6) utöver mina egna åsikter, om vars inverkan (Podtserobs telegram) jag inte kunnat ha någon aning.

Jag vill vidare betona att jag aldrig givit något intryck av att jag skulle ha agerat på uppdrag. Det vet f ö Erzin med tanke på hela historiens initialskede.

Till sist skulle jag som min egen åsikt vilja säga, att W. beklagligtvis enligt all sannolikhet är död, vilket Du skulle kunna berätta för Engzell för att undvika fåfänga förhoppningar. En liten, försvinnande liten möjlighet ligger naturligtvis däri, att det på senare år – efter Stalins och Berias död genomförts avsevärda förändringar av Sovjetunionens säkerhetssystem. Erzin sade mig en gång att ”hur kan Du kräva att vi i en handvändning skall finna en fånge, då vi har dem i oräkneliga antal”.

Du kan vara förvissad om att jag endast inom ramen för de riktlinjer Du givit skall försöka klara upp denna svåra historia och att jag ofördröjligen kommer att rapportera om eventuellt nya faser.

Med de värdsammaste hälsningar och de bästa välgångsönskningar i ditt nya ämbete tecknar jag

Åke Frey

FINLANDS LEGATION

Nr 656

Ankara den 31 juli 1956

Ärade Broder,

Som jag nämnde i mitt föregående brev hade Erzin för avsikt att i mitten av juli på nytt förhöra sig om utvecklingen i ärendet Wallenberg. Det gjorde han också nyligen, varid svaret blev att man inte funnit några spår trots alla ansträngningar.

På detta svarade Erzin, enligt sin egen framställning, med att förhöra sig om detta svar var att betrakta som slutgiltigt och kunde han i så fall meddela mig det för vidarebefordran via Finlands regering till Sveriges regering.

På Erzins nya telegram kom svar för ett par dagar sedan. Enligt detta ville sovjetregeringen ännu inte ge ett definitivt, negativt svar utan uppger sig alltjämt göra allt för att finna Wallenberg. Enligt Erzin har sovjetregeringen nu sakens utomordentliga betydelse fullt klar för sig och har i denna anda utsträckt sina efterforskningar också till "utlandet", dvs satellit-länderna.

Förhoppningarna att finna Wallenberg är enligt Erzin mycket små, men sovjetregeringen vill under inga omständigheter ge något definitivt, negativt svar förrän alla ansträngningar visat sig förgäves. Erzin nämnde att sovjetregeringen följt alla de av de svenska myndigheterna givna tipsen men utan framgång.

På min fråga om Erzin trodde att Wallenberg var död, svarade han att det tyvärr var sannolikt, men också i så fall skulle man ge sanningsenliga uppgifter till Sveriges regering.

Detta är läget i slutet av juli. Erzin lovade ofördröjligen meddela mig om nya vändningar i ärendet, om det ännu blir några sådana. Han trodde sig kunna ge mig sovjetregeringens slutgiltiga svar före min avresa i slutet av september.

Jag hörde av Kivikoski, att Du är på semester, men förhoppningsvis når detta Dig ändå inom kort. Till sist vill jag påpeka att jag skriver detta på Erzins uttryckliga begäran.

Med de värdsammaste hälsningar

Åke Frey

P.M.

Enligt meddelande från legationssekreterare Åke Frey i Ankara hade Erzine för avsikt ånyo förhöra sig om utvecklingen av fallet Wallenberg under medlet av juli månad. Detta gjorde han också nyligen, varvid svaret var, att några spår inte påträffats trots alla försök.

Med anledning av svaret frågade Erzine ytterligare, enligt egen uppgift, om svaret kunde anses vara slutgiltigt och, därest så vore fallet, kunde han meddela legationssekreterare Frey därom för vidarebefordran genom finska regeringen till svenska regeringen.

Svar på Erzines nya telegram inkom för några dagar sedan. Enligt detta önskar sovjetregeringen inte ännu avgiva slutgiltigt, negativt svar, utan meddelar, att den fortsättningsvis gör allt för att finna Wallenberg. Enligt Erzine är sovjetregeringen nu fullt på det klara med ärendets synnerliga vikt och har också i detta avseende utsträckt sina efterforskningar "utomlands" d.v.s. till satellitländerna.

Utsikterna för Wallenbergs påträffande äro, enligt Erzine, synnerligen små, men sovjetregeringen önskar inte i något fall giva slutgiltigt, negativt svar, förrän alla försök visat sig vara fruktlösa. Erzine omnämner, att sovjetregeringen beaktat alla antydningar som den erhållit från svenska myndigheter, men utan resultat.

På legationssekreterare Freys förfrågan, trodde Erzine, att Wallenberg avlidit, svarade han, att detta beklagligtvis är sannolikt, men att en sanningsenlig uppgift även i detta fall kommer att tillställas svenska regeringen.

Sådan är situationen i slutet av juli. Erzine lovade omedelbart underrätta legationssekreterare Frey om ärendets nya skeden, därest sådana ännu tillkomma. Han trodde sig kunna meddela sovjetregeringens slutgiltiga svar till legationssekreterare Frey i slutet av september.

Helsingfors 10.8.1956.

P.M.

Sedan dåvarande statssekreterare Seppälä sistlidna juli på begäran av ambassadör Engzell bad mig på nytt förhöra mig hos ambassadrådet vid Sovjetunionens ambassad i Ankara, herr Erzin, om när det utlovade svaret i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet var att vänta (den tidigare detaljerade skriftväxlingen härom finns i ministeriets arkiv), har det inte hänt något egentligt nytt i ärendet. Jag kunde då svara ambassadör Seppälä, att herr Erzin lovade att påskynda efterforskningarna, men att förhoppningarna om att påträffa Wallenberg i livet var i det närmaste obefintliga. Å andra sidan utlovades då någon form av klarläggande, varom förhandsbesked eventuellt skulle ges mig.

Innan jag lämnade Ankara i slutet av september inträffade i ärendet praktiskt taget inget annat än att herr Erzin ytterst allmänt gav mig otydliga vinkar om att man eventuellt skulle ta kontakt med mig senare i denna fråga.

På Sovjetunionens ambassads mottagning med anledning av oktoberrevolutionen kom jag att tala med en för mig tidigare okänd ryss, som presenterade sig som andre ambassadsekreterare Vladimirov. Han började strax tala om Ankara och ambassadrådet Erzin och bad att få tillfälle till ett samtal med mig, förslagsvis genom att jag besökte honom på ambassaden. Eftersom jag av många skäl inte önskade detta bad jag honom komma hem till mig, vilket han omedelbart gick med på.

Påföljande lördag, den 10 november, kom herr Vladimirov ensam till mig och började ganska omedelbart tala om Wallenberg-ärendet. Han betonade att läget i Ungern inte hade påverkat sovjetregeringens strävan att föra åtgärderna för uppklarande av Wallenbergs öde till ett "tillfredsställande slut" och nämnde att ett sådant slut var att vänta före innevarande års utgång. Samtidigt förklarade han att man i ärendet torde komma att ge någon form av förhandsmeddelande till undertecknad och lovade att inom kort återkomma till saken.

Kort efter detta reste jag till Stockholm i samband med handelsförhandlingar. Efter några dagar meddelade man mig från utrikesdepartementet, att förre kabinetssekreteraren Lundberg ville tala med mig om "ett politiskt spörsmål".

Då jag nästa dag träffade herr Lundberg, som numera är generaldirektör för ett stort statligt företag, förklarade han sig inledningsvis tala i svenska regeringens namn. Därefter bad han om vissa närmare klarlägganden rörande de uppgifter, som från finsk sida givits Sveriges regering i detta ärende. Han betonade dessa uppgifters utomordentliga betydelse och framförde följande synpunkter:

1. Fallet Wallenberg är i Sveriges utrikespolitik en fråga av största vikt.
2. Trots alla ansträngningar har sovjetmyndigheterna, vilka tidigare i samband med statsminister Erlanders besök utlovat svar inom den närmaste tiden och senare på diplomatisk väg före utgången av oktober, hittills ännu inte varit villiga att göra detta.
3. Såvida ett tillfredsställande svar inte ges av Sovjetunionens regering inom den närmaste tiden kommer Sveriges regering vara tvungen att utge en vitbok, vilken innehåller sådant bevismaterial som t v inte överlämnats till sovjetmyndigheterna. Han betonade att just detta faktum måste hållas absolut hemligt.
4. Om Sveriges regering föranleds att publicera en sådan vitbok, är en "opinionsstorm" att vänta, vilken kan ha oöverskådliga följder och leda till en fullständig omprövning av Sveriges nuvarande utrikespolitik.

Med hänvisning till ovannämnda uttryckte han sin starka förhoppning att jag med all makt skulle söka bevara kontakten med ryssarna i detta ärende och om möjligt i tid få klarhet i hurudant ryssarnas slutgiltiga svar skulle vara, så att man kanske i sista stund skulle kunna slippa publicera vitboken. Jag förklarade med anledning härav att jag inte ansåg mig kunna göra annat i ärendet än att vänta på eventuella nyheter, en uppfattning som herr Lundberg helt anslöt sig till med framförande av ett tack för de uppgifter som hittills givits från finsk sida.

Nämnas må att närvarande vid samtalet var det svenska utrikesdepartementets Wallenberg-expert herr Lorentzon.

Jag har sett som min uppenbara plikt att bringa ovanstående till i första hand Herr Statssekreterarens kännedom. Denna promemoria existerar endast i detta egenhändigt utskrivna exemplar.

Helsingfors den 23 november 1956

Åke Frey

Byråchef

Hemligt

P.M.

I min promemoria den 23 november 1956 redogjorde jag för mina samtal med herr Vladimirov och herr Lundberg. Som jag nämnde i promemorian såg jag det inte som min uppgift att med anledning av dessa samtal vidtaga några åtgärder, utan jag inväntade eventuella kontakter från herr Vladimirovs sida.

Den 7 innevarande december ringde han mig också och bad att få komma till mig påföljande dag. Efter ankomsten började han inledningsvis att vidlyftigt redogöra för händelserna i Ungern och konstaterade bl a med beklagande att Sovjetunionens mödosamt uppbyggda goodwill i viss utsträckning gått förlorad. Därefter började han tala om Wallenberg, varvid jag nämnde att jag nyligen läst i tidningarna att Sverige framlagt ett nytt förslag i Moskva. Herr Vladimirov brydde sig inte alls om detta, utan bad mig förklara för honom av vilka skäl Sverige ansåg detta fall vara så viktigt. Jag försökte göra detta och tillade, att händelserna i Ungern och den världspolitiska situationen på intet sätt hade minskat de svenska myndigheternas och den svenska allmänhetens intresse för ärendet.

Herr Vladimirov sade då, att enligt hans uppfattning överdrev jag säkerligen sakens betydelse, men han sade sig likväl "fästa uppmärksamhet vid de synpunkter jag framfört". Jag förhörde mig om vad som enligt honom kunde vara anledningen till att den redan i april av sovjetregeringen till Sveriges statsminister givna och även offentliggjorda utfästelsen att klarlägga Wallenbergs öde ännu inte lett till något som helst resultat. Då sade herr Vladimirov att åtgärderna tydligen ännu inte lett till resultat och att de sovjetiska myndigheterna kunde befara en kraftig reaktion i Sverige, om svaret inte var tillfredsställande. Jag anmärkte här, att det enligt min uppfattning inte borde vara omöjligt att i förväg komma överens med svenska vederbörande. Herr Vladimirov blev entusiastisk över en sådan "ny möjlighet" och gjorde to m några anteckningar. Därefter började han på nytt tala om Ungern och försäkrade att sovjetregeringen fattat beslutet med "tungt hjärta" och att Ungerns egen inställning, uppsägningen av Warszawapakten m m försvårade en förlikningslösning, liksom Israels samtidiga angrepp mot Egypten och Englands och Frankrikes åtgärder i Mellersta östern. Han hade hört att sovjetregeringen suttit i ett 8 timmars oavbrutet möte, och rädslan för Ukrainas (?) ställningstagande hade väsentligt inverkat till förmån för interventionsbeslutet. Denna allmänpolitiska "översikt" föranledde ingen kommentar från min sida.

Till slut underströk herr Vladimirov ännu en gång hur goda Finlands och Sovjetunionens relationer är och erbjöd sig att under alla omständigheter "hjälpa till", för såvitt jag hade några "viktiga ärenden". Jag svaade direkt att jag inte kände till något enda sådant ärende, och att sådana frågor dessutom inte hörde till mina uppgifter.

Idag på morgonen ringde mig herr Vladimirov och sade att han hade ett "viktigt ärende" och bad att få komma till mig på eftermiddagen. Då han kom sade han först att hans enda ärende var att önska "god jul". Sedan vi en stund utbytt artigheter förklarade herr Vladimirov att han "ännu inte" hade några nyheter i Wallenberg-ärendet. Eftersom jag inte heller hade väntat några sådana nyheter konstaterade jag bara kort att ärendet föreföll mycket komplicerat. Herr Vladimirov nämnde då, att Sovjetunionen bytte ambassadör i Stockholm dessa dagar. Detta byte var tydligen en anledning till svarets fördröjning, ty som herr Vladimirov sade: "det skulle vara utomordentligt nyttigt för den nye ambassadören, om han i början av sin tjänstgöring kunde ge ett för Sverige tillfredsställande svar i denna för dem så viktiga fråga". Herr Vladimirovs uppträdande hade i någon mån förändrats. Tidigare hade han intagit en något överlägsen och skeptisk attityd. Nu åtminstone låtsades han ta saken på allvar och sade sig helt förstå hur viktig den var för Sverige, samtidigt som han förklarade sig redo att göra allt han förmådde för att "föra saken framåt".

Sedan berättade han som om det vore en viktig nyhet att familjen Wallenberg var i Sverige mycket känd och inflytelserik och tillade, att detta uppenbarligen varit skälet till de svenska myndigheternas envisa agerande till hans förmån. Jag medgav att jag visste att Wallenberg var en känd släkt i Sverige, men jag gav mig inte in på något ytterligare samtal om denna egendomliga uppfattning.

Herr Vladimirov betonade, att det vore oändligt viktigt att finna nya argument för att klara upp Wallenberg-ärendet. Härmed menade han uppenbarligen nya skäl varför det skulle vara fördelaktigt att ge Sverige ett tillfredsställande svar i ärendet, och således inte uppgifter om Wallenberg själv. Jag påpekade då, att den svenska pressen och de svenska myndigheterna redan i årtal understrukt att gåtan Wallenberg väsentligt stör relationerna mellan Sverige och Sovjetunionen, något som sovjetmyndigheterna säkert kände till. Han medgav att så var fallet och försäkrade samtidigt att ett svar "förr eller senare" skulle ges till svenska vederbörande.

Därefter började han tala om sig själv. Han sade sig agera helt "privat", utan att förklara närmare vad han menade med det. Han bad att jag inte skulle nämna dessa samtal för andra än de direkt intresserade. Jag försäkrade att han i det avseendet inte hade något att frukta, och att jag själv alldeles av en slump dragits in i ärendet, som egentligen inte alls hade med mig att göra. Jag hoppades bara att det snarast möjligt skulle kunna avföras från dagordningen.

Herr Vladimirov upprepade sin tidigare uttalande tillfredsställelse över Finlands och Sovjetunionens förträffliga relationer och beklagade, att Wallenberg inte varit finne, ty då hade "saken varit mycket lättare att hantera". Han talade ännu något om den sovjetiska ämbetsapparatusens tröghet och ansåg det möjligt att ärendet hade fastnat på någon nivå. Han ansåg det inte omöjligt att Wallenberg ännu var i livet, fast han tidigare, utan att säga det direkt, hade låtit förstå att det därvidlag inte fanns några som helst förhoppningar.

Då han sade adjö trodde han sig kanske under loppet av januari få något slags "nyheter".

Herr Vladimirov talar finska ganska mödosamt och behärskar inga andra språk förutom ryska. Han uppträder något magisteraktigt, talar gärna själv och fäster ingen större uppmärksamhet vid vad som sägs till honom, kanske beroende på språksvårigheter. Han har aldrig ställt några ömtåliga eller eljest opassande frågor eller förslag, om man inte skall räkna dit det i det föregående nämnda förslaget om ”goda tjänster”.

Helsingfors den 20 december 1956

Åke Frey
Byråchef

Salasähkejäljennös.

Ankara 9.3.1956 klo 17.06
Saap. 10.3. " " 0.41
" min. " " " 7.45
Avattu " " " 9.45
Kirj. " " " 11.00

1

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖN	
26/26 Kap. 56	
1093-56	
6	7
ARKISTOO : 1	

Ressor

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n k i

3 ERITTÄIN SALAINEN. Elokuussa lähetystön taholta tehdyn yksityisaloitteen johdosta Neuvosto-ambassaadin neuvos ERZINE eilen FREYlle ilmoittanut 1) Raoul WALLENBERG Venäjällä 2) taipuvaliset luovuttamaan mikäli elossa 3) ERLANDERin syytä ottaa asia esille käydessään Moskovassa missä venäläisten toivomuksesta Suomen taholta ainoastaan hänelle henkilökohtaisesti huomautettava. Venäläisten pyynnöstä asia pidettävä ehdottoman salaisena.

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Ulkoasiainministeri
Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

— ark.

Vakuudeksi: Eeva Korhonen

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

EK.

N:o 152.

Sala

Vast.ot. 10.3.1956 klo 10.15

Kirj. " " " " 10.50

Ced 26/28 val 86
10/3-86
6 t *Ruotsi*
✓

FINLANDIA

A n k a r a

Tu-5 Mitä tarkoittatte yksityisaloitteella miten motivoitte 3

(Asia: Yksityisaloinne)

Enckell

Ulkoasiainministeri
Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

— Ark.

EK/EK

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

Salasähkejäljennös.

Ankarasta	11.3.1956	klo	17.30
Saap.	12.3.	" "	0.56
" min.	" "	" "	7.55
Avattu	" "	" "	8.10
Kirja	" "	" "	8.55

ed 26 24 Pa. 56
12/5-56
6 F Ruots.
V

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n k i

4 Venäläisten osoitettua mielenkiintoa pohjoismaihin erikoisesti Suomeen huomautimme WALLENBERGIN vapauttaminen edistäisi yhteisymmärrystä Ruotsin kanssa. Lentokuriroimme täys-selostuksen 5

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Vakuudeksi: M.Waltimo

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

EK

Ulkoasiainministeri
Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

—ark.

SUOMEN LÄHETYSTÖ

Ankara, 12 päivänä maaliskuuta 1956.

N:o 202.

Ad 2426 Ca SZ
 1/12/3-SZ
 6
 Ruotsi

Herra Valtiosihteeri R. Seppälä,
 Ulkoasiainministeriö,
 Helsinki.

H.V.

Lähetän tämän mukana lähetystösihteeri Freyn muistion, joka koskee Wallenbergin asiaa. Siitä näet, miten asia on tullut hänen ja Erzine'n kesken puheeksi ja miten viimeainnuttu nyt kotona käydessään on ottanut asian esille ja saanut lupauksen, että koettavat etsiä Wallenbergin, joka on heidän kirjoissaan. On tietysti mahdollista, että hän on kuollut, tai ettei häntä löydetä. Siksi olisi kai parasta sopivalla tavalla asiasta Erlanderille ilmoittaa varottamalla häntä samalla liiallisesta optimismista sekä painostamalla että asiasta ei julkisesti puhuttaisi, ennenkuin se lopullisesti selviää hänen Moskovassa käyntinsä aikana, tai siitä muuten saadaan lisätietoja.

Parhain terveisin

Tuus



LÉGATION DE FINLANDE

P.M.

Noin vuosi sitten ryhtyi Neuvostoliiton tšekiläinen suurlähetystö osoittamaan erikoista mielenkiinota pohjoismaiden edustustoihin. Erikoisen aktiivisena järjestämään kutsuja ym. toimi lähetystöneuvos Pavel Erzine, sota-aikana Lontoossa toiminut miellyttävä ja rehelliseltä vaikuttava diplomaatti. Minua ja vaimoani kohtaan hän on aina ollut hyvin ystävällinen.

Elokuussa 1955, lähetystön ollessa silloin Istanbulissa, kävin kaupallisissa asioissa Ankarassa. Lauantaina 20.8. heräsi eräällä pohjoismaisella lounaalla kysymys Wallenbergista, jolloin useat läsnäolijat käsityksenään ilmoittivat, että nyt olisi otollinen tilaisuus tehdä uusi demarchi, Genèveen henki kun silloin vielä oli ajankohtainen.

Asia jäi jotenkin vaivaamaan minua, ja otin yhteyden Erzineen sekä ryhdyin varovaisesti puhumaan asiasta. Hän suhtautui siihen yllättävän positiivisesti ja pyysi minulta mahdollisimman tarkat tiedot.

Pitkin syksyä kävin moneen otteeseen neuvostoambassaadissa ja sain vähitellen käsityksen, että venäläiset vakavasti harkitsivat Wallenbergin luovuttamista. Puhuin aina vain Erzinen kanssa, mutta hänen ilmoituksensa mukaan suurlähettiläs Podtserob oli myös tietoinen asiasta ja suhtau-

tui siihen positiivisesti.

Erzine kävi marraskuussa Venäjällä ja palasi vasta viikko sitten, jolloin hän ilmoitti sen, minkä olemme sähköllä tiedoittaneet.

Asiasta en ole voinut aikaisemmin ilmoittaa, paitsi tietenkin ministeri Kivikoskelle, sillä venäläiset pyysivät minua olemaan kertomatta asiasta, ennenkuin sitä oli ehditty tarkemmin tutkia. Ensimmäinen sähköemme asiassa lähetettiin venäläisten nimenomaisesta kehoituksesta.

Koko tänä aikana olen saanut sen käsityksen, ettei venäläisillä ollut oikein selvää käsitystä siitä, mitä Raoul Wallenbergin vapauttaminen merkitsisi. On luonnollista, ettei alussa minulle myönnetty hänen olemassaoloakaan, mutta sitä ei kiellettykään.

Palattuaan Moskovasta muutama päivä sitten Erzine itse otti yhteyden minuun ja pyysi saada käydä luonani kotona. Hän sitten kertoi kääntyneensä heti Moskovaan tullessaan "viranomaisten" puoleen, jotka ensin olivat pitäneet asiaa täysin toivottomana, mutta myöhemmin ilmoittaneet tekevänsä mahdollisensa Wallenbergin löytämiseksi ja luovuttamiseksi ruotsalaisille.


Tässä yhteydessä Erzine viittasi Suomen, kuten hän sanoi, tavattomaan goodwilliin Venäjällä ja ehdotti, että Suomen hallitukselle ilmoitettaisiin, että Erlanderin olisi syytä ottaa asia esille käydessään piakkoin Moskovassa. Tämän ehdotuksen hän toisti neljä kertaa, joten sain käsityksen, että hän piti sitä kovin tärkeänä. Koko keskustelun aikana hän ei enää yrittänyt kieltää, että Wallenberg on tai ainakin on ollut Venäjällä, mutta sanoi, että

hän mahdollisesti olisi jo kuollut. Hän lisäsi itse nähneensä dossierit asiassa ja vakuutti venäläisten tosissaan yrittävän löytää hänet tarkoituksella luovuttaa sopivasti Erlanderin käydessä Moskovassa.

Tämän jälkeen hän vielä alleviivasi, että tieto olisi annettava Erlanderille suoraan eikä Ruotsin UD:lle.

Lopulta mainittakoon, ettei Ruotsin täkäläisellä lähetystöllä ole minkäänlaista aavistusta näistä keskusteluista.

Ankarassa, 12 päivänä maaliskuuta 1956.


Åke Frey
Lähetystösihteerri.

Erittäin salainen.

Helsingissä 13 päivänä maaliskuuta 1956.

13/3-56 340A

6 7 Ruotsi

H.V.,

Olemme saaneet ehdottoman salaisina pari sähkettä Ankara-
rasta, joissa sanotaan seuraavaa:

1. Keskusteluissa sikäläisen Neuvostoliiton suurlähetys-
tön kanssa ovat neuvostoliittolaiset osoittaneet erikoista
mielenkiintoa Pohjoismaihin, mikä antoi aiheen meidän puolel-
tamme huomautuksiin, että Wallenbergin vapauttaminen edistäisi
Neuvostoliiton yhteisymmärrystä Ruotsin kanssa. Eräs neuvosto-
ambassadin neuvos sanoi 8.3. läh.siht. Freylle, että Raoul
Wallenberg on ollut Venäjällä ja että neuvostolaiset olisivat
taipuvaisia luovuttamaan hänet, mikäli hän on elossa. Neuvos-
olainen oli myös sanonut, että Erlanderin on syytä ottaa asia
esille käydessään Moskovassa, josta Suomen taholta olisi huoma-
tettava ainoastaan henkilökohtaisesti Erlanderille. Tätä lau-
suntoa oli venäläinen pyytänyt pidettäväksi ehdottoman salai-
sena.

2. Olen koettanut yllä selostaa Ankaran-lähetystön tähän
astiset ilmoitukset mahdollisimman tarkasti, mutta myönnän, et-
tä esitys on puutteellinen. Näin ollen on vaikeata arvostella
onko, ja jos, niin mitä merkitystä mainitun ambassadineuvok-
sen lausunnolla. Kun kuitenkin ruotsalaiset ovat kovin kiinnos-
tuneita Wallenbergin kohtalosta, niin alistan harkittavaksesi,
onko syytä käydä Erlanderin puheilla jo tätä kertomassa. Jos
ilmoituksesta ei olekaan muuta hyötyä, niin jäisi se ainakin
eräänlaiseksi osoitukseksi, että me puolestamme koetamme ruot-
salaisia tässä traagillisessa tapauksessa auttaa.

3. Kun Ankarasta saadut ilmoitukset olivat näin puutteel-
lisia, niin olemme pyytäneet seikkaperäisen selostuksen asias-
ta, jonka Ankaran-lähetystö lupasi 11.3. lähettää lentokurii-
ritse. Nykyisessä tilanteessa ei meillä ole varmaa tietoa sii-
tä, milloin se saapuu perille.

Parhain terveisin

R.R.Seppälä

Suurlähettiläs G.A. Gripenberg
T u k h o l m a

Ulkoaslain- ministeriön kirjelmän jäljennös	Laati	Puhtaaksi- kirjoitti	Varmensi	Näki				Allekirjoitti
					Jaosto- päälikkö	Osasto- päälikkö	Kanslia- päälikkö	
								

LÉGATION DE FINLANDE

Ankarassa, 16.3.1956.

Qd 26/24 (p. 15) 56
1/16/3-56
6 F Ruotsi

Herra Valtiosihteeri R. Seppälä,

Ulkoasiainministeriö,

Helsinki.

H.V.,

Palaten vielä R. Wallenbergiä koskevaan asiaan lähetän tämän mukana jäljennöksen lähetystöneuvos Erzine'n Freylle antamasta kirjallisesta vahvistuksesta. Se on jäljennetty kaikkine kirjoitusvirheineen. Alkuperäisen säilytämme täällä kunnes se voidaan hävittää asian tultua tavalla tai toisella selvitettyksi.

Tämän kirjejäljennöksen voisitte mielestämme toimittaa yksityisesti Erländerille todistukseksi siitä, että asianomaiset ovat tosissaan ja vakavasti asiaa pohtineet, mutta olisi Erländerille samalla huomautettava, ettei hänen millään tavoin pitäisi osoittaa olevansa tietoinen Erzinen interventtiosta kun ja jos hän Neuvostoliiton viranomaisten kanssa puhuu asiasta.

Kirjeen ensimmäiseen kappaleeseen sisältyvä maininta, ~~nn~~ ettei tähän saakka ole tietoja R. Wallenbergista, on ristiriidassa lähetystöneuvos Erzine'n aikaisemmin antaman ilmoituksen kanssa. Tämä johtuu siitä, ettei hän yksinkertaisesti uskaltanut panna paperille, että Wallenberg olisi tai ainakin olisi ollut Neuvostoliitossa.

Lähetystöneuvos Erzine ilmoitti tämän kirjallisen vahvistuksen antaessaan, että neuvostohallitus tulisi joka tapauksessa antamaan totuudenmukaisen vastauksen Erländerille siinäkin tapauksessa että Wallenberg olisi kuollut tai hävinnyt.

Täkääläisessä Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystössä ovat ainoastaan suurlähettiläs Podtserob ja lähetystöneuvos Erzine tietoisia asiasta ja haluavat pysyä ehdottomasti kokonaan salassa, paitsi mitä asian luonteesta johtuen pakosta on eräille henkilöille luottamuksellisesta ilmoitettava (Erländer itse sekä Suomen hallituksen ja ulkoasiainministeriön eräät edustajat). Parasta olisi ettei suurlähettilään nimeä Erländerille eikä muillekaan mainita. Myös Frey toivoi ettei hänen nimeään mainita vaan että hänen osuutensa asiassa jäisi ainaiseksi salaisuudeksi.

Tämän mukana seuraava kirjejäljennöskin olisi paras hävittää, kun se on tarkoituksensa täyttänyt, niin ettei joudu sivulisten käsiin, jolloin se voisi tuottaa ikävyyksiä sen laatijalle, joka on toiminut hyvässä tarkoituksessa ilman minkäänlaisia itsekäitä pyyteitä.

Tuus
Bruno Kivikosa

LÉGATION DE FINLANDE

JÄLJENNÖS.

Private and Confidential

15 March 1956

My dear Ake,

Conforming what I told you last thursday and to avoid any possible misinterpretation I would like to repeat that during my recent visit to Moscow I took up the case of Raul Wallenberg with the people concerned. They told me that the case was known and up to-date there are no news of the man's whereabouts. They declared however that they would be only glad if they could trace him or some information about him.

In case he will be found there would be no obstacle to deliver him to the Sweedish authorities. It would be worthwhile for the Sweedish Prime Minister to inquire about Mr. Wallenberg during his visit to Moscow. (bw) 70-1

As you understand this is very preliminary and my own inquiries must in no case be mentioned by Mr. Erlander because I did it quite unofficially and it is no matter of my concern.

I sincerely hope that the case will come to a successful end.

Sincerely yours

P. D. Erzine

Counsellor of the USSR Embassy

To: Mr. Ake Frey,

in Ankara

Finish Legation in Ankara

Jäljennöksen oikeaksi tädistänyt:

Ryszard Sikorski
M. Frey

UE 16: A 4. *Ankara, 16. 3. 1956*

Salasähkejäljennös

Ankara 17/3 1956 klo 15.33
 Saap. " " " 22.10
 " min. 18/3 " " 7.55
 Avattu " " " 10.40
 Kirj. " " " 10.45

AD 26/28 56
 18/3-56
 6 f Rausti

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n k i

7 Venäläiset kirjehavvistaneet ilmoituksensa Wallenbergista.
 Kuriroimme jäljennöksen annettavaksi Erlanderille jonka asian
 esilleottaessaan ei saisi osoittaa olevansa tietoinen täältä
 lähteneestä aloitteesta

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Vakuudeksi: M.Waltimo

MW

Ulkoasiainministeri

Valtiosihteeri

Pol.os.

Ark.

Sala

N:o 152.

Vast.ot. 19.3.1956 klo 14.25

Kirj. " " " " 14.45

(ed)

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ	
26/24	26/24
19/3-56	19/3-56
6	F
Raoln.	
KASTUON:	

FINLANDIA

A n k a r a

Tu-10 Kuka kirjoitti kenelle sähkökää sanamuoto 7

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Enckell

Tasavallan Presidentti
 Ulkoasiainministeri
 Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

EK/EK

-ark.

Sala

N:o 152

Vast. ot. 19.3.1956 klo 14.25

Kirj. " " " " 14.55

Ulkoasiainministeriön
No 26/24 m. 56
19/3-56
6
P. Rautanen
✓

GRIPENBERG

FINLANDIA

S t o c k h o l m

Ru - 18 Neuvoksen nimi Erzine muistio huomenaamulla
Tukholmaan ensi koneella

Seppälä

Seppälä

Valtiosihteeri

-ark.

EK/EK

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

Erittäin salainen.

Helsingissä 19 päivänä maaliskuuta 1956.

N:o 3650.

QD

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ			
No 26/24 al. 26			
19/3-56 3650			
OSASTO	6	f	Ruotsi
ARKISTOINTI			

H.V.,

Oheisena lähetän Sinulle jäljennöksen Wallenbergin asiaa koskevasta läh.siht.Frey'n muistiosta, joka ei sisällä sanottavasti uutta yli sen, mitä jo Sinulle tiedoitin.

Tänä aamuna kuitenkin saapui uusi sähkö, jossa Ankara ilmoittaa neuvostolaisten kirjeellä vahvistaneen ilmoituksensa Wallenbergista. Kun ei sähköestä selviä enempää, olemme tänään pyytäneet sähköttämään ilmoituksen sanamuodon. Palaamme tähän heti, kun saamme lisätietoja.

Haluan tässä yhteydessä mainita, että min.Törngren viime perjantai-iltana tuli maininneeksi tästä asiasta myös suurläh.Engzellille, joka oli heti tiedoittanut siitä UD:lle, joka on pyytänyt lisätietoja. Kun Engzell tänään niistä minulle puhui, niin huomautin hänelle, että neuvostolaisten toivomuksesta meidän on tiedoitettava asiasta vain Erlanderille. Engzell ymmärsi tämän ja lupasi ilmoittaa UD:lle, että kaikki tiedot toimitetaan Sinun kauttasi Erlanderille. Myös min. Törngren on tämän menettelyn hyväksynyt, koskei hänen taroituksensa ollut kertoa asiasta kuin Engzellille tiedoksi.

Suurlähettiläs G.A.Gripenberg

T u k h o l m a

Ulkoasiainministeriön kirjelmän jäljennös	Laati	Puhtaaksi-kirjoitti	Varmensi	Näki				Allekirjoitti
					Jaosto-päällikkö	Osasto-päällikkö	Kanslia-päällikkö	
		Keh						Ref

5/

Todennäköisesti UD ei tule puoleesi kääntymään tässä asiassa, mutta jos näin kävisi, voisit selittää heille neuvostolaisten nimenomaisen pyynnön tiedoitustapaan nähden.

Parhain terveisin

R.R.Seppälä

Salasähkejäljennös.

Ankara 20.3.1956 klo 12.00
Saap. " " " " 18.41
" min. " " " " 20.10
Avattu 21 " " " 11.00
Kirj. " " " " 13.45

11.

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ	
No 26	124
21/3-56	
RYHMÄ	OLASTO
6	7
ARKISTOON: / 19	

Ulkoasiat

H e l s i n k i

8. ERZINE FREYlle 15. englanniksi. Confirming what I told you last thursday and to avoid any possible misinterpretation I would like to repeat that during my recent visit to Moscow I took up the case of Raoul WALLENBERG with the people concerned. They told me that the case was known and up to date there are no news of the man's whereabouts. They declared however that they would be only glad if they could trace him or some information about him. In case he will be found there would be no obstacle to deliver him to the Swedish authorities. It would be worthwhile for the Swedish Prime Minister to inquire about Mr. WALLENBERG during his visit to Moscow but you understand this is very preliminary and my own inquiries must in no case be mentioned by Mr. ERLANDER because I did it quite unofficially and it is no matter of my concern. I sincerely hope that the case will come to a successful end. 10

(Asia: Yksityisaloite)

Tasavallan Presidentti
Ulkoasiainministeri
Valtiosihteeri
Pol.os.

—ark.

Väkuudeksi: Eeva Korhonen

Ulkoasiainministeriön
sähkösanoman jäljennös.

UM 30: A 4.

EK.

Erittäin salainen.

3899.

Helsingissä 23 päivänä maaliskuuta 1956

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ			
No 26/24		23/3-56-3899	
RYHMÄ	OSASTO	Pääministeri	
6	7	Ruoslahti	
ARKISTOON: / 19			

Hyvä Veli,

Oheisena lähetän vielä Sinulle jäljennöksen läh. Kivikosken kirjeestä t.k. 16 päivältä Wallenbergin asiasta, koska siihen mielestäni sisältyy eräitä lisäpiirteitä, jotka voisit saattaa pääministeri Erlanderin tietoon.

Saatuaan min. Törngreniltä vihiä asiasta on suurläh. Engzell koettanut udella myös lisätietoja. Silitin kuitenkin hänelle, että korrektius tiedonantajiamme kohtaan vaatii, että kaikki tiedot tästä asiasta toimitetaan henkilökohtaisesti päämin. Erlanderille.

Olemme verranneet tämän kirjeen mukana saapuneen hra Erzinen kirjeen tekstin Enckellin Sinulle jo toimittamaan englanninkieliseen tekstiin ja havainneet ne täysin yhtäpitäviksi.

Parhain terveisin

Suurlähettiläs G.A.Gripenberg

R.R.Seppälä

T u k h o l m a

Ulkoasiainministeriön kirjelmän jäljennös	Laati	Puhtaaksi kirjoitti	Varmensi	Näki				Allekirjoitti
					Jaosto-päällikkö	Osasto-päällikkö	Kanslia-päällikkö	
		R. Th.						Act.

8352

13.

Erittäin salainen.

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIO			
Helsingissä 14 päivänä kesäkuuta 1956.			
26/24	26.10.1956		
14/6-56	8352		
RYHMÄ 6	OSASTO F	Ruotsi	
ARKISTOON: / 19			

H.V.,

Ruotsin suurlähettiläs kävi luonani kertoen, että Erlander Moskovassa käydessään oli ottanut esille Raoul Wallenbergin asian, jota neuvostoliittolaiset aluksi vastusteltuaan suostuivat tutkimaan ja lupasivat antaa aikanaan tiedon tutkimustensa tuloksista. Suurlähettiläs kertoi, että vaikka nyt on jo kulunut näin paljon aikaa, ei Neuvostoliiton taholta ole mitään asiasta kuulunut. Koska ruotsalaiset haluaisivat kaikin tavoin selvitystä kiirehtiä, niin ehdotti suurlähettiläs, että Sinä tavatessasi ambassadineuvos Erzinen ottaisit asian hänen kanssaan vielä puheeksi.

Tietenkin ruotsalaisista mitään mainitsematta voisit esim. sanoa hänelle seuraavasti: "Olen nähnyt ruotsalaisista lehdistä ja muutenkin kuullut, että Erlander otti Wallenbergin asian esille Moskovassa, ja lupasivat neuvostolaiset asiaa tutkia. Ruotsin lehdistä päätellen ei kuitenkaan asiasta ole tullut enempää selvyyttä, jotenka näin ollen olisi mielenkiintoista tietää, mitä hra Erzine arvelee, saadaanko ja jos, niin milloin, asiasta selvyys."

Pyytäisin Sinua heti tämän saatuasi vastaamaan,

Lähetystösihteeri Åke Frey

A n k a r a

Ulkoasiainministeriön kirjelmän jäljennös	Laati	Puhtaaksi kirjoitti	Varmensi	Näki				Allekirjoitti
					Jaosto-päällikkö	Osasto-päällikkö	Kanslia-päällikkö	
UM 9: A 4.		K. Frey						Åke Frey

onko Erzine nykyään siellä ja, jos on, niin milloin arvelet saavasi tilaisuuden asiasta hänelle puhua. Luonnollisestikaan ei Sinun pidä mennä asiaa suoraan kysymään, vaan ainoastaan sopivan tilaisuuden tullen ikäänkuin ohimennen ottaa se puheeksi, kun te kerran asiaa aikoinaan niin pitkälle käsittelitte.

Parhain terveisin

R.R.Seppälä

P.S.

Korostan erityisesti, että keskusteluistasi hra E:n kanssa ei saa mitenkään käydä ilmi, että ne tapahtuvat toimeksiannosta. Päinvastoin on Sinun niille annettava kokonaan yksityisharrastelun leima.

Mikäli keskusteluja syntyy, pyydän Sinua laatimaan niistä hyvin seikkaperäiset muistiinpanot.

Tämän kirjeen sisällön voit luonnollisesti ilmoittaa Kivikoskelle.

SUOMEN LÄHETYSTÖ

Ankarassa 24 päivänä kesäkuuta 1956.

N:o 611.

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIO	
No 26/24 al.	SB
7/24/6-56	1
RYHMÄ 6	8
Ruotsi	
ARKISTOO:	1 19

Arvoisa Virkaveli,

Kirjeesi johdosta haluan ensin esiintuoda muutamia yleisiä huomautuksia. Kun palasin Ankarahan huhtikuun puolivälissä, tapasin hyvin pian Erzinen ja hänen apulaisensa Vladilen Fedorovin, joka kuuluu samaan "ammattikuntaan" kuin Erzine itse. Molemmat kysyivät uteliaina minkälaisen vastaanoton olin Helsingissä saanut, ja ilmoitin lyhyesti, ettei minua ainakaan erikoisemmin moitittu. Itse Wallenbergista ja neuvostohallituksen vastauksesta Erlanderille ei ollut puhetta, sillä katsoin asian omasta puolestani päättyneeksi.

Muutama viikko myöhemmin, tavatessani taas Erzinen - minun täytyy huomauttaa, että minulla on häneen hyvin läheiset suhteet - hän kysyi minulta jonkun verran huolestuneena, minkä vaikutuksen arvelin neuvostohallituksen vastauksen tehneen Ruotsissa. Vastasin silloin täysin rehellisesti - vielä erikoisesti korostaen puhuvani yksityishenkilönä - että mikäli saattoi arvella lehtien lausunnoista, vastaus ei ollut läheskään tyydyttävä. Hän kysyi silloin, olinko itse samaa mieltä, jolloin myönsin olevani lisäten, että vastaus oli minulle henkilökohtaisesti tuottanut suuren pettymyksen. Keskustelu päättyi tähän,

Herra Valtiosihteeri R.R. Seppälä,
 Ulkoasiainministeriö,
 Helsinki.

mutta olen joka kerta Erzinen nähdessäni tiedustellut häneltä uutisia, jolloin hänen ainoa vastauksensa on ollut, että asia on "hyvissä käsissä". Koska näissä keskusteluissa ei ole ilmennyt mitään uutta, en ole katsonut aiheelliseksi niillä vaivata Ministeriötä - olen odottanut jotakin konkreettista, jolloin tietenkin olisin siitä viipymättä ilmoittanut.

Kirjeesi saapui otolliseen aikaan, sillä samana iltana tapasin Erzinen Puolan suurlähetystön vastaanotolla. Luonnollisesti mainitsematta mitään kirjeestäsi ryhdyin taas puhumaan Wallenbergin asiasta - siihen minulla oli hyvä veruke, sillä pari päivää aikaisemmin olin Erzinellemme lähettänyt "Newsweek"issä ilmestyneen kirjoituksen, missä ilmoitettiin Wallenbergin kuolleen jo vuonna 1953 ja neuvostohallituksen häpeävän tunnustaa sitä.

Tällöin Erzine kertoi, että kuultuaan mielipiteeni toukokuun alkupäivinä, hän oli pyytänyt suurlähettiläs Podserob'ia lähettämään sähkeen Moskovaan, missä sähkössä ilmoitettiin Wallenbergin arvoituksen selvittämisen olevan erinomaisen tärkeää, siinäkin tapauksessa että W. olisi kuollut jo aikoja sitten. Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystö Tukholmassa olikin sitten - kuten lehdissäkin on mainittu - pyytänyt UD:ltä lisätietoja Wallenbergin tapauksesta, mitkä annettiin 12.5. Johtuiko tämä Podserob'in sähköstä vai oliko se neuvostohallituksen oma, riippumaton aloite, ei Erzine tietänyt. Missään tapauksessa en ole voinut tästä aikaisemmin

ilmoittaa, sillä olin itse tietämätön sähköestä aina viime perjantaihin asti, kirjeesi jo saavuttua.

Kysyin Erzineltä, aiotaanko pysyä nykyisessä salaperäisyydessä, vai onko konkreettinen vastaus yleensä odotettavissa, jolloin hän vastasi, että hänen on vaikeata tehdä uusi interventio, jollei hän saa jotakin erikoisaihetta siihen. Kysyin, mitä hän tarkoitti "erikoisaiheella" (specific reason), jolloin hän vastasi, että jos Suomen tai Ruotsin hallitus epävirallisesti, minun kauttani, antaisi ymmärtää, että kärsivällisyys on lopussa, hän voisi tehdä kolmannen yrityksen. Ohjeittesi yleisävyn mukaisesti vastasin lyhyesti, etten nähnyt mitään mahdollisuutta tällaiseen, jolloin hän huomautti, ettei se ehkä ole tarpeellistakaan. Hän kertoi harkitsevansa asiaa ja mahdollisesti heinäkuun puolivälissä tekevänsä joka tapauksessa uuden yrityksen.

Kysyessäni milloin lopullinen vastaus ehkä on odotettavissa, hän sanoi yrittävänsä kaiken, jotta se annettaisiin minulle henkilökohtaisesti ennen lähtöäni Ankarasta. Ihmettellessäni tätä hän korosti, että aloite oli minun ja että vastaus halutaan myöskin minulle antaa.

Tällainen on tilanne. Haluan vielä erikoisesti alleviivata, ettei minusta ole ollut mitään syytä vaivata sinua täysin akateemisilla keskusteluilla Erzin kanssa, niissä kun ei ole ollut nimeksikään uutta aina viime perjantaihin saakka (22.6.), paitsi omia mielipiteitäni, joiden vaikutuksista (Podserob'in sähkö) minulla ei voinut olla aavistusta.

Edelleenkin haluan korostaa, että koskaan en ole anta-

SUOMEN LÄHETYSTÖ

Ankarassa 31 päivänä heinäkuuta 1956.

N:o. 656.

Arvoisa Veli,

Kuten edellisessä kirjeessäni mainitsin, oli Erzinellä tarkoitus heinäkuun puolivälin tienoilla uudelleen tiedustella Wallenbergin asian kehitystä. Tämän hän tekikin hiljattain, jolloin vastaus oli, ettei kaikista yrityksistä huolimatta mitään jälkeä ole löytynyt.

Tähän Erzine, oman kertomuksensa mukaan, vastasi tiedustellen, onko vastausta pidettävä lopullisena ja siinä tapauksessa, voiko hän sen minulle ilmoittaa edelleen Suomen hallituksen kautta Ruotsin hallitukselle toimitettavaksi.

Erzinen uuteen sähkeeseen tuli pari päivää sitten vastaus. Sen mukaan neuvostohallitus ei halua vielä antaa lopullista, negatiivista vastausta, vaan ilmoittaa jatkuvasti tekevänsä kaiken Wallenbergin löytämiseksi. Erzinen mukaan neuvostohallitus nyt täysin käsittää asian erinomaisen merkityksen ja onkin siinä mielessä ulottanut etsiskelynsä "ulkomaille", t.s. satelliittimaihin.

Herra Valtiosihteeri R.R. Seppälä,

Ulkoasiainministeriö,

H e l s i n k i.

P.M.

Enligt meddelande från legationssekreterare Åke Frey i Ankara hade Erzine för avsikt ånyo förhöra sig om utvecklingen av fallet Wallenberg under medlet av juli månad. Detta gjorde han också nyligen, varvid svaret var, att några spår inte påträffats trots alla försök.

Med anledning av svaret frågade Erzine ytterligare, enligt egen uppgift, om svaret kunde anses vara slutgiltigt och, därest så vore fallet, kunde han meddela legationssekreterare Frey därom för vidarebefordran genom finska regeringen till svenska regeringen.

Svar på Erzines nya telegram inkom för några dagar sedan. Enligt detta önskar sovjetregeringen inte ännu avgiva slutgiltigt, negativt svar, utan meddelar, att den fortsättningsvis gör allt för att finna Wallenberg. Enligt Erzine är sovjetregeringen nu fullt på det klara med ärendets synnerliga vikt och har också i detta avseende utsträckt sina efterforskningar "utomlands" d.v.s. till satellitländerna.

Utsikterna för Wallenbergs påträffande äro, enligt Erzine, synnerligen små, men sovjetregeringen önskar inte i något fall giva slutgiltigt, negativt svar, förrän alla försök visat sig vara fruktlösa. Erzine omnämner, att sovjetregeringen beaktat alla antydningar som den erhållit från svenska myndigheter, men utan resultat.

På legationssekreterare Freys förfrågan, trodde Erzine, att Wallenberg avlidit, svarade han, att detta beklagligtvis är sannolikt, men att en sanningsenlig uppgift även i detta fall kommer att tillställas svenska regeringen.

Sådan är situationen i slutet av juli. Erzine lovade omedelbart underrätta legationssekreterare Frey om ärendets nya skeden, därest sådana ännu tillkomma. Han trodde sig kunna meddela sovjetregeringens slutgiltiga svar till legationssekreterare Frey i slutet av september.

Helsingfors 10.8.1956.

29/11-13
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 Fray
 min
 pol. P.
 Viik
 O-

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ

Salainen ja henkilökohtainen.

P.M.

Sen jälkeen kun silloinen valtiosihteeri Seppälä viime heinäkuussa Ruotsin suurlähettiläs Engzellin pyynnöstä kehoitti minua uudelleen tiedustelemaan Neuvostoliiton Aukaran suurlähetystön neuvokselta, herra Erzine'ltä, milloin luvattu vastaus Raoul Wallenbergin asiassa oli odotettavissa (aikaisempi yksityiskohtainen kirjeenvaihto tästä kosketuksesta löytyy ministeriön arkistosta), ei asiassa ole tapahtunut oleellista muutta. Saatoin silloin vastata suurlähettiläs Seppälälle, että herra Erzine lupasi kiirehtiä tutkimuksia, mutta että toiveet Wallenbergin hengissä olemisesta olivat melkein olemattomat. Toisaalta luvattiin silloin jonkinlainen selvitys, joista ennakkotieto ja mahdollisesti annettaisiin minulle.

Minun lähtöäni Aukarasta syyskuun lopussa asiasta käytännöllisesti katsoen ei tapahtunut muuta, kuin että herra Erzine erittäin ylimalkaisesti antoi minulle epämääräisiä vihjauksia siitä, että minua mahdollisesti myöhemmin otettaisiin yhteys tässä kysymyksessä.

Neuvostoliiton suurlähetystön vastaanotolla lokkuun vallankumouksen johdosta saapui minua puhuttelemaan emmestään tuntematon venäläinen, joka ilmoitti olevansa toinen lähetystösihteeri Vladimirov. Hän ryhtyi heti puhumaan Aukarasta ja lähetystöneuvos Erzine'stä ja pyysi saada tilaisuuden keskustella kanssani, ehdottaen että kävisin suurlähetystössä häntä tapaamassa. Koska monestakin syys

valkoinen kirja, johon sisällytetään sellainen todistusaineisto, jota toistaiseksi ei ole neuvostoviranomaisille luovutettu. Hän korosti, että nimenomaan tätä seikkaa on pidettävä ehdottoman salaisena.


4. Mikäli Ruotsin hallitus joutuu julkaisemaan tällaisen kirjan, on odotettavissa "mielipidemyrsky", jolla saattaa olla arvaamattomia seurauksia sekä johtaa Ruotsin nykyisen ulkopolitiikan täydelliseen tarkistamiseen.

Edellämainitun johdosta hän lausui vakavan toivomuksen, että kaikin voimin yrittäisiin säilyttää kosketukseni venäläisiin tässä asiassa ja mikäli mahdollista saada selville ajoissa, minkälainen Neuvostoliiton hallituksen lopullinen vastaus tulee olemaan, jotta ehkä viime tingassa voitaisiin välttää valkoisen kirjan julkaisemista. Ilmoitin tämän johdosta, etten katsonut voivani asiassa tehdä muuta kuin odottaa mahdollisia uutisia, mihin käsitykseen herra Lundberg täydellisesti yhtyi, esittäen kiitoksensa tähän saakka Suomen taholta annetuista tiedoista.

Mainittakoon, että keskustelussa oli läsnä Ruotsin ulkoasiaindepartementin Wallenberg-erikoistuntija herra Lorentzon.

Olen pitänyt selvänä velvollisuutenani saattaa edelläolevan ensi tilassa Herra Valtiosihteerin tietoon. Tästä muistiosta on ainoastaan tämä, omakätisesti kirjoitettu kappale olemassa.

Helsingissä, 23 päivänä marraskuuta 1956


Åke Frey
Jaostopäällikkö

Wallenberg, Reoul

P.M.

Muistiossa 23 päivältä marraskuuta 1956 olen tehnyt selkoa keskusteluistani herra Vladimirovin ja herra Lundbergin kanssa. Kuten muistiossa mainitsin, en katsonut asiakseni näiden keskustelujen johdosta ryhtyä mihinkään toimenpiteisiin, vaan jäin odottamaan mahdollista kosketusta herra Vladimirovin taholta.

Kuluvan joulukuun 7 päivänä hän soittikin minulle ja pyysi saada tulla luokseni seuraavana päivänä. Saapuessaan hän ryhtyi aluksi laajalti selostamaan Unkarin tapahtumia, todeten mm. valittaen, että Neuvostoliiton vaivalloisesti rakentama goodwill oli tämän johdosta jokseenkin hävinnyt. Tämän jälkeen hän rupesi puhumaan Wallenbergista, jolloin mainitsin hiljattain lukeneeni lehdistä Ruotsin tehneen uuden esityksen Moskovassa. Tähän herra Vladimirov ei kiinnittänyt lainkaan huomiota, vaan pyysi minua hänelle selittämään, mistä syystä Ruotsissa tätä tapausta pidettiin niin tärkeänä. Yritin tehdä tämän ja lisäsin, etteivät Unkarin tapahtumat ja maailmanpoliittinen tilanne mitenkään olleet vähentäneet Ruotsin viranomaisten ja yleisön kiinnostusta tähän asiaan.

Herra Vladimirov lausui tällöin, että hänen mielestään varmasti liioittelun asian tärkeyttä mutta ilmoitti kuitenkin "kiinnittävänsä huomiota esittämiin näkökohtiin. Tiedustelin, mikä hänen käsityksensä mukaan oli syynä siihen, että jo viime huhtikuussa neuvostohallituksen taholta Ruotsin pääministerille antama, julkisuuteenkin saatettu vakuutus selvittää Wallenbergin kohtaloa, ei vielä ole johtanut mihinkään tulokseen. Tällöin herra Vladimirov lausui, etteivät toimenpiteet vielä ilmeisesti ole johtaneet tuloksiin ja että neuvostoviranomaiset saattavat pelätä voimakasta reaktiota Ruotsissa, jollei vastaus ole tyydyttävä. Huomautin

tähän, ei käsitykseni mukaan tästä pitäisi olla mahdotonta sopia etukäteen Ruotsin viranomaisten kanssa. Herra Vladimirov oli innostuvinaan tällaisesta "uudesta mahdollisuudesta" ja teki jopa joitakin muistutinpanoja. Tämän jälkeen hän ryhtyi uudelleen puhumaan Unkarista, vakuuttaen, että neuvostohallituksen päätös oli tehty "raskain sydämin" ja että Unkarin oma asenne, Varsovan sopimuksen irtisanominen ym. vaikeutti sovintoratkaisun aikaansaamista, kuten myös samanaikaisesti tapahtunut Israelin hyökkäys Egyptiin sekä Englannin ja Ranskan toimenpiteet Lähi-Idässä. Neuvostohallitus oli kuulemma istunut 8 tuntia yhtämittaa kokouksessa, ja pelko Ukrainan asennoitumisesta oli oleellisesti vaikuttanut interventiivä päätöksen puolesta. Näiden yleispoliittisten "katseusten" johdosta en tehnyt minkäänlaisia kommentaareja.

Lopulta herra Vladimirov vielä alleviivasi, kuinka hyvät Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton väliset suhteet ovat ja tarjontui kaikissa suhteissa "auttamaan", mikäli minulla olisi joitakin "tärkeitä asioita". Vastasin suoraan, ettei tiedossani ollut ainuttakaan tämänkaltaista asiaa, ja ettei tällaisten asioiden hoito sitäpaitsi kuulunut tehtäviini.

Tänä aamuna herra Vladimirov soitti minulle, ilmoittaen, että hänellä oli "tärkeä asia" ja pyysi saada tulla luokseni iltapäivällä. Tullessaan hän ensin ilmoitti käyntinsä tarkoitukseksi ainoastaan toivottaa "hyvää juhlaa". Vaihdettuamme jonkun aikaa yleisiä kohteliaisuuksia herra Vladimirov ilmoitti, ettei hänellä "vieläkään" ollut mitään uutisia Wallenbergin asiassa. Koska en tällaisia uutisia odottanutkaan, huomautin vain lyhyesti, että asia näyttää kovin mutkikkaalta. Herra Vladimirov mainitsi silloin, että Tukholmassa vaihdetaan näinä päivinä Neuvostoliiton suurlähettiläs. Tämä vaihto oli kuulemma yhtenä syynä vastauksen viipymiseen, sillä kuten herra Vladimirov ~~sen~~ lausui; "olisi uudelle suurlähettiläälle erittäin hyödyllistä, jos hän virkauransa alussa voisi antaa Ruotsia tyydyttävän vastauksen tässä heille

niin tärkeässä asiassa."Herra Vladimirovin käytös oli jonkun verran muuttunut. Aikaisemmin hän oli omaksunut hieman ylimielisen ja skeptillisen asenteen. Nyt hän ainakin oli ottavinaan asian vakavasti ja lausui täysin ymmärtävänsä kuinka tärkeä se on Ruotsille, ilmoittaen samalla olevansa valmis tekemään kaiken mahdollisen asian "edesauttamiseksi."

Tämän jälkeen hän ikäänkuin tärkeänä uutisena kertoi Wallenbergin perheen olevan Ruotsissa hyvin tunnetun ja vaikutusvaltaisen ja lisäsi, että tämä ilmeisesti on ollut syynä Ruotsin viranomaisten itsepintaiseen toimintaan hänen hyväkseen. Myönsin tietäväni, että Wallenberg on tunnettu suku Ruotsissa, mutta en antautunut sen enempään keskusteluihin tästä oudosta käsityksestä.

Herra Vladimirov korosti, että olisi äärettömän tärkeätä löytää uusia argumentteja Wallenbergin asian selvittämiseksi. Tällä hän ilmeisesti tarkoitti uusia syitä, miksi olisi edullista antaa Ruotsia tyydyttävä vastaus asiassa, eikä siis tietoja itse Wallenbergista. Huomautin tällöin, että Ruotsin lehdistö ja viranomaiset jo vuosikausia ovat alleviivanneet, että Wallenbergin arvoitus oleellisesti häiritsee Ruotsin ja Neuvostoliiton välisiä suhteita, mikä seikka varmasti on neuvostoviranomaisten tiedossa. Hän myönsi tämän oikeaksi, vakuuttaen samalla, että vastaus "ennemmin tai myöhemmin" annetaan Ruotsin viranomaisille.

Tämän jälkeen hän rupesi puhumaan itsestään. Hän kertoi toimivansa täysin "yksityisesti", selittämättä tarkemmin mitä hän tällä tarkoitti. Hän pyysi, ettei näistä keskusteluista mainittaisi muille kun asiasta välittömästi kiinnostuneille. Vakuutin, ettei hänellä siinä suhteessa ollut mitään pelättävää, ja että itse aivan sattumalta olin joutunut tekemisiin asian kanssa, joka ei oikeastaan lainkaan kuulunut minulle. Toivoin vaan, että se mahdollisimman pian saataisiin pois päiväjäestyksestä.

Herra Vladimirov toisti aikaisemmin lausumansa tyydytyksen

Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton erinomaisiin suhteisiin ja valitti, ettei Wallenberg ollut suomalainen, sillä silloin "asia olisi paljon helpommin hoidettavissa." Hän vielä puhui jonkun verran Neuvostoliiton virkakoneiston kankeudesta ja piti mahdollisena, että asia on jäänyt kiinni johonkin portaaseen. Hän ei pitänyt mahdollisena, että Wallenberg vielä olisi elossa, vaikka aikaisemmin, sanomatta sitä suoraan, oli antanut ymmärtää ettei siihen nähden ollut juuri mikäänlaisia toiveita.

Lähtiessään hän arveli ehkä saavansa tammikuun kuluessa jonkinlaisia "uutisia".

Herra Vladimirov puhuu melko vaivalloisesti suomea eikä hallitse muita kieliä, venäjää lukuunottamatta. Hän esiintyy jonkun verran opettajamaisesti, puhuu mielellään itse eikä paljon kiinnitä huomiota siihen, mitä hänelle sanotaan, johtuen mahdollisesti kieli-vaikeuksista. Hän ei ole koskaan esittänyt mitään arkaluontoisia tai muuten sopimattomia kysymyksiä tai ehdotuksia, jollei sellaiseksi lueta aikaisemmin mainittua "hyvien palvelustensa" tarjoamista.

Helsingissä, 20 päivänä joulukuuta 1956

Åke Frey
Jaostopäällikkö

14/5-57
P. P. Tämän jälkeen on ollut Norjasta tied.
toja. Joulun mukana Frey oli julkaissut "suulla suu-
reunalla" mahdollisesti samankaltaan SNT:n vii-
meisen kauden. - Hän on tainnut itse pyytää
kiittäkää ja kiitos on viivästyttävä, että
näin on, mutta tiedän, että herra Vladimirov
on kuitenkin jättänyt häntä rauhaan. - Katso
että on parasta, että Frey joutuu taistelemaan
UM:stä eikä vielä tulokseen. Terve. -
Suljet kättäsi. PKT! L. T.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (13)

1999-03-14

Handläggare: H MAGNUSSON

Delgivning från
kryptexpeditionen
enl. adressering/samt
UMK
BMK

12

EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

B R Å D S K A N D E

UD/EC/Amb Jan Lundvik
990318

t. amb Riga

Re RAOUL WALLENBERG

Till: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: EI (L Olson), amb Moskva (Foyer/Wallberg)

Jag har nu haft tillfälle att gå igenom de många och långa meddelandena från S Mesinai resp S Berger och har därför sammanställt mina kommentarer i bilaga 1. Där kommenteras Mesinais anteckningar från mötet den 22 februari, hennes PM om utestående personakter som skall granskas, PM om registreringsnummer i Butyrka m m. Vad gäller de s k troféfonderna är det ännu flera oklara frågeställningar. Ett förslag kunde vara att Mesinai och Berger gemensamt försöker formulera ett nytt utkast. Slutligen bifogas som bilaga 2 en reviderad och utvidgad frågelista till ryska sidan (dvs de 20 frågor som översändes inför mötet i Moskva). Den bör granskas (både i Stockholm och Moskva) och förses med ev tillägg, speciellt vad gäller frågan om bruket av registreringsnummer. Om Susan Mesinai redan skrivit tillägg till en del av dessa frågor, så har jag inte erhållit detta papper. Mina kommentarer har skrivits på engelska.

MAGNUSSON

1999-03-13

α (13)

Raoul Wallenberg - comments to the report from the
meeting on 22 February etc.

I. Comments to S Mesinai's notes from the meeting in Moscow on February 22, 1999 (many thanks for the detailed report).

page 1, second paragraph, first line: "Mr Kozachev".

page 1, last sentence: delete ("Even if...general public").

page 7, first paragraph, NOTE: Clarification: The Russians were able to provide us with the interrogation schedule of Langfelder (in the absence of his personal file), thanks to the registry of calls to interrogation. Also the interrogation schedule for RW could be established from this registry (where their names in most instances had been painted over).

page 8, second last paragraph (within parenthesis): Yes you gave a short but not complete summary of findings on Vladimir numbering system etc. I think it is enough to mention this here.

page 9, third paragraph (Vinogradov). As far as I remember there was an act on the execution and death, not on the burying/cremation, but I might be wrong.

page 9, fourth paragraph, (Important note post meeting): This information motivates adding one question to our list.

page 9, fifth paragraph: requires follow-up question to the original one.

page 10, fifth paragraph(Mesinai): please not that the birth year of this numbered prisoner was 1909.

page 11, third paragraph(Note): would you formulate the question?

page 11, fourth paragraph(note): could you give us the list of these Balts. Stockholm could forward relevant requests to Tallinn and Vilnius. I guess, though, that most files on important Balts, are in Russia.

page 11, sixth paragraph(Note): the observation on Galitsky is correct.

page 13, fifth paragraph(On Schlitter/Scheuer): Mr Vinogradov said that this file had been brought back to the Special archive. But we will repeat the question.

page 13, second last paragraph(Question8). This was on Pitovranov. Mr Vinogradov said that no answers had been received from Mr Pitovranov on the written questions presented to him, as he was very ill. I said we should not then insist.

page 13, last paragraph(Question 9): Vinogradov said it would create problems to confirm in written that the Swedish side was not entitled to view in their archival context all original documents. I said we would like to keep this question open(i e on the table) until the end of our work.

page 14, third paragraph from bottom(Magnusson on Smoltsov). I said that the Swedish analysis had not been able to prove with the same amount of certainty(as the Russian analysis) that the Smoltsov report had actually been written by Smoltsov. The request for additional documents written by Smoltsov is not primarily in order to be able to establish the authenticity of his handwriting but more to understand Smoltsov's role.

page 15, three last paragraphs(Nikishkin and note): Even if Butyrka was the "most meticulous record-keeping institution"(an assertion I am not sure of)it still does not rule out that many files/registries have been destroyed, because this is something we have been told several times over the years by several people(Please check with Memorial).

page 16, second and third paragraphs(intercepts): My question referred to Soviet intercepts of german traffic and Vinogradov understood it in that way. I think the Russians need to think about this, but

probably they will have difficulties to give a positive reply. I said that we had asked the Swedish Signal Intelligence, which had not been able to find any intercepts relating to Raoul Wallenberg.

II. Comments to paper by Susan Mesinai of March 8 (mainly on the files)

The information from BBC on the registry of incoming prisoners going to Beria may be of interest but may also be of routine character. Perhaps it could disclose somewhat more about Beria's role (so far very much in the shade).

As to the remaining files I don't remember Nikishkin expressing himself as categorically negatively as you say, but we should any way insist on your seeing these files, and also that any missing file would have to be explained/justified in written form. If a new letter is needed to Stepashin and/or the Minister of Justice I have nothing against that, but perhaps first the Embassy via Tuchnin could try to establish how many more files that are on the list will be made available. Do you intend to give your list with the comments?

Has not the file on BAJ been shown earlier?

On BETHLEN, our embassy in Budapest has heard from the former Hungarian ambassador in Moscow that Stalin wanted to keep him in reserve for some time as a future potential leader. When that option was abandoned Bethlen, together with other prominent prisoners, was brought to Ivanovo to "starve to death". Bethlen had by then got a Russian name in the files.

KUPRYANOV may be less important as we have his diaries from prison, where his route is given.

On MUNTHERS, which is the recent sighting you refer to.

III. Comments to paper by S Mesinai on Reconstruction of the missing Butyrka registry.

Do you want to hand in this paper more or less as you have written it? It might be enclosed to the list of 20+ questions.

On the last but one paragraph on page one, you talk about the Second Main Directorate (MVD). This is a

misunderstanding. It is always the question about MGB/KGB, never MVD in the 40's and 50's.

IV. Comment to E-mail from S Mesinai 1999-03-09 (VERY LITTLE TIME-2).

Again, MVD/Pitovranov is not correct. Pitovranov was all the time in MGB/KGB.

V. Comment to E-mail from S Mesinai 1999-03-09 (VERY LITTLE TIME-1)

Of the materials you mention in the first paragraph I have not seen the draft letter to Tuchnin on Registrations (except concerning Butyrka), nor have I seen the selected methods/questions.

I will include a request on Gfornier in the list, as well as that of Huber (if it exists).

Third paragraph: On Richter, nothing rules out anything, but I recall nothing about Budapest or RW from the interrogation protocols for Richter, even if I don't remember today what was the contents of the interrogation on July 17, 1947. Anyway I think we can leave this aside.

VI. The trophy files.

The picture I get from reading Susanne's and your exchange of messages is still quite confuse. Would it be possible for you two to agree on a consolidated text, which should preferably not be longer than the original draft or with more detail? There are still two options I suppose, on more open-ended and vague, the other more specific and limited.

VII. List of questions.

My new draft is sent as enclosure no 2. Please check it and add/revise where appropriate.

Hans Magnusson

1999-02-08

Revised 1999-03-04

Raoul Wallenberg: some questions and observations to be discussed at a meeting in Moscow on February 22, 1999. (Revised after the meeting; changes and additions marked in italics).

The Swedish side of the working group on Raoul Wallenberg would like to draw the attention of the Russian side to the following questions and observations, of which several refer to earlier requests from Ms Mesinai. Some additional points will be brought up orally. (These have been added at the end of this list).

As a general point the importance of fully implementing the outstanding work programme in accordance with the Russian-Swedish agreement late 1997 should be stressed.

1. Although this matter has been touched upon, there is still a certain confusion, at least on the Swedish side, concerning the use of registration numbers for prisoners of war as well as the sources available for establishing such registration numbers and for establishing cell numbers. It would be valuable to clarify this in a conclusive way. In this context, it would be appreciated if access could be granted to review the Lubyanka registry for the years 1945-1952. The Swedish side is grateful for the access given to the Lubyanka registry (kartoteka). As to the varying use of registration numbers for prisoners arriving to and kept in Vladimir/Ivanovo/Lubyanka/Lefortovo (some examples were given during the meeting) it would seem to be of interest for the investigation if the Russian side could give a clear picture of the various numbering systems used (we are not talking of the so-called numbered prisoners here). Enclosed, please find a further elaboration of this matter by Ms Mesinai.

Furthermore, the Swedish side has understood it so, that information on cell occupancy of a prisoner is to be found mainly in the personal file or, if such a file is missing, in the documents relating to exchange of correspondence between authorities. Sometimes cell occupancy can also be seen from the registration cards(?). Can this understanding be confirmed? Are there any other sources for establishing cell numbers?

2. For Franz Rudolf Gfrorener, the Russian side has indicated that he on 11 February 1952 was sentenced to be executed by a firing squad and that the execution was carried out on 30 April 1952. It would be important to find the document confirming this in the prescribed legal way and also the document confirming if he was cremated and where he was buried. The requested additional information was given at the meeting. Could a copy of this document be handed over? Furthermore, considering the research undertaken in American, British and JOINT archives by Ms Mesinai and notwithstanding that Mr Lyrvall and myself were kindly given the possibility to study the investigative file of Gfrorener, it would be appreciated if Ms Mesinai could also be permitted to go through this file once. The same access is asked for the investigative file of Ernst HUBER.

3. Concerning numbered prisoners. It was earlier established in the Working group, that prisoner no.1 in Vladimir was a Hungarian, born 1909, but later there appeared to have been some uncertainty concerning the birth year. Could this be confirmed again?

In one of the working group meetings Mr Galitsky said that he had been able to establish the identity of all numbered prisoners in the so called Op Fund 451. Could the full list be made available (we presume that it does not only refer to Vladimir). At the meeting it was claimed that Mr Galitsky had only been able to establish the identity of some numbered prisoners. What is correct?

In april 1947 a group of numbered prisoners was sent to Ivanovo. In a document instructions and guidelines for numbered prisoners were established (this will be presented at the meeting). This document might lead to the discovery of similar documents for Vladimir and other special prisons/camps/institutions. Some comments were given by the Russian side to these questions during the meeting. As much further information on guidelines etc for numbered prisoners

as possible would seem important.

4. In its reply of 16 December 1998 on the questions of Ms Susan Mesinai, the Russian side says that Otto Hatz, i a, was interrogated on 27.01, 29.01, 08.04 and 19.04 in the year 1947. However, in accordance with lists previously presented by the Russian side, Hatz was also interrogated on 08.08 in 1947 (by Solovov).

It was also stated in the Russian answer that Hatz was interrogated on 18.07, 22.07 and 23.07 1947. These dates can not be found on the above-mentioned list earlier presented. The necessary clarification was given during the meeting.

5. It would be valuable to have a clear idea about which files/documents exist for the Swiss diplomats Feller and Maier and to be given access to these. Also to this question the requested response was given.

6. It seems that for Walter Schlüter/Scheuer the sequence of pagination in his file is broken. This should be discussed. I understand that the file of Schlüter/Scheuer has been given back to the Special Archive. A clarification would still be appreciated.

7. According to the Russian answer, no file has been found on Field Noel. It should be pointed out that the first name is Noel and the surname is Field.

8. On 17 November 1997 some written questions were given to Mr Pitovranov. Have any answers been received? In view of the explanation given by the Russian side this question does not require any further action for the time being.

9. In one of the working group meetings the Russian side said it could not grant the Swedish request to be able (through independent experts) to review archive documents in original in their archive context (this mainly, but not only, is valid for the FSB archive). It would be important to have this policy confirmed in written. This question could be left open and pending until the final stage of the work.

10. In his letter to Mr Dahl, Minister at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, of 10 August 1998, Mr Kuznetsov said, in response to a letter from the Swedish Embassy, that search for and handing over of medical documents signed by the MGB Doctor Mr Smoltsov can only be done on the basis of a decision by the working group. It would be valuable to discuss this.

This is not in order to be able to establish with more certainty the authenticity of Dr Smoltsov's signature but rather to understand his importance and role in Lubyanka in relation to Abakumov, Mironov and others.

11. Another reply in that letter was that it is at present impossible to put together a list of the prisoners who were transferred from Butyrka to Lefortovo, as the investigation on this is not completed. Has it been completed by now? *It is understood that most documents from Butyrka have been destroyed, but some conclusions might be drawn from Lefortovo documents?*

12. It is obvious that the Soviet Union during the last year of the war managed to intercept, by way of signal intelligence, cable and telegram/radio traffic between Budapest-Berlin and Budapest-Bukarest, including OKW field cables, communications of the German Embassy Budapest, Abwehr, Gestapo, Stab Becher, SD, Sonderkommando Eichmann with RSHA. We could discuss how access to this material could be arranged in the most practical way.

13. It would be valuable to study any Smersh/NKVD/MGB memoranda on prisoners of war, from the period 1945-47 (relating to the Conference on reparations).

14. The Russian side has earlier, without success so far, been trying to locate protocols of interviews/interrogations conducted by Frontline Red Army Units (incl. Smersh) of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, with certain persons in Budapest who either worked in the Swedish Legation or with Raoul Wallenberg's relief efforts.

The names discussed so far have been:

- Ivar Danielsson
- Per Anger
- Lars Berg
- Denes P. von Mezey
- Yngve Ekmark
- Goete Carlsson
- Margareta Bauer
- Birgit Brulin (all from the Swedish legation)
- Valdemar Langlet (Swedish Red Cross)

It might also be worthwhile to try to locate any material from interrogations with the following persons:

- Nina Langlet
- Asta Nilsson
- Simon Margel

-Sixten von Bayer
 -Weyermann
 -Friedrich(Fritz) Born
 -Ernst(Erno) Kugel
 -Antonio Vidmar(all Swedish or International Red Cross)

Peter Hain, Karoly Szabo, Evald Maxson Engestrom, Laszlo Kelemen, Laszlo Geiger, Ivan Szekely, Pal Hegedus, Tibor Vador, Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Miklasz Krausz, Pal Szalai, Peter Zuercher, Erno Peto, Laszlo Ferency, Laszlo Falk, Razso Mueller, Otto Fleischmann, Jozsef Benes, Andor Balog, Max Fleischmann, Hugo Wohl, Vilmos Forgecs, Guyla Simon/Stephanie Simon, Vilmos Tarcsai, Helene and Raszlo Falk, Stefan Engelmann, Karoly Wilhelm, Peter Sugar, Konstantin Takasczy(all from Raoul Wallenberg's staff or his international contacts).
For the new names the Swedish side will try to establish more personal data.

15. Has any correspondence, including communications on behalf of third parties, relating to the Swedish Legation's in Budapest role as Protective Power of Soviet interests in Hungary, been discovered in Russian(mainly MID) archives? It would be of interest to have access to this.

16. Documentary sources indicate that Mellaneuropeiska AB, the company where Raoul Wallenberg was co-director, had numerous contacts with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm. There are sources indicating that Raoul Wallenberg even had plans to travel from Budapest to Moscow in 1944(before his mission) and that the Trade Delegation had been informed about Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission. Could access be given to the files of the Soviet Trade delegation in Stockholm, for the years 1942-1947?

17. Access to records of the Hungarian Political Police, Section for War Criminals, headed by Gabor Peter, 1945-46; records of the Russian Liaison Agency in Budapest for these years, concerning the interrogations of Kurt Andreas Becher conducted from November 14-December 1, 1945(we know that the Russian side has been trying to locate these interrogation protocols before). A document on Becher recently received from Hungarian archives is enclosed.*)

18. The working group has several times discussed the possible links between Raoul Wallenberg and his fate and Walter Schellenberg. Materials on Schellenberg is still being reviewed in several international

archives and it would be appreciated to be given access also to the documents relating to Schellenberg available in Russian archives.

19. In the working group we have discussed the contacts in Ankara between the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Pavel Erzine, and a Finnish diplomat, Mr Ake Frey, as well as later contacts between the Soviet diplomat in Helsinki, Mr Vladimirov and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, relayed to Stockholm, concerning Raoul Wallenberg. These contacts took place in 1955-56 and, in short, indicated an interest or readiness on the Soviet side to discuss, in the early phase, the possibilities of finding Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union, and in a later phase, after Swedish Prime Minister Erlander's visit to Moscow, to have informal Swedish-Soviet discussions on the Soviet reply to the Swedish "demarche", including new testimonies, already before such a reply was worked out on the Soviet side. So far, the Russian side has been able to find three documents on Mr Erzine's contacts with Mr Frey, which give a somewhat different and less sensational picture of these conversations than the reports of Mr Frey. Furthermore, in a conversation I personally had with Mr Vladimirov in 1993, he confirmed the Soviet attempts to have informal discussions with Sweden in late 1956, in order to be able to work out "the most suitable answer", an answer also described by him as approximately a "half-truth".

It would be of great interest to investigate if any further material on these contacts could be located in Russian archives. For example, it appears that, at the time, Mr Boris Fedorovich Podtserov was Soviet ambassador in Ankara. He was earlier the Head of Mr Molotov's secretariat in the Foreign Ministry, and was probably the only person, apart from Mr Molotov himself, who might have been able to read the letter from Mr Abakumov of July 17, 1947. There are also indications that Mr Podtserov was personally in contact with Moscow from Ankara on the Raoul Wallenberg matter. Could there, in the MID archive, or in any other archive, be any documents relating to Mr Podtserov, either from his time as Ambasssador in Ankara or from earlier times, containing anything about Raoul Wallenberg?

20. Some of the questions from Ms Mesinai to the Russian side have not been commented upon in the replies of December(FSB) and January(MVD). Inter alia, this is the case for
-the question on foreign prisoners shot during the period when *rasstrel* was not carried out(May 1947

until February 1952).

-the question on the "American" departments of Smersh/MGB, whether they could at any time have been indirectly involved or consulted in the Raoul Wallenberg case.

-the question relating to Schandl and Ionov.

-the question on the respective competence of the Internal prison, the Transport Directorate and the prison department in emergency cases like the suicide attempt of Gudenko or the death of Roedl.

-the need to have a clearer understanding of the deaths of Jankowski and prisoner no. 11 on March 13, 1953.

-the question why Loyda(1947), Beckerle(1952) and Konoye were brought back to Moscow from their respective destinations. Who ordered this? A complete list of Konoye's cellmates.

New questions, raised orally during the meeting on February 22, 1999.

21. This related to the continuation and conclusion of the study of personal files included in the list of approximately 100 files given to the Russian side. It is extremely important for the investigation and for its credibility that as many as possible of the remaining files are made available for Ms Mesinaí. This is fully in accordance with the agreement already made. The absence of any file should be justified/explained in written, separately for each file.

22. This concerned the finalization of the analysis of the Vladimir registry cards. This question would also be brought up with the Ministry of Justice. A positive answer has now been given. This is very gratifying.

23. Referred to a request relating to the so-called Trophy files, in accordance with the original agreement with the Russian side. The written request will soon be presented to the Russian side.

24. The Swedish side informed that it would prepare an additional request to the SVR (taking into account the informal views - non-paper - presented by the Russian co-chairman of the Working group). The request is enclosed.

25. A request was presented to have access to all documents describing the death of the prisoner Oggins

and the circumstances surrounding it. This case is of particular interest in view of the time aspect and the documents describing a "conspiratorial" solution on the highest political levels.

26. The Swedish side asked the Russian side to give a description of the character of the camp at Krasnogorsk.

27. There was a discussion whether any additional documents or information existed on the prisoner of war Katona, who sat together with Langfelder.

28. According to a Comintern foreign prisoner who was imprisoned for some time in Lubyanka (she has published a book about this), Lubyanka had in the forties its own crematory. Could this be confirmed.

29. The Russian side is reminded about the very important suggestion to make available to Ms Mesinai a counterpart with access to and good knowledge about the key archives. Such a person could on a continuous basis answer questions and take necessary additional measures, thus speeding up the work and reducing the need for presenting long written lists of questions.

Hans Magnusson
Ambassador

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 ~~13~~ (13)

1999-03-15

Aambs A. Wallberg

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

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För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

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Re Raoul Wallenberg

Bifogat översänds kommentarer från Susan Mesinai avseende de svar som MVD och FSB givit på frågor i hennes rapport om Raoul Wallenbergs öde för eventuella synpunkter.

HIRDMAN

**REGARDING ANSWERS RECEIVED FROM THE FSB AND MVD
TO PRELIMINARY REPORT NUMBER ONE**

From FSB:

1945-47. Question Number 8. Regarding the documents of diplomat Jan Spishak, arrested by Smersh in Budapest at the same time as Wallenberg, and returned to Czechoslovakia in early 1947: After having briefly seen the alphabetical registries for 1945 - 47 for Internal Prison related to possessions, it is very important to pursue this question more closely. I would like to review these registries again to answer this question -- that is to see what possessions each diplomat brought with him, at what point his identity papers and/or diplomatic documents were taken from him, at what point they were returned. This should be easy to do and the list of diplomats should include: Spishak, Chatlosh, Wallenberg, Beckerle, Roedl, Gerstenberg, Bethlen, Marek, Jankowski, Okulicki, Ben, Meyer, Feller, Gerstenberg, af de Sandberg, Richter, Urbshis, Merkis, Munters, Laidoner, and so on. We will want to see what happened when, for example, Meyer and Feller were returned, what happened when certain diplomats died, and who else has a blank space beside their name for documents not returned.

Questions Number 11 and 12: The question of substantiating Smoltsov's role in dealing with the sickness or sudden death of prominent prisoners as opposed to that of MGB Special Medical Services Tzitrinblat remains unanswered. The question of why -- if Semenovskiy and Finayev could sign off on the death of a number of important prisoners like Marek and Okulicki -- a Smoltsov report was needed remains unanswered. Also, I have asked for the meaning of the phrase 'because of your instruction personally to watch Walenberg' and want to know if this phrase exists elsewhere, say for example in the death of Esau Oggins. At the meeting of February 22, 1999 I specifically asked if Smoltsov was involved in any way in the death of Oggins.

Given that the death certificate of Oggins cites a form of death different than that recommended by Abakumov in his 2733A, it would appear that some medical personnel intervene to determine the false history to give and therefore were involved in the process. Who were these persons?

I also have raised the issue of Smoltsov's more direct connection with the Especially Grave Matters Unit, i.e. Leonov and Schwartzmann, as well as Mironov, as seen in the case of Pataridze. Nonetheless, so far as we can tell, his role is limited to evaluating Okulicki for labor and prescribing rations or signing off on routine examinations. We need to substantiate this further.

Finally, where Smoltsov is concerned, I wish to recall the file of Okulicki to see if the memo with Smoltsov's signature is to be found in his personal prisoner file. I did not see it there, nor did any of my team. If this slip is not in the Okulicki file, we want to see the file from which it was obtained. By like token, there is a page number in the upper right hand corner of the Smoltsov document regarding Wallenberg. From what file was this obtained?

I would also raise the question of the significance of death in one's cell or outside of the hospital setting, as seen in the Smoltsov document for Wallenberg and in the Konoye report, and whether or not Wallenberg could have met his fate in the Butyrka Medical Service or in Butyrka Prison as suggested by the Serov-Molotov document, Memorandum 3, never handed over to the Swedish side until recent declassification.

Bearing in mind that the location of the prisoner in the case of emergency or sudden death has direct bearing on jurisdiction and accountability, these questions should be dealt with most seriously.

Question 15. Was there a crematory at Lubyanka during this period as per the publication attached, the text of which I submit from the book in Russian? If this existed, does this not offer a possible explanation for Smoltsov's ability to seize responsibility for the cremation? Does this not also refer to the question and answers related to disposing of Okulicki's body in Question 16, namely whether or not it should be cremated in the crematory 'on general grounds as usual.' That is, a choice is implied here. Given that Domskey has denied any record of Wallenberg having been cremated on their grounds, the existence of another crematory is the only possible explanation.

Question 17. This question which was also to have been raised by Ambassador Magnusson at the meeting of February 22, 1999 remains unanswered. We note that Karl Schandl was held for years without interrogation. Ionov of Lefortovo complains of this state of affairs between October 48 until December 1949 to Borashnikov, Chief of Section A, Leonov as head of the Investigation Unit for Especially Important Prisoners, and Pitovranov of the Second Main Directorate. It should be noted that no approach was made to Abakumov as Head of the Third Main Directorate even though Pap, Clement and Schandl were all arrested per his approval and held by him. Nor was any approach made to the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate.

This would imply a working knowledge that the responsibility or the ability to correct the situation belonged somewhere among those to whom Ionov had complained. The response came from the Deputy Chief of Section A 'not to report on the arrest of the arrested.' It should be noted also that these three prisoners were numbered and sentenced, in Schandl's case without the proper paperwork being filed, by Pitovranov and sent to Vladimir in June of 1950, prior to the arrest of Abakumov. It would therefore appear that while Abakumov may have done the initial paperwork for holding these prisoners, the actual handling and sentencing was done elsewhere -- even during Abakumov's term.

I repeat the question of whether or not Raoul Wallenberg's case, or that of Vilmos Langfelder, could have been subject to the same format for moving the issue ahead -- i.e. resolving the problem, namely sentencing without filing the sentence and sending them out as numbered prisoners under the direct supervision of someone in Moscow.

Given that Pap, Clement and Schandl are numbered prisoners 24, 25, and 26, I would like to know who are numbered prisoners 20, 21, 22, 23, 27 and 29. How many of these are Hungarians? How many of these were arrested in Budapest?

Given that Pap, Clement and Schandl were all British officers -- in fact -- and probably van der Waals as well, as per documents I have seen in the London Public Records Office, to whom, including Abakumov, would they be of most interest and why?

Question Number 18. As the Russian side already provided on their interrogation chart for Schlitter the information that he was interrogated by Sinitsyn in May 1945, as confirmed by his personal prisoner file, if Sinitsyn was not an investigator and not an operative officer, who was he and under whose authority and in what capacity did he conduct this interview/interrogation? Given the absence of Schlitter's protocols for interrogation for 1945, we will assume that this particular interrogation relates directly to the Wallenberg case unless shown otherwise for reasons which can be documented at another time.

We repeat the question as to whom else Sinitsyn interrogated, or met with, or negotiated with during the 1945 to 1947 period. This is especially important given the fact that he wrote in his Memoires that he was involved with some effort to recruit Wallenberg as a way of saving his life by involving himself in a plan which involved also Abakumov and Fitin.

Where and under what circumstances did Fitin intervene?

Question Number 19. On the issue of reporting to the Council of Ministers on the fate of prominent or controversial cases: Are the memorandum limited to discussions of 'liquidatsia' or do they include actual reports of deaths, as in the case of Okulicki, or do they include reports of prominentia who have been sent away as numbered prisoners?

Question Number 20. Do we have a complete list of Roedl's interrogations and or can we compile one through the various forms of information mentioned by FSB in their response? Did Richter's interrogation regarding Roedl's activities as Chief of Abwehrstelle /Bucharest ever touch upon Gflorener/Dr. Karl Schmidt's activities for Abwehrstelle Wien out of Budapest? Did it thereby raise the question of overlaps in Wallenberg's connections in Jewish rescue with Gflorener? I raise this question because there is a brief note in the Counter Intelligence archives in Washington to the effect that Gflorener's information-gathering activities in the Balkans coupled with Willi Roedl's diplomatic skills in Bucharest were quite effective during that phase of the War.

We would be interested in Hatz's interrogations for that period, namely July 18, 22, and 23, 1947 as volunteered by the FSB response. We would also be interested in any interrogations for Bentivegni whose file is on our original list and who was Abwehr chief until moving over to the Kurland front.

Question Number 21: Please describe, as requested, the respective competencies of Internal Prison, the Transport P and Prison Department in relation to the attempted suicide of prisoner Gudenko. Please show us in a comparable registry where Roedl's death in transport was recorded. We need to know -- among other issues -- if this is a Transport Directorate registry or for prisoners of, say, the 4th Department Third Main Directorate or if this directory was used for prisoners of Internal, no matter whose jurisdiction they were under.

Question Number 22: This list has been revised to include only those with the most direct relationship to the Wallenberg case or Swedish/Hungarian connections and appears elsewhere in this text. I have included the relevant information from the SAPO and other files. Please note that some of this research was done by Susanne Berger taking notes only and is to be considered confidential to the Working Group.

As for the question of the Butyrka registry, this question remains important. I have submitted a proposed list of those believed to have crossed over, but I think it would be more to the point if the MVD would make a serious effort to find this registry and or produce the appropriate destruction document. I am also requesting that this issue be presented to the Justice Ministry as they now have jurisdiction over these materials as well as MVD

1952-54 Question Number 1: Serov's reply on November 3, 1954 to Gromyko's question 'where and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died', repeating Ignatiev's reply of March 3, 1952 that Raoul Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union combined with the Molotov statement, 'given what we know about Wallenberg's fate --' combined with the mention of Butyrka should be fully evaluated and probed by the Russian side.

Such language would indicate that there is some kind of knowledge in the inner circle, which would have remained secret under the cover of the denial of Wallenberg's presence, were it not for the subsequent testimony of the returning prisoners. It should be noted that by November 1954 both Abakumov and Beria had been executed. Abakumov experts denounce the possibility that Abakumov had any warning before his arrest in order to destroy incriminating documents. It is therefore difficult to understand why, if Abakumov is to blame, this could not have been shared with Gromyko by Serov, who was in competition with Abakumov, both during and just after the War and on.

I also would ask whether or not stronger emphasis shouldn't be placed on the fact that Gromyko is asking Serov, precisely because he not only helped bring down Abakumov but was important to the fall of Beria. To what degree and in what way might Raoul Wallenberg be of direct interest to Serov? To what degree and in what way was Serov responsible for the selection and destruction of documents related to this case?

Or, are we to understand from Serov's reply to Gromyko, that he had no knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union?

Question 2. This entire question related to sentencing I wish to turn over to the Ministry of Justice at a later date, after I have compiled information and completed my analysis of the investigative and sentencing process. It remains however a relevant question.

Question 3. The Swedish side would like me to have the opportunity to study the investigative file of Gftorener as my background knowledge in counter-intelligence vis a vis Jewish rescue could give me a clearer understanding of its consequences to the Wallenberg case.

Question 4. The question of the 'especially important prisoner' to whom Grossheim-Krisko and Richter were connected remains unanswered. The general questions related to the nature of the relations between a detained person and an especially important person or matter remain unanswered.

Question 5. In 1953, Loyda, Grossheim Krisko, Hoffstetter and Hille were released. Huber and Pelkonen were not. Why were the presences of the first group 'no longer necessary'?

Question 6. This refers also to the question of why Loyda and Hille were not called for interrogation by Kartashov on July 22, 1947? How could Kartashov not know that these were important Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses or were their roles as informants so obvious that to call them in July was unnecessary? Why did Kartashov then call them in October 1947 when Roedl was en route Krasnogorsk? How could Kartashov not know that Loyda had been released and was in the repatriation camp at Odessa? Who needed Loyda returned to Moscow and why?

Who and under what department or competency ordered the return of Loyda to Moscow in late 1947, Beckerle from Verchne Uralsk in 1952 and Konoye from Irkutsk where he was to have gone to Harbin? Was it the same office, the same official? What was the purpose in each case?

Question 7. The significance of not reporting a death of OAGS/ZAGS remains unexplained. We will submit this question, along with more particulars, also to the Ministry of Justice.

We repeat our request to examine records related to sending foreign prisoners from Vladimir to internats outside of the Vladimir Oblast, as in the cases of Jankowski and Vorovei (Mordov) and Menshagin (the Archangel region).

1955-56

Question 1. The question of reporting systems for foreign and stateless prisoners, as for prisoners of war and the interned, has not been answered. This question is addressed to both the former MGB and the MVD. Was Serov responsible for

initiating this reporting system in his capacity as head of the prisoner of war and interned division of MVD as of his return to Moscow in 1947? Were the special camps and prisons for which foreign prisoners were evaluated in 1949 under his direct supervision? If not his, whose?

Question 2. We repeat the request to all the relevant agencies to examine the internal documents related to the question of the return of Prince Konoye to compare it to language and concerns on the response to be offered to the Swedes, as these were under discussion during the same approximate time period. I would like to emphasize that this is not a question of analogy, but of comparison. That is, I am very aware of a number of essential differences -- namely that Konoye's presence in the USSR was known and that his return, like that of Oggins previously, was under consideration. Wallenberg's presence at that time was still denied. Therefore a number of different avenues were open to the Soviet side in their response, depending upon the real circumstances of the situation and their policy considerations.

An essential Question is, of course, whether or not, Wallenberg and Konoye ever sat together.

Question 3: In relation to this question, special attention should be placed on the category of 'Especially Dangerous State Criminals' which applied to both Konoye and Jankowski, both of whom died at a time and under circumstances where their return -- even when it involved the completion of a term -- was denied in favor of exile or, in Jankowski's case, an internat. We need a clearer understanding of this category as applied to a foreign prisoner. Was it a form of sentence which had to be issued through the Courts? Was it a label which could be applied by one or another of the security organs without actual sentencing? If so, how was this paperwork done, by whom? How could it be appealed? Were there specific facilities to absorb those foreign prisoners who had this designation or were they scattered among the camps and prisons, only 'under the watch of MGB organs?' How was the handling of prisoners with this designation distributed among the different security organs?

This question should also be submitted to the Ministry of Justice.

The question of where Wallenberg's letter to Stalin of the Fall of 1946 is to be found has not been answered. Is there any record of this appeal in any incoming registry? We know for example that in Okulicki's file is to be found a draft of a letter to Stalin, on which he spilt ink. We do not however find the actual appeal. Therefore it seems possible that this letter could be found elsewhere. We would consider it of value.

Question 4. The question of why all those prisoners we know to be related to this case, with the exception of Schlitter, Hatz and Gfrorener, were brought to or called back to Vladimir remains unanswered. The question of who cancelled Konoye's trip to Harbin and had him sent to Vladimir remains unanswered. The question of who sent him from Vladimir to Ivanovo 48 and whether or not this is the same party or competency throughout remains unanswered.

Question 5. This is a repeat of the question of the significance of stating on a document that the prisoner was not in the hospital when he died, as applied also to the Smoltsov document versus the Molotov-Serov draft Memorandum which places Wallenberg in Butyrka.

Question 6. Regarding the question of why meticulous reporting of deaths were the case even where the prisoner who died was an enemy of the USSR or where there were no diplomatic ties with the nation involved, versus the absence of such reporting in the case of Wallenberg where Swedish/Soviet relations have been described as good: could it be precisely because of the ongoing relationship with the Swedish government that there was no willingness to produce a falsified document at that time? Could the absence of such documentation not be a strong indication of Wallenberg's disappearance as opposed to his death? If not, why not?

Question 7. The question of other diplomats with whom Konoye sat remains to be answered. The question of a Japanese prisoner at Vladimir with knowledge of Wallenberg remains to be answered. The question of the Japanese prisoner who sat with Roedl, and of Roedl's connections with Japan (he was arrested returning from there) remain to be answered. The request for the file of Chamota who sat with Schlitter remains to be fulfilled. All of these questions could easily be related and we therefore urge the Russian side to assist us in being as specific as possible.

In addition it should be noted that Konoye's file shows a significant gap for the period from 28 IV 46 until 14 VIII 51. While we know from one of his letters that he was held for a long period of time without moving in Lefortovo we do not know with whom he sat or other matters related to that time, including how his custody was prolonged and so on.

In this context, I would raise the question of where Wallenberg was held in Lefortovo between the time he left Cell 203 in February 1947 until March 1, 1947 when he was finally passed to Internal Prison.

Question 11 regarding Isaac M. Wolfen. In the alphabetical registry I was shown at Lubyanka, Wolfen entered Internal Prison on July 25, 1946. This corresponds to the information which the FSB gave me in answer to my question regarding Wolfen. However, I would like to point out that Wolfen was interrogated at Lefortovo on July 17, 1946 just prior to the interrogations of Wallenberg and Langfelder by Koppelyansky. This would suggest that Wolfen was not yet a prisoner when this 'meeting' or 'interview' took place. Please would you clarify his status at that time -- especially since A) I have raised the question of whether or not Wolfen was used as a Swedish translator for these interrogations and B) Wolfen's designation on his card at Vladimir describes him as a 'Swedish spy.'

I would like to request, if at all possible, that an interrogation history of Isaac Wolfen be made between his arrest in 1946 and his sentencing in 1948, along the lines of similar charts turned over by the Russian side. I am not asking for the contents of the protocols, although that would be most interesting, but simply time, place,

interrogator, jurisdiction., duration (hours) so I can compare it with other interrogations.

I also would like to point out that I specifically asked the MVD to provide me with the date when Isaac Wolfin turned in his Internal Passport for emigration to America. If such does not exist, then I am inclined to question whether or not this is another case like that of Michael Demesco where the family is told that the person has left for America while the person is detained in an internat. In any case, the fate of Isaac Wolfin as a witness is of great interest to us. If he is alive, we wish to speak to him and request full cooperation from the Russian government.

Question 13. The request to see the list of prisoners who died in Lubyanka in 1948, including the name of Langfelder, remains unfulfilled. If such lists do exist, we would also request to see the list for 1947 and for all subsequent years until the Gromyko Memorandum was issued.

FSB ANSWERS:

Number 4. As there seems to be some conflict between Wolfin's arrest date and entrance to Internal, then transfer to Lefortovo and the date given for the interrogation registry of Wolfin, Wallenberg, Langfelder -- we would like to see that interrogation registry in the original to confirm that the date of July 17, 1946 is correct. Thank you.

Number 5. May I understand from the wording of this answer that it is probable or definite that Ernst Huber sat with Schlitter even prior to their overlapping interrogation on July 22, 1947 by Kartashov?

Number 7. Regarding Roedl and Wallenberg: as it seems now established that both these men stayed under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate, I would like permission to study the correspondence of Department 4 (Otdel) at Glavnoye Upravleniye 3 on the prisoners of war 1945 - 47 with the help of Andrey Allahverdov, acting as translator.

Also, please would you define what it means that 'no charges were put against Roedl.' Does this mean he died before he had reached that point in his investigative procedure? Would one expect this to be true of Wallenberg as well, presuming a normal progression in his investigation?

Number 8. Otto Hatz. Military Attache in Bulgaria and Turkey.

A. While Hatz was kept by the Soviet military Command in Budapest until April 1945, was he 'in protective custody', under arrest or considered a volunteer to the Soviet defense efforts?

B. Where exactly was Hatz held in Budapest and environs? Were Pap and Clement kept in the same locale?

C. Did Hatz have reason to know, or did he know, of the arrests of Wallenberg, Langfelder, Meyer, Feller, and the Hungarians brought with them, Bethlen, Grossheim-Krisko and his superior in the Hungarian Intelligence, Ujszaszy?

D. Did Hatz give testimony regarding Gflorener or related matters, such as the Joel Brand swap which was presented first in Istanbul, or other parallel deals involving neutral nations? To whom were such protocols of interrogation of interest?

E. Was Hatz ever interrogated on Jewish intelligence matters, Jewish networks as linked with Allied intelligence, or the Joint? To whom were such protocols of interrogation of interest?

F. Was Hatz ever interrogated on British American activities in Bulgaria, particularly proposed separate peace discussions through the OSS (Donovan) or War Refugee Board in Turkey (Steinhardt, Hirschman, Katzki, Irving Sherman)? To whom were such protocols of interrogation of interest?

G. Was Hatz ever interrogated about -- or volunteer information on -- separate peace offers in the neutral nations in the West (Switzerland, Sweden, the Vatican, Spain and Portugal) involving Bethlen or other high ranking former Hungarian officials?

H. In a recently published catalogue on the 'ocobi' archives for Stalin, it is indicated that interrogation protocols for Ujszasy were forwarded for Stalin's personal attention. As Ujszasy evidently was pro-Western Allies, we would be interested in studying these protocols and their summaries for a clearer understanding of Soviet security concerns for Hungary as per Questions 9 and 10 in the 1945-47 section of Preliminary Report One.

More questions based on Hatz's interrogations may be forthcoming after we have completed our in depth interrogation analysis. We remain, of course, most interested in the content of the interrogations conducted on July 18, 22, and 23rd, 1947. Who conducted these interrogations, under whose jurisdiction, what did they concern and to whom in the highest level of Soviet leadership were they of interest?

Question 9: As I have stated in my updated explanation of the value of the files on the original list, I am concerned only to determine if Rado met with Wallenberg in Hungary in October 1944, just prior to the fall of the Horthy government, and when and under what circumstances did he make trips to Great Britain during the War, as per the testimony of Heinz Pamwitz who stated that he had been informed by the Soviets of this fact? I am interested in determining also the nature of his connection, if any, with Vilmos Bohm and Andre Gellert, two Hungarian ex officials working in Stockholm, the first with a relation to the British, the second with a relation to the Americans.

Question 10. As stated previously, regarding documents -- in order to better understand procedures in relation to documents, as opposed to personal possessions,

we would like permission to review again the alphabetical registries shown us on March 10, 1999 in the cases of all the relevant diplomats. If need be, we will refrain from taking notes.

Question 12. We are interested in the personal prisoner file of Menshagin, but appreciate this information from his investigative file.

Question 14. Would the FSB be so kind as to provide us with the appropriate orders for the 50s and 60s related to the destruction of different categories of documents as this will be necessary to prove to the world that we have thoroughly pursued all doors open to us and to define those which were closed and why. It is very important that the responsibility for such destruction be clearly defined and established to offset myths and legends which may arise related to them.

On the positive side, we would like to be informed of the avenues or registries or correspondence bodies that do exist, in whole or in part, so we can make an assessment of their value and possible use of them, in relation to specific questions which have emerged from our research.

Question 16. As we have now been permitted to examine the 1945 alphabetical registry where the personal file number, along with the name of the arresting body, is given next to the name of an incoming prisoner and the date of his entry to Lubyanka: I would like to request that the date of arrival, jurisdiction and personal registration number be given us in the case of Loyda, Hille, Huber and others whose files lack essential information from their initial arrest period.

Question 19. Regarding Elemer Benczes/Berczes -- this name appears under another form in the file of Max Meier which was presented to me at the February 22, 1999 meeting as one of three Hungarians brought with Meier and Feller to Moscow. There it appears as Emil(c) Burklas. When at FSB, we cross referenced this name with the ABC registry where it appears under the correct letter of the alphabet and correct date it is spelt in yet a third form. However it appears, I wish to review his personal prisoner file. I would in this case appreciate it if FSB would check his interrogation file for protocols involving Wallenberg, Hungarian national resistance, Jewish rescue and Swedish-Hungarian connections.

Regarding Captain Zoltan Miko. Why was he sentenced to death by shooting when Bondor was not?

Question 20. We appreciate the information that Esau Oggins had been transferred from Norillag labour camp to Moscow prisons in 1942. We would still like to review the personal and medical files of Esau Oggins as relates to his detention in Moscow prisons from 1942 until his death in 1947.

Question 21. We would like to review the personal prisoner file of Caludio Di Mohr, Armando Diego and Pietro Aladjani-Aladjan whose interrogation schedule was given over to the Swedish side as relevant to the Wallenberg case and who was sent to Vladimir on March 8, 1947. This prisoner later appears in Vladimir as Prisoner Number 15.

MVD RESPONSES

1. Kindly provide the orders whereby the 'materials of Butyrka Prison, including the personal files of the prisoners who sat there in the 1940-1950s were destroyed in the late Fifties.' As clearly this as a selective destruction process -- given the files that we have been able to see -- who made these determinations and on what grounds? Is there a list of those to be destroyed? We ask that all of this be documented in writing so that it can be clearly shown to the world that we have left no stone unturned.

4. We have specifically asked the MVD to inform us of the date when Isaac Markovitch Wolfen surrendered his internal passport for emigration to America so that we can search for him abroad. If there is no evidence of this, we ask the MVD authorities to track Wolfen and determine his fate as this is a very important witness and we wish to speak to him.

11-12. Ms. Mesinai requests access to all information of numbered prisoners in Vladimir, Moscow, Ivanovo and elsewhere. She will be requesting separately access to documents known to exist in GARF on these prisoners as well as access to the Ivanovov kartotecha in reference to the April 19, 1947 document presented at the meeting of February 22, 1999. She wishes to be informed of who and what office determined the numbering of Pap, Schandl and Clement and what other Hungarians were part of this series. Related to the Numbered Prisoners at Vladimir, for the present our interest is focused on Prisoner Number One (Hungarian 'American Spy'), Prisoner Number Five, Prisoner Number Nine, Prisoner Number Eleven (who died at the same time as Jankowski), Prisoner Number 15, Prisoner Number 23, Prisoner Number 31 and Prisoner Number 32 (Menshagin). In each case there is evidence that the prisoner existed and was held at Vladimir.

Page 17. If the incoming registry(ies) for prisoners brought from Lefortovo to Butyrka, March 30/31 through April 10, 1950 have been destroyed, I repeat my request for a copy of the destruction document of the kind presented to me by the MVD authorities in Vladimir Prison for the approximate same time period. As this registry is extremely important to drawing the parameters on this case, it is very unfortunate that no effort is being made to locate it. We all know that whatever destruction occurred in the late 50s in Butyrka, it was not total. Some selection was necessary and some form of accountability.

It should be noted that if Wallenberg did cross with this group, he like them would have been leaving the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate (MGB) and falling under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Main Directorate and

the MVD. It is therefore to the MVD's advantage to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallenberg was not part of this group. Otherwise one could well argue, in the absence of conclusive death documents, that Wallenberg survived and left the jurisdiction of Abakumov, three and a half months before Abakumov was arrested. This would raise many questions as to the possibility that Wallenberg died in Butyrka or elsewhere at a later date -- regarding which there has been some indication.

A separate request related to this matter will be submitted to the Ministry of Justice.

Further to this we are submitting elsewhere in this report our request for the remaining prisoner files from the Original List which was reviewed and accepted in March of 1996. I have added an updated discussion as to why these files are important to the investigation and I request the MVD's full cooperation in fulfilling their commitment to this part of the search.

With this I am also submitting a revised list for Question 22, with the necessary information from SAPO and elsewhere.

Thank you.

Delges (enligt Hans Magnusson)

von Dardel

Makinen

Berger

Mesina

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Conversation with Mr Anatoly A Krayushkin in Moscow, 21 February 1999.

On February 21 Ambassador Jan Lundvik and I had an approximately two hours long dinner conversation with Mr A Krayushkin, former director of the KGB Archive directorate, in a restaurant at hotel Slavyanskaya.

Mr Krayushkin was in a good mood but revealed that he had contacted Mr Vinogradov of FSB before the meeting, in order to receive an update on the progress of work in the Working group. At the end of our dinner, he indicated that he had contemplated not to come at all, but that in the end he had found it wiser to attend, as a refusal might have been interpreted as if he had something to conceal. He also referred to a telephone call from Guy von Dardel, requesting to see him.

There is no need to give a full transcript of the conversation, which took place in a very friendly atmosphere and touched not only on Raoul Wallenberg but also on current political issues. The most interesting comments on RW will be summarized below, however. Of course, I used this opportunity to thank Mr Krayushkin for his contribution to our work.

1. During the period he was in charge of KGB's Archive Directorate, 1992-1995, there were no restrictions whatsoever to hand over any archive material found relating to RW – on the contrary there were clear instructions to search for and make available such documents.
2. Mr K was 99% convinced that RW was executed in 1947. Dr Smoltsov had special tasks of "confidence" in such matters. Against the background of realities of those days, this destiny of RW was the only natural one.
3. Lubyanka had an ever higher security classification than Vladimir. That fact made it unlikely that RW would have been sent to Vladimir after 1947.
4. In 1976-78 there was an overall scrutiny of all important Soviet archives. Especially important questions were grouped thematically in catalogues. There was also a reclassification of files. (This information was new to me).
5. The most important and secret matters were sometimes only shown to the General Secretary of the CPSU, and when he had read these documents they were kept in the safe of the Secretary in charge of the General department (Obshchiy otdel). The most secret documents in the KGB archive would never leave or be kept outside Moscow; they always stayed in the Central KGB archive. We should have no hopes of finding any interesting documents in regional archives.
6. We should be aware that the disclosures by Chruschov in 1956 were very limited and clearly designed to avoid revealing any odious activities he had himself been involved in.

Hans Magnusson

Jul 99-03-15
(Arch-Rogz)

a. a.

1999-03-04


Conversation with Mr Anatoly A Krayushkin in Moscow, 21 February 1999.

On February 21 Ambassador Jan Lundvik and I had an approximately two hours long dinner conversation with Mr A Krayushkin, former director of the KGB Archive directorate, in a restaurant at hotel Slavyanskaya.

Mr Krayushkin was in a good mood but revealed that he had contacted Mr Vinogradov of FSB before the meeting, in order to receive an update on the progress of work in the Working group. At the end of our dinner, he indicated that he had contemplated not to come at all, but that in the end he had found it wiser to attend, as a refusal might have been interpreted as if he had something to conceal. He also referred to a telephone call from Guy von Dardel, requesting to see him.

There is no need to give a full transcript of the conversation, which took place in a very friendly atmosphere and touched not only on Raoul Wallenberg but also on current political issues. The most interesting comments on RW will be summarized below, however. Of course, I used this opportunity to thank Mr Krayushkin for his contribution to our work.

1. During the period he was in charge of KGB's Archive Directorate, 1992-1995, there were no restrictions whatsoever to hand over any archive material found relating to RW – on the contrary there were clear instructions to search for and make available such documents.
2. Mr K was 99% convinced that RW was executed in 1947. Dr Smoltsov had special tasks of "confidence" in such matters. Against the background of realities of those days, this destiny of RW was the only natural one.
3. Lubyanka had an ever higher security classification than Vladimir. That fact made it unlikely that RW would have been sent to Vladimir after 1947.
4. In 1976-78 there was an overall scrutiny of all important Soviet archives. Especially important questions were grouped thematically in catalogues. There was also a reclassification of files. (This information was new to me).
5. The most important and secret matters were sometimes only shown to the General Secretary of the CPSU, and when he had read these documents they were kept in the safe of the Secretary in charge of the General department (Obshchiy otdel). The most secret documents in the KGB archive would never leave or be kept outside Moscow; they always stayed in the Central KGB archive. We should have no hopes of finding any interesting documents in regional archives.
6. We should be aware that the disclosures by Chruschov in 1956 were very limited and clearly designed to avoid revealing any odious activities he had himself been involved in.


Hans Magnusson

1999-03-06

Meeting with Mr G Sokolov.

On February 22, 1999, Ambassador Lundvik and I had a meeting with Mr Gennady Sokolov in his apartment in Moscow. Mr Sokolov is a journalist, about whom there was approx. two years ago an article in the Guardian. I had a meeting with him 1 1/2 year ago. The main points of interest in Mr Sokolov's story then was that 1/ he had talked several times with the former KGB chief Serov before he died in 1990 and that Serov had disclosed that he in 1956 had destroyed documents about Raoul Wallenberg in order to conceal the role played by Molotov in the case and 2/ that he had had many conversations with a certain Yevgeny Ivanov, who in his turn had learned many interesting things, among others also concerning the role of Molotov and Serov in the RW case, from his father-in-law, a Supreme Court judge in the days of Stalin. Ivanov was also a Soviet spy. Additionally there was a colonel Andrei Sverdlov, who had learnt about the use of poison to kill prisoners in the late forties(I wrote a brief report about his in 1997).


At this visit we got the following additional information.

1/ Sokolov had had one or two meetings with Solovov, one of our interrogators. He had learnt that Solovov was much closer to Abakumov than what one could imagine. Solovov had called Abakumov "his teacher".

2/ Yevgeny Ivanov was a relative of Tolstoy-Kutuzov and they had met in London before T-K died. T-K had always believed that RW was alive after 1947 – perhaps as a result of a guilty conscience due to his role in reporting on RW. GS claimed T-K's diaries were kept in his file. Ivanov had been participating in the search made by KGB officials in T-K's home in Ireland in 1981 after he had died (reported in a Swedish book).

3/ One of the experts on the use of injections to execute prisoners was still alive and working in the Kuchino Institute (close to FSB) – Mr Goncharov. He had talked about dozens of such cases in 1947.

According to Sokolov "it was clear what had happened to RW". He would include a chapter about RW in his new book, which was about to be published ("Behind seven seals")


Hans Magnusson



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Sid. 1 (1)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114

EC

P 2 Eu'

Ambassaden Riga

EXP 990315/ARN

Re Raoul Wallenberg - den ungerska vinkeln

1999-03-14

För Magnusson från Lundvik

P

Jag reser på lördag till Budapest och är där hela påföljande vecka. Nanofvszky tillhör dem som jag bett ambassaden ordna sammanträffande med. Förutom Bethlen/Deseö har jag tänkt ägna mig åt de övriga ungerska fångar som figurerat i vårt material, motståndsrörelsen med Géza Soos, Debrecen och radiosändningarna därifrån, Röda Korset inklusive Langlet samt arkivsituationen i stort. Finns det något Du vill jag skall ta upp vore jag tacksam för en rad därom.

Cabinet

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

sid. 1 (10)

1999-03-16

Aamb A. Wallberg

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EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

AVU.	Grupp	Mål
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För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Riga, UD-EI (Olson)

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogade brev från Susan Mesinai innehåller en redogörelse för hennes genomgång den 10 mars på FSB av registreringsjournaler från åren 1945-47 i syfte att bringa klarhet i Raoul Wallenbergs öde.

HIRDMAN

March 11, 1999

REPORT TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson, Riga
Ambassador Jan Lundvik, Stockholm
Anders Wallberg & Mats Foyer, Moscow

FROM: Susan Mesinai

RE: Alphabetical Registries, Lubyanka, Studied at FSB Archives
22 Kuznetsky Most on March 10, 1999 with
Andrey Allahverdov as translator

Please note that all of the information put forth below was done without having taken any notes. It was recalled from memory later on the 10th of March, but already certain details were fading fast. I came expecting to have to calculate Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder's personal prisoner file registration number which could take some weeks. I had no knowledge of what I would see, nor did I feel comfortable inventing new questions on the spot. It seemed more correct to receive the answers they had prepared for me and to thank them step by step. I signed a receipt for what I had seen, but I made it very specific -- namely that this had established the probable registration numbers as x and y and that I was satisfied. This would I hope leave the door open for a few more specific questions on the basis of these very simple directories which refer to other aspects of my Preliminary Report or Reports. In other words, I saw much more than I was prepared to see and was not ready to make immediate use of it.

THIS REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL AS THE MATERIALS TO WHICH IT REFERS ARE CLASSIFIED BY THE RUSSIANS WHICH MUST BE HONORED PER OUR AGREEMENT.

After greeting again Yuri Michaelovitch Razboyev, the FSB Archivist who over the years has provided us with very valuable documents on the Wallenberg case, we were presented in a systematic way with a number of alphabetical registries from Lubyanka. This was in response to our request, and perhaps that of State Secretary Eliasson as I had mentioned the importance of this kind of detail to him, to provide us with Wallenberg and Langfelder's registration numbers for their personal prisoner files in 1 Internal Prison MGB 1945 - 47.

We were first shown the alphabetical registry for receipts for possessions of those arriving in Lubyanka Prison in 1945. Names of the various prisoners appear under their alphabetical headings, but within each letter heading they are recorded chronologically. In other words, all those whose name begins with B are placed in that section but not arranged therein alphabetically. One must search for the name under that letter heading. It definitely helps to know the date or approximate date of arrival.

Raoul Wallenberg's name appears under B, with a receipt unber 205 for his rucksack¹ but no receipt that I remember for his personal papers or for documents, although such matters as a general procedure were itemized in the book very carefully.² The registration was made on February 7 ?,³ that is the day after he arrived in the prison on February 6, 1945. Following the line across, the registry shows him leaving for Lefortovo on May 30, 1945, which was one day after his actual departure -- in short leaving time for confirmation of his arrival in Lefortovo to get back to Lubyanka. (My memory is that while one might be registered on the same day as arrival, the departure date would always be a day off. By 1947, the arrival registration was also a day off).

Langfelder's name is also visible and shows his departure for Lefortovo as March , 1945, again one day after we know that he actually left. The archivist pointed out to us that this was the case. Langfelder's receipt number was/were as we have seen in document XXXXXx handed over to us by the Russians in 1991.

In the 1946 alphabetical registry there is no indication that either Wallenberg or Langfelder re entered Internal Prison during that time⁴. This book does show us however that Isaac Markovitch Wolfin appeared on or about July 25, 1946 with a number of possessions, including documents or notes, (money?) and a knife. It should be noted that this is approximately one week after he was interrogated in Lefortovo (just proceeding the joint interrogation of Wallenberg and Langfelder) by Koppelyansky. Wolfin, if my memory serves me, stayed only a day -- in spite of the fact that he brought a great deal of things with him. This makes me all the more interested and determined to chart his interrogation history, even if we don't know the contents of his interrogations.

In 1947, the names of Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katon(a) have been blotted out in the equivalent registry. Some of this material was shown to us, including the forensics done on Wallenberg's name and Langfelder. Wallenberg's blot, corresponding to the date March 2, 1947 ... one day after we know he was brought over from Lefortovo ... is thin compared to Langfelder's. Wallenberg's covers only one line. In addition to that, it is not blotted all the way across the registry which in 1947 runs from the left hand page across the right, a two page spread. Wallenberg's blot covers only his family name and first name, (check to see if it includes DOB), possessions -- essentially the contents on the left hand page.

¹ A question occurred to me later in reference to Richter's testimony that would indicate Wallenberg had a number of his possessions with him in the cell, including food -- although the guard removed the cans. It is very unclear to me how these possessions were handled. After a full inventory has been made upon arrival, are the possessions removed? From the prisoner files one gets the impression that the department chiefs, their deputies and the senior investigators have some kind of discretionary control as to who gets to keep what, when and for how long.

² This note must be double checked, either from the materials handed over by the Russian side or going back to the book.

³ This detail must also be doublechecked.

⁴ Which does not however exclude the possibility that one or both of them could have been taken to a place such as Sukhanova for questioning. See Pelkonen's file for more detail on this.

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Neither the name of the person who received Wallenberg's possessions in 1947 nor the column corresponding to the date when the possessions were handed back have been blotted out. While we did not discuss the matter at the Archive or later over lunch, both Andrey and I in our individual efforts to record our memories both commented independently that we felt it was intended for the reader to see the empty space which would seem to establish that the prisoner went in to Lubyanka in 1947 but did not come out.

Katona's blotted line is also not very thick. Langfelder's blot is an eye sore, quite large and would imply -- among other things -- a large number of itemized things being brought with him. I also noted a possible scratch under the blot for Katona in the column corresponding to the date when his possessions would have been returned. Given that Langfelder and Katona were brought to Lubyanka together from Lefortovo on July 23, 1947, I went back and looked at the Langfelder registration. There are definite scratch marks on the right hand page which I thought could have been made by doing the forensics. Not being sure, I held the right hand page vertical from the book, so that the light was not reflected off the smoothness of the purple ink. It looked to me like there were a number of dates written there, one under the other. I even thought I saw something that looked like the 27 VII or VIII -- which is not as the story goes. This can only be determined by doing forensics on all three of these blots -- which I greatly recommend. That is, it would seem to me that Katona went someplace else and that Langfelder may have gone in and out in 1947 or even into another year. We also should try to determine who else was 'blotted out' during this time period.

It should be noted, when we examined this kind of registry, I asked the archivist if it were possible for a prisoner to have come to Internal Prison without having any possessions -- meaning, could anyone come into Internal and not be registered here. Yuri M. Razboyev proceeded to show us that everyone had something, even if it was just a wallet or a key ring. But he also pointed out to us an inscription for someone who brought nothing. This too was noted and therefore this registry is considered THE SOURCE for determining who entered for each year, also to determine when they went back out. This makes them very important for us to study -- not just Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder -- but to get a more consistent picture of the ins and outs and to identify other prisoners brought in together or interrogated together.

The question of personal file registration numbers -- the reason I made this request -- was quite straightforward. We examined another alphabetical registry for 1945, again alphabetical, again arranged chronologically. Under B in the chronological space where February 6, 1945 or an approximate date would fall, a name has been cut out of the book with a razor, along with the date of arrival. What has been retained is the jurisdiction of the arresting body, which is GUKR Smersh, and the personal file registration number which is 153.

By like token, under L, in approximately the spot where February 6, 1945 or that approximate date would appear, there is a name cut out with a razor, and the date of arrival, but again what is left is GUKR Smersh and the personal file registration number of 154.

To double check that I was indeed in the right kind of registry, I called up the names of Richter and others whose personal prisoner file numbers I know from their prisoner files. And indeed the numbers registered in the book conform and cross reference with what we have seen. In short, these registries alone are worthy of careful study as they are -- but this was not part of the deal, nor were they going to let us. I would however like to request the personal registration number of important prisoners like Loyda, Hille, Huber and Zoltan Rivo whose files begin much later than their first arrival.

So we are now in possession of the two important keys. The problem is to access the lock box, doors or gates which can be opened by them to open with them. One of the first things Yuri Michaelovitch did in his well organized presentation was to point to this section of the answers to my questions in the Preliminary Report, to the effect that all cell occupancy information, corpus lists (isolation lists by extension although the existence of these are not even pointed to), transport lists, list of those sent to Butyrka, correspondence about the prisoners have been destroyed. According to him the fact that these alphabetical registries still exist is lucky. (I would suggest that there is nothing unusual about holding onto records having to do with possessions as there is accountability involved until the end of time. The question is: to what use is a registry that, where a name is cut out, still refers you to the body under whose jurisdiction the prisoner is and to their personal prisoner file registration numbers ?)

In this context, namely that all of the documents reflecting the operations of the apparatus are seemingly destroyed -- definitely absent for our purposes for one reason or another -- **Yuri Michaelovitch stated that the only way to reconstruct the truth we sought was indeed through the individual prisoner files because this was the only place where the information still exists in any form.** While this is important in terms of making certain that we see all the prisoner files we requested to achieve a maximum threshold of reference, I am not convinced that there does not exist more material of some form from the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate. The 1945 directory, with the names believed to be Wallenberg and Langfelder sliced out, still makes certain that the jurisdictional body (accountable) and their registration numbers can be identified. Those in the know could still use it as a guide to finding the right operational correspondence group and within that the right personal file. This will be discussed in more detail below.

What was important is Vinogradov's comment regarding the jurisdiction -- that it was consistent throughout. I harped on this remark, by pointing out that the registration for the interrogation in Lubyanka with Kuzmishin, Number 33, in March of 1947 gives the jurisdiction as 3 YUP and that the registration of Abakumov's letter to Molotov Number 3044A also writes 3 YUP. So I asked him very specifically if this meant only the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate, as per the end of Smersh as GUKR /Smersh and/or the 2nd Department of the 3rd Main Directorate turned into the 4th Department. Or, if 3 YUP could also refer to a prisoner under the Especially Grave Matters/Cases Unit. He answered quite definitely that it meant the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate and that Wallenberg was under their

jurisdiction throughout. Which is consistent with what we seem to be seeing in the case of Roedl as well.

I then asked them to show me the registry that was used to answer my question about Schlitter's possible cellmates at Internal Prison in 1947, namely Akikusa, Wallenberg, Roedl, Langfelder. Yuri Michaelovitch, as I expected him to, went straight to the 1947 alphabetical registry which showed the prisoner entering with possessions and departing on such and such a date. Schlitter departs in 1948, which is true. It should be noted that Roedl's name is not cut out or blotted out -- it is perfectly clear and easy to see that Roedl entered in February 1947 and left for Krasnogorsk in October 1947, with the date as well. He showed me Akikusa, arrival and departure, and referred to the blot for Wallenberg (which of course does not give a departure date) .

What he did not volunteer was the blot for Langfelder as part of answering this question, nor do they answer in writing my very specific question whether or not Schlitter sat with Langfelder after the latter's all day and night interrogation by Kartashov in Internal Prison in July 1947. I did not go into this with them. What I did however say to Vinogradov was that I had the mounting impression that Langfelder was an extremely important prisoners, perhaps even more important in certain respects than Wallenberg. He answered, off the record I assume, that Langfelder is indeed a 'Very Important Prisoner' but our investigation has to do with Raoul Wallenberg, not Vilmos Langfelder -- unless of course I happened to be one of Langfelder's relatives. I told him I was the relation of no one involved in this case.

As Yuri Michaelovitch was putting the registries away, he waved the Meier and Feller arrest files to remind me that this request had been satisfied. I informed Mr. Vinogradov and him that the name of Elermer Berczes, given the foils of transliteration into Russian, would seem to have appeared on a document in the Meier file -- where he is one of three prisoners brought in with the two Swiss diplomats, in which case one might question if they all did not work with Raoul Wallenberg. Upon being shown the document, Yuri Michaelovitch cross referenced the name with the date of arrival in Moscow in the 1945 registry. It appeared under the appropriate letter of the alphabet at approximately the right date interval, but spelled in yet another form.

I asked to see the file, which we have formally requested and they have formally answered that it cannot be found. They made a face which I can only perform in person. I get the impression that this could be a problem. And I wondered again if perhaps they are under orders not to show any more files, which may underlie Nikiskin's statement at the meeting that we had seen all the files we were going to see. On the other hand, without words, it was suggested that we should apply pressure. Very serious pressure and more and more.

At some point, by the way, Yuri Michaelovitch went out of his way to produce the rasstriel directory and to show me the execution sentence for Gfornier, the interim documents, and the AKT which affirms his execution along with fourteen others. Their names were visible to me. Vinogradov and Yuri Michaelovitch affirmed that all of them had been sentenced on the same date, but that did not imply that their crimes were related.

We then had a bit of a conversation about Esau Oggins. They brought in the two volume books by Sudhaplatov's son which states that Oggins was executed by injection in 1947 and about the lab. Vinogradov emphasized that very few people were executed in this manner. I said I expected as much, but if he didn't mind I would have to repeat my question whether or not Smoltsov was responsible for injecting the prisoner or witnessing his death, as is required also in the rasstriel akt above. (I apologized saying that they must think I am a horrible person to ask such questions but if we are going to arrive at the truth, we have to really look at the possibilities). Vinogradov was not evidently horrified by my question, but he did very quickly ask the nature of and kind of documents I had received from the American sides. After I had enumerated them more or less he blinked and stated thereafter that this was all that existed on the subject. He also stated that he believed these documents to have been found in the Party archives. (He may be right, but I had assumed since they were given over by Primakov at the time that they were from SVR).

I asked if anyone had seen Oggins medical file, that I wanted to see exactly how they faked the record -- especially since the form of death Abakumov recommends is not the one on the death certificate. That I wanted to document the steps in between because if an extreme procedure had been applied successfully once, it would most likely be applied again. Again, I wanted to know who was involved -- if not Smoltsov, then who? Because the Smoltsov Document has to stand in a context.....

Andrey was translating all of this, but Vinogradov had already understood it completely and cut him off. That is he said, I understand Context. At which point he switched back to the issue of analogy, my method he thinks, which he stated they had attacked somewhat critically at the meeting. (I had not noticed). Their strategy at this point is not simply to enumerate the weaknesses of using an analogue, but to convert all that I have put into fact and practical detail -- my data -- back into an analogue. . So here too there was no willingness at all to make use of the parallel, to allow us to compare to see where in fact the two cases are alike, where different. Instead he starting explaining to me the differences -- that Oggins was an American whose presence was known.....exactly the differences I had pointed out to them in my Preliminary Report when I argued that 2733A did not necessarily predict the contents of Abakumov's document 3044A which we knows relates to the Wallenberg case.

The bottom line here, as elsewhere, is that they are not -- for reasons known only to them -- willing to close the gap. Also, one should note, that one cannot discuss the real details or possible real details of Raoul Wallenberg's death without a great hush falling on the room -- which seemed to effect all of the Russians. I felt like I was suddenly in a church and that this was sacred ground and there were very important taboos about what could and could not be said. And not because there was foul play involved but because dead is dead.

For my part and Andrey's too -- the question is whether or not you can base a death on one Smoltsov document and one very open space in a 1947 registry that shows Raoul Wallenberg's possessions being taken to Lubyanka but not coming out. We know

this is a fact, at least if they are the possessions which were returned in 1989. But we do not yet know is WHY they were still sitting there.

OBSERVATIONS

Mr. Vinogradov who arrived at some point made the remark that there was a separate registry for numbered prisoners and other categories had their registries too. I did not have my wits about me at that point, as it was an invitation to ask to see the inscription for Okulicki, Jankowski et al who became numbered prisoners within a day of their arrival at Lubyanka. This would enable them to separate out the different series of numbers I had mentioned at the meeting in Stockholm. In other words, Kitschman's registration number for his arrival in late 1945 is in the thousands. The Polish leaders seemed to have the same series but to have arrived in March 1945 to be sentenced in June. These distinctions have to be more finely tuned. If we get another opportunity to study these documents further, we should grab it.

I felt that the whole 'show and tell' was carefully programmed, although I was allowed to ask questions and they went with them to the appropriate place. I asked by the way that they check for Katon(a) arrival in 1945, but it was not there. As I have seen that he sat with Gerstenberg in Cell 156 Lefortovo on July 4, 1945, we can assume then that he arrived in 1944 or earlier. This plus the company he was keeping in Cell 156 would indicate a strong Rumanian or Transylvanian connection, which links him also with Bethlen. Vinogradov was as dissuasive as he could be about looking into the file of Schmidt-Durmond for the order to move Katon(a) into Cell 156. The repeated his statement from the meeting that what was important was to identify of what nationality he was.

The most important observation I can make is that the absence, yet continual control over Wallenberg's identity papers -- if such they were in this case --- could mark the first step in a disappearance procedure. Roedl's death was reported: what happened to his possessions afterwards, when they knew for a fact that the was gone? Some comparisons are in order here between those we know to have died in Lubyanka and how the return of their possessions is marked. I left it alone because technically it was beyond the scope of our request and also, I was unprepared to do the work.

We must request the very specific acts that govern the destruction of documents in the 50s and 60s, although knowing FSB they will be able to produce them.

I would specifically request that anything that remains of the correspondence of the Kartashov group from 1944 until 1952, or until its dissolution under Kartashov, be made available to us and that we be allowed to study it in sequence, not a fragmented document here or there. Given also that the jurisdiction of the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate is acknowledged in the case of Wallenberg, I repeat the points I have been trying to make about the significance of this entire contingent being passed to Butyrka in March/April 1950 -- that is, if Grossheim-Krisko was correct, then jurisdiction over Wallenberg would have passed to the 2nd Directorate and MVD -- whether as a named or numbered prisoner.

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED: - FIRST THOUGHTS:

1. What possessions did Raoul Wallenberg bring with him to Lubyanka in March 1947? This must be determined even if we have to do forensics using the greatest team in the world. There is a difference I think between personal identity papers or diplomatic documents and notebooks which are being removed and the kind of possessions like clothing and so on which could conceivably accompany one everywhere in the GULAG under whatever name. This makes sense in that Raoul's rucksack is still missing.
 - 2- What possessions did Vilmos Langfelder bring with him to Lubyanka in July 1947? Were some or all of these returned and where did he go with them? Again, this requires a forensic team to tackle that blot which is quite thick and ominous.
 3. If in the case of Wallenberg we are speaking of identification papers, notes or documents only, were these until that time still in his possession? (See my questions in the Preliminary Report on Spishak and the other diplomats papers. I get the impression that they were not removed from them immediately.)
- I would specifically like to use this directory to pursue the question of diplomatic papers as I had put forth in my query and which they could answer more satisfactorily. I would like the opportunity to double check in the case of Meier, Feller, Bethlen, Marek, Merkis, Munthers, Jankowski, Okulicki, Beckerle, Spishak, Chatlosh, etc.
4. Does the March 11, 1947 interrogation relate to or make use of these documents?
 5. Is this the interrogation which Kondrashev has described?
 6. And/or was the interrogation Kondrashev described a further version based on the same documents conducted by someone other than Kuzmishin, whom I assume Kondrashev knew well enough. (Kondrashev has stated that the interrogator was a man unknown to him.)
 7. Note the name of the person who received or stored Raoul's possessions. Can we find him and or determine others whose possessions he took. In other words are we dealing with a certain person dealing with certain kinds of documents or is this at random? (Again I relate to the issue of Spishak, Weinberg and documents).
 8. If documents, where were they stored?
 9. Do these possessions correspond to those which were handed over to the family in 1989? Is there anything missing? Is there anything included which shouldn't be there, or would indicate that it comes from another time or place?
 10. Forensically, is anyone skilled enough to estimate WHEN this blotting took place?

11. Forensically, is there a date or series of dates under Langfelder's wide blot???
12. If RW's possessions consist of passport, etc. identity papers -- does this in any way relate to the process of becoming a numbered prisoner? (Holding back all proof of identity that would establish to an official or prisoner along the way that someone truly is the famous person he claims to be and not delusional?)

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (10)

1999-03-16

Aambs A. Wallberg

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EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
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Kopia: rekryfax amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds ny version av Susan Mesinais redogörelse för genomgången av alfabetiska register i FSB:s arkiv den 10 mars.

HIRDMAN

March 16, 1999

REPORT TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson, Riga
Ambassador Jan Lundvik, Stockholm
Anders Wallberg & Mats Foyer, Moscow

FROM: Susan Mesina

RE: Alphabetical Registries, Lubyanka, Studied at FSB Archives
22 Kuznetsky Most on March 10, 1999 with
Andrei Allakhverdov as translator

Please note that all of the information put forth below was done without having taken any notes. It was recalled from memory later on the 10th of March, but already certain details were fading fast. I came expecting to have to calculate Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder's personal prisoner file registration number which could take some weeks. I had no knowledge of what I would see, nor did I feel comfortable inventing new questions on the spot. It seemed more correct to receive the answers they had prepared for me and to thank them step by step. I signed a receipt for what I had seen, but I made it very specific — namely that this had established the probable registration numbers as x and y and that I was satisfied. This would I hope leave the door open for a few more specific questions on the basis of these very simple directories which refer to other aspects of my Preliminary Report or Reports. In other words, I saw much more than I was prepared to see and was not ready to make immediate use of it.

THIS REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL AS THE MATERIALS TO WHICH IT REFERS ARE CLASSIFIED BY THE RUSSIANS WHICH MUST BE HONORED PER OUR AGREEMENT.

After greeting again Yuri Michaelovitch Razboyev, the FSB Archivist who over the years has provided us with very valuable documents on the Wallenberg case, we were presented in a systematic way with a number of alphabetical registries from Lubyanka. This was in response to our request, and perhaps that of State Secretary Eliasson as I had mentioned the importance of this kind of detail to him, to provide us with Wallenberg and Langfelder's registration numbers for their personal prisoner files in 1 Internal Prison MGB 1945 - 47.

We were first shown the alphabetical registry for receipts for possessions of those arriving in Lubyanka Prison in 1945. This is called the 'Alphabetical Incoming Registry' and follows the same two page format in whatever year we viewed the registry. Andrei Allakhverdov remembers the columns to read as follows, from left to right: Date of Arrival, Possessions (sometimes itemized, sometimes not), Name with Family Name, First all together in one column), a column we think was entitled No.No. but for which we remember no entry on the cases we examined, Name of Party to Receive Them (or the Possessions); When they left and the possessions were handed over to them again. Note also that the Incoming Registry does not give

3

jurisdiction of the incoming prisoner nor does it say where he was coming from, only where he was going. We should study this more carefully to see if lesser known prisons, like Sukhanovo were listed as well, or only Lefortovo, or only Lefortovo or Butyrka.

Names of the various prisoners appear under their alphabetical headings, but within each letter heading they are recorded chronologically. In other words, all those whose name begins with B are placed in that section but not arranged therein alphabetically. One must search for the name under that letter heading. It definitely helps to know the date or approximate date of arrival.

Raoul Wallenberg's name appears under B, with a receipt number 205 for his rucksack¹ but no receipt that I remember for his personal papers or for documents, although such matters as a general procedure were itemized in the book very carefully.² The registration was made on February 7³, that is the day after he arrived in the prison on February 6, 1945. Following the line across, the registry shows him leaving for Lefortovo on May 30, 1945, which was one day after his actual departure -- in short leaving time for confirmation of his arrival in Lefortovo to get back to Lubyanka. (My memory is that while one might be registered on the same day as arrival, the departure date would always be a day off. By 1947, the arrival registration was also a day off).

Langfelder's name is also visible and shows his departure for Lefortovo as March 19, 1945, again one day after we know that he actually left. The archivist pointed out to us that this was the case. Langfelder's receipt number was as we have seen in document handed over to us by the Russians in 1991. Andrei Allahkverdov says this was only for a suitcase. At this point, in 1945 in the cases of both Wallenberg and Langfelder there was no itemization of possessions, compared to the document which the Russians also gave us which breaks down Langfelder's possessions quite extensively -- including for shaving, a slide rule, tools, the kind of magnifying object a gem dealer might use in looking at jewelry, etc.

In the 1946 alphabetical registry there is no indication that either Wallenberg or Langfelder re entered Internal Prison during that time⁴. This book does show us however that Isaac Markovitch Wolf appeared on or about July 25, 1946 with a number of possessions, including documents or notes, (money?) and a knife. It should be noted that this is approximately one week after he was interrogated in Lefortovo (just proceeding the joint interrogation of Wallenberg and Langfelder) by

¹ A question occurred to me later in reference to Richter's testimony that would indicate Wallenberg had a number of his possessions with him in the cell, including food -- although the guard removed the cans. It is very unclear to me how these possessions were handled. After a full inventory has been made upon arrival, are the possessions removed? From the prisoner files one gets the impression that the department chiefs, their deputies and the senior investigators have some kind of discretionary control as to who gets to keep what, when and for how long.

² This note must be double checked, either from the materials handed over by the Russian side or going back to the book.

³ This detail must also be doublechecked.

⁴ Which does not however exclude the possibility that one or both of them could have been taken to a place such as Sukhanova for questioning. See Pelkonen's file for more detail on this.

4

Koppelyansky. Wolfen, if my memory serves me, stayed only a day -- in spite of the fact that he brought a great deal of things with him. This makes me all the more interested and determined to chart his interrogation history, even if we don't know the contents of his interrogations. When I rechecked the answers which FSB gave to my first Preliminary Report I see that they list July 25, 1946 as his arrest date. In that case, was he acting (or led to believe he was acting) as an NKVD agent when called to Lefortovo on July 17, 1946?.

In 1947, the names of Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katon(a) have been blotted out in the Incoming Registry. Some of this material was shown to us previously, including the forensics done on Wallenberg's name and Langfelder. Wallenberg's blot, corresponding to the date March 2, 1947 ... one day after we know he was brought over from Lefortovo ... is thin compared to Langfelder's. Wallenberg's covers only one line. In addition to that, it is not blotted all the way across the registry but covers only his date of arrival, possessions, family name and first name -- essentially the contents on the left hand page.

Neither the name of the person who received Wallenberg's possessions in 1947 nor the column corresponding to the date when the possessions were handed back have been blotted out. While we did not discuss the matter at the Archive or later over lunch, both Andrey and I in our individual efforts to record our memories both commented independently that we felt it was intended for the reader to see the empty space which would seem to establish that the prisoner went in to Lubyanka in 1947 but did not come out. It also was important to leave an authority, someone accountable for future reference. Why?

Katona's blotted line is also not very thick. Langfelder's blot is an eye sore, quite large and would imply -- among other things -- a large number of itemized things being brought with him. I also noted a possible scratch under the blot for Katona in the column corresponding to the date when his possessions would have been returned. Given that Langfelder and Katona were brought to Lubyanka together from Lefortovo on July 23, 1947, I went back and looked at the Langfelder registration. There are definite scratch marks on the right hand page which I thought could have been made by doing the forensics. Not being sure, I held the right hand page vertical from the book, so that the light was not reflected off the smoothness of the purple ink. It looked to me like there were a number of dates written there, one under the other. I even thought I saw something that looked like the 27 VII or VIII -- which is not as the story goes. This can only be determined by doing forensics on all three of these blots -- which I greatly recommend. That is, it would seem to me that Katona went someplace else and that Langfelder may have gone in and out in 1947 or even into another year. We also should try to determine who else was 'blotted out' during this time period. If given a chance to return, I should definitely check Pelkonen for all three years, each year for a different reason that could have direct bearing on RW and VL.

It should be noted, when we examined this kind of registry, I asked the archivist if it were possible for a prisoner to have come to Internal Prison without having any possessions -- meaning, could anyone come into Internal and not be registered in this

5

book. Yuri M. Razboyev proceeded to show us that everyone had something, even if it was just a wallet or a key ring. But he also pointed out to us an inscription for someone who brought nothing. This too was noted and therefore this registry is considered THE SOURCE for determining who entered for each year, also to determine when they went back out.

This makes them very important for us to study -- not just Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder -- but to get a more consistent picture of the ins and outs and to identify other prisoners brought in together or interrogated together. This is a classic case where we need to study the original documents in an ongoing fashion and in a context.

The question of personal file registration numbers -- the reason I made this request -- was quite straightforward. We examined another alphabetical registry for 1945, again alphabetical, again arranged chronologically called the Registry for Those Detained in Lubyanka in 1945. Under B in the chronological space where February 6, 1945 or an approximate date would fall, a name has been cut out of the book with a razor, along with the date of arrival. What has been retained is the jurisdiction of the arresting body, which is GUKR Smersh, and the personal file registration number which is 153.

By like token, under L, in the spot where February 6, 1945 or that approximate date would appear, there is a name cut out with a razor, and the date of arrival, but again what is left is GUKR Smersh and the personal file registration number of 154.

To double check that I was indeed in the right kind of registry, I called up the names of Richter and others whose personal prisoner file numbers I know from their prisoner files. And indeed the numbers registered in the book conform and cross reference with what we have seen. In short, these registries alone are worthy of careful study as they are -- but this was not part of the deal, nor were they going to let us. I would however like to request the arrival and departure dates, jurisdiction and personal registration number of important prisoners like Loyda, Hille, Huber and Zoltan Rivo whose files begin much later than their actual arrival in Moscow prisons or whose Internal Prison personal registration numbers are missing from their files.

We are now in possession of two very important keys. The problem is to access the lock box, doors or gates which can be opened by them. One of the first things Yuri Michaeolovitch did in his well organized presentation was to point to this section of the answers to my questions in the Preliminary Report, to the effect that all cell occupancy information, corpus lists (isolation lists by extension although the existence of these are not even pointed to), transport lists, list of those sent to Butyrka, correspondence about the prisoners have been destroyed. According to him the fact that these alphabetical registries still exist is lucky. (I would suggest that there is nothing unusual about holding onto records having to do with possessions as there is accountability involved until the end of time. The question is: to what use is a registry that, where a name is cut out, still refers you to the body under whose jurisdiction the prisoner is and to their personal prisoner file registration numbers ?)

6

In this context, namely that all of the documents reflecting the operations of the apparatus are seemingly destroyed -- definitely absent for our purposes for one reason or another -- Yuri Michaelovitch stated that the only way to reconstruct the truth we sought was indeed through the individual prisoner files because this was the only place where the information still exists in any form. While this is important in terms of making certain that we see all the prisoner files we requested to achieve a maximum threshold of reference, I am not convinced that there does not exist more material of some form from the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate. The 1945 directory, with the names believed to be Wallenberg and Langfelder sliced out, still makes certain that the jurisdictional body (accountable) and their registration numbers can be identified. Those in the know could still use it as a guide to finding the right operational correspondence group and within that the right personal file. This will be discussed in more detail below.

What was important is Vinogradov's comment regarding the jurisdiction -- that it was consistent throughout. I harped on this remark, by pointing out that the registration for the interrogation in Lubyanka with Kuzmishin, Number 33, in March of 1947 gives the jurisdiction as 3 YHP (in Russian) and that the registration of Abakumov's letter to Molotov Number 3044A also writes 3 YHP. So I asked him very specifically if this meant only the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate, as per the end of Smersh as GUKR /Smersh and/or the 2nd Department of the 3rd Main Directorate turned into the 4th Department. Or, if 3 YHP could also refer to a prisoner under the Especially Grave Matters/Cases Unit. He answered quite definitely that it meant the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate and that Wallenberg was under their jurisdiction throughout. Which is consistent with what we seem to be seeing in the case of Roedl as well.

I then asked them to show me the registry that was used to answer my question about Schlitter's possible cellmates at Internal Prison in 1947, namely Akikusa, Wallenberg, Roedl, Langfelder. Yuri Michaelovitch, as I expected him to, went straight to the 1947 alphabetical registry which showed the prisoner entering with possessions and departing on such and such a date. Schlitter departs in 1948, which is true. It should be noted that Roedl's name is not cut out or blotted out -- it is perfectly clear and easy to see that Roedl entered in February 1947 and left for Krasnogorsk in October 1947, with the date as well. He showed me Akikusa, arrival and departure, and referred to the blot for Wallenberg (which of course does not give a departure date).

What he did not volunteer was the blot for Langfelder as part of answering this question, nor do they answer in writing my very specific question whether or not Schlitter sat with Langfelder after the latter's all day and night interrogation by Kartashov in Internal Prison in July 1947. I did not go into this with them. What I did however say to Vinogradov was that I had the mounting impression that Langfelder was an extremely important prisoner, perhaps even more important in certain respects than Wallenberg. He answered, off the record I assume, that Langfelder is indeed a 'Very Important Prisoner' but our investigation has to do with Raoul Wallenberg, not Vilmos Langfelder -- unless of course I happened to be one of Langfelder's relatives. I told him I was the relation of no one involved in this case.

7

As Yuri Michaelovitch was putting the registries away, he waved the Meier and Feller arrest files to remind me that this request had been satisfied. I informed Mr. Vinogradov and him that the name of Elemer Berozes, given the foils of transliteration into Russian, would seem to have appeared on a document in the Meier file -- where he is one of three prisoners brought in with the two Swiss diplomats, in which case one might question if they all did not work with Raoul Wallenberg. Upon being shown the document, Yuri Michaelovitch cross referenced the name with the date of arrival in Moscow in the 1945 registry. It appeared under the appropriate letter of the alphabet at approximately the right date interval, but spelled in yet another form.

I asked to see the file, which we have formally requested and they have formally answered that it cannot be found. They made a face which I can only perform in person. I get the impression that this could be a problem. And I wondered again if perhaps they are under orders not to show any more files, which may underlie Nikiskin's statement at the meeting that we had seen all the files we were going to see. On the other hand, without words, it was suggested that we should apply pressure. Very serious pressure and more and more.

At some point, by the way, Yuri Michaelovitch went out of his way to produce the rasstriel directory and to show me the execution sentence for Gfornier, the interim documents, and the AKT which affirms his execution along with fourteen others. Their names were visible to me. Vinogradov and Yuri Michaelovitch affirmed that all of them had been sentenced on the same date, but that did not imply that their crimes were related. They commented that the only thing which was lacking was a document describing where and when there had been disposal of the body, either by burying him or cremation.

We then had a bit of a conversation about Esau Oggins. They brought in the two volume books by Sudhaplatov's son which states that Oggins was executed by injection in 1947 and about the lab. Vinogradov emphasized that very few people were executed in this manner. I said I expected as much, but if he didn't mind I would have to repeat my question whether or not Smoltsov was responsible for injecting the prisoner or witnessing his death, as is required also in the rasstriel akt above. (I apologized saying that they must think I am a horrible person to ask such questions but if we are going to arrive at the truth, we have to really look at the possibilities). Vinogradov was not evidently horrified by my question, but he did very quickly ask the nature of and kind of documents I had received from the American side. After I had enumerated them more or less he blinked and stated thereafter that this was all that existed on the subject. He also stated that he believed these documents to have been found in the Party archives. (He may be right, but I had assumed since they were given over by Primakov at the time that they were from SVR).

I asked if anyone had seen Oggins medical file, that I wanted to see exactly how they faked the record -- especially since the form of death Abakumov recommends is not the one on the death certificate. That I wanted to document the steps in between because if an extreme procedure had been applied successfully once, it would most likely be applied again. Again, I wanted to know who was involved -- if not Smoltsov, then who? Because the Smoltsov Document has to stand in a context.....

8

Andrey was translating all of this, but Vinogradov had already understood it completely and cut him off. That is he said, I understand Context. At which point he switched back to the issue of analogy, my method he thinks, which he stated they had attacked somewhat critically at the meeting. (I had not noticed). Their strategy at this point is not simply to enumerate the weaknesses of using an analogue, but to convert all that I have put into fact and practical detail -- my data -- back into an analogue. So here too there was no willingness at all to make use of the parallel, to allow us to compare to see where in fact the two cases are alike, where different. Instead he starting explaining to me the differences -- that Oggins was an American whose presence was known.....exactly the differences I had pointed out to them in my Preliminary Report when I argued that 2733A did not necessarily predict the contents of Abakumov's document 3044A which we knows relates to the Wallenberg case.

The bottom line here, as elsewhere, is that they are not -- for reasons known only to them -- willing to close the gap. Also, one should note, that one cannot discuss the real details or possible real details of Raoul Wallenberg's death without a great hush falling on the room -- which seemed to effect all of the Russians. I felt like I was suddenly in a church and that this was sacred ground and there were very important taboos about what could and could not be said. And not because there was foul play involved but because dead is dead.

For my part and Andrey's too -- the question is whether or not you can base a death on one Smoltsov document and one very open space in a 1947 registry that shows Raoul Wallenberg's possessions being taken to Lubyanka but not coming out. We know this is a fact, at least if they are the possessions which were returned in 1989. But we do not yet know WHY they were still sitting there.

OBSERVATIONS

Mr. Vinogradov who arrived at some point made the remark that there was a separate registry for numbered prisoners and other categories had their registries too. I did not have my wits about me at that point, as it was an invitation to ask to see the inscription for Okulicki, Jankowski et al who became numbered prisoners within a day of their arrival at Lubyanka. This would enable them to separate out the different series of numbers I had mentioned at the meeting in Stockholm. In other words, Kitschman's registration number for his arrival in late 1945 is in the thousands. The Polish leaders seemed to have the same series but to have arrived in March 1945 to be sentenced in June. These distinctions have to be more finely tuned. If we get another opportunity to study these documents further, we should grab it.

I felt that the whole 'show and tell' was carefully programmed, although I was allowed to ask questions and they went with them to the appropriate place. I asked by the way that they check for Katon(a) arrival in 1945, but it was not there. As I have seen that he sat with Gerstenberg in Cell 156 Lefortovo on July 4, 1945, we can assume then that he arrived in 1944 or earlier. This plus the company he was keeping in Cell 156 would indicate a strong Rumanian or Transylvanian connection, which links him also with Bethlen. Vinogradov was as dissuasive as he could be about looking into

7

the file of Schmidt-Durmond for the order to move Katon(a) into Cell 156. The repeated his statement from the meeting that what was important was to identify of what nationality he was.

The most important observation I can make is that the absence, yet continual control over Wallenberg's identity papers -- if such they were in this case --- could mark the first step in a disappearance procedure. Roedl's death was reported: what happened to his possessions afterwards, when they knew for a fact that he was gone? Some comparisons are in order here between those we know to have died in Lubyanka and how the return of their possessions is marked. I left it alone because technically it was beyond the scope of our request and also, I was unprepared to do the work.

We must request the very specific acts that govern the destruction of documents in the 50s and 60s, although knowing FSB they will be able to produce them.

I would specifically request that anything that remains of the correspondence of the Kartashov group from 1944 until 1952, or until its dissolution under Kartashov, be made available to us and that we be allowed to study it in sequence, not a fragmented document here or there. Given also that the jurisdiction of the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate is acknowledged in the case of Wallenberg, I repeat the points I have been trying to make about the significance of this entire contingent being passed to Butyrka in March/April 1950 -- that is, if Grossheim-Krisko was correct, then jurisdiction over Wallenberg would have passed to the 2nd Directorate and MVD -- whether as a named or numbered prisoner.

Andrei Allahkverdov made the following observation, that the blotting out of the names of Wallenberg and Langfelder, or cutting them out of the registry, only attracts attention to them. This is especially the case when they are the only ones to be blotted out or cut out in the entire registry according to the archivist (we did not get to scan, page by page). Andrei Allahkverdov believes this is not what one would do if seriously removing something -- there are ways to eliminate all traces which was what he had expected. In that sense, even a missing file attracts attention and interest.

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED: - FIRST THOUGHTS:

1. What possessions did Raoul Wallenberg bring with him to Lubyanka in March 1947? This must be determined even if we have to do forensics using the greatest team in the world. There is a difference I think between personal identity papers or diplomatic documents and notebooks which are being removed and the kind of possessions like clothing and so on which could conceivably accompany one everywhere in the GULAG under whatever name. This makes sense in that Raoul's rucksack is still missing.

2- What possessions did Vilmos Langfelder bring with him to Lubyanka in July 1947? Were some or all of these returned and where did he go with them? Again, this requires a forensic team to tackle that blot which is quite thick and ominous although it may correspond to one small part of the forensics.

3. If in the case of Wallenberg we are speaking of identification papers, notes or documents only, were these until that time still in his possession? (See my questions in the Preliminary Report on Spishak and the other diplomats papers. I get the impression that they were not removed from them immediately.)

I would specifically like to use this directory to pursue the question of diplomatic papers as I had put forth in my query and which they could answer more satisfactorily. I would like the opportunity to double check in the case of Meier, Feller, Bethlen, Marek, Merkis, Munthers, Jankowski, Okulicki, Beckerle, Spishak, Chatlosh, etc.

4. Does the March 11, 1947 interrogation relate to or make use of these documents?

5. Is this the interrogation which Kondrashev has described?

6. And/or was the interrogation Kondrashev described a further version based on the same documents conducted by someone other than Kuzmishin, whom I assume Kondrashev knew well enough. (Kondrashev has stated that the interrogator was a man unknown to him.)

7. Note the name of the person who received or stored Raoul's possessions. Can we find him and or determine others whose possessions he took. In other words are we dealing with a certain person dealing with certain kinds of documents or is this at random? (Again I relate to the issue of Spishak, Weinberg and documents). What is his position and in what department?

8. If documents, where were they stored?

9. Do these possessions correspond to those which were handed over to the family in 1989? Is there anything missing? Is there anything included which shouldn't be there, or would indicate that it comes from another time or place?

10. Forensically, is anyone skilled enough to estimate WHEN this blotting took place?

11. Forensically, is there a date or series of dates under Langfelder's wide blot????

12. If RW's possessions consist of passport, etc. identity papers -- does this in any way relate to the process of becoming a numbered prisoner? (Holding back all proof of identity that would establish to an official or prisoner along the way that someone truly is the famous person he claims to be and not delusional?)

Kopia Lindes

P 2 Eu'

Originalt hos A-RED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
920 EAST 58TH STREET
CHICAGO • ILLINOIS 60637

March 8, 1999

67/005
99 3 16

Mr. Lage Olson
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
UD/EI/ESEK
Gustav Adolfs Torg 1
S-10323 Stockholm
Sweden

P 2 Eu'

Dear Lage:

With respect to the meeting of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I am submitting the following expenses over the January 8-13, 1999, period.

1. Living expenses in Berlin, Germany, to arrange to interview Mr. Hans Loyda in Mittweida, Germany (January 11-13, 1997).
2. Round trip airfare for Susan Mesinai to accompany me on this interview.

As you may recall, during the "regular" part of the meeting in Stockholm, Hans Magnusson had strongly recommended to me to try to continue contact with Mr. Jan (Hans) Loyda of Mittweida, Germany, who had been a cellmate of Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder in Moscow prisons. After the meeting in Stockholm I arranged to meet with Hans Loyda again and was accompanied by Susan Mesinai who had prepared a large list of topics to be covered in the interview with him.

In order to try to curtail costs as much as possible, I am submitting only my expenses in Germany to interview Hans Loyda. This includes the airfare for Susan Mesinai to travel to Berlin with me. To try to keep costs as manageable as possible, I have submitted to the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States costs for travel to and participation in the discussions on Stockholm.

A report on the interview has been submitted already to Hans Magnusson.

In summary:

1. *Per diem* expenses: January 8-13, 1999 (6 days)
2. Expenses for travel to Mittweida, Germany, from Stockholm, (receipts included)

Airfare for Susan Mesinai	\$852.20 ✓
Hotel in Berlin	305.04 (319.60)
Meals	104.52 ✓
Automobile rental, gasoline, etc.	280.06 ✓
Gifts to Mr. & Mrs Loyda	10.21 ✓

total \$1575.59

1552:84

Att: [Signature]
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
Mr. L. Olson
March 8, 1999
Page 2

A conversion rate of 1.73 DM per US dollar was used.

Thank you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Marvin W. Makinen".

Marvin W. Makinen

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (9)

1999-03-16

Aambs A. Wallberg

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EC

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: rekryfax amb Riga ✓

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds Susan Mesinais handskrivna kommentarer till den reviderade frågelistan från mötet med arbetsgruppen för ett uppklarande av Raoul Wallenbergs öde den 22 februari.

HIRDMAN

ENCL NO: 2

1999-02-08

Revised 1999-03-04

Raoul Wallenberg: some questions and observations to be discussed at a meeting in Moscow on February 22, 1999. (Revised after the meeting; changes and additions marked in italics).

The Swedish side of the working group on Raoul Wallenberg would like to draw the attention of the Russian side to the following questions and observations, of which several refer to earlier requests from Ms Mesinaï. Some additional points will be brought up orally. (These have been added at the end of this list).

As a general point the importance of fully implementing the outstanding work programme in accordance with the Russian-Swedish agreement late 1997 should be stressed.

1. Although this matter has been touched upon, there is still a certain confusion, at least on the Swedish side, concerning the use of registration numbers for prisoners of war as well as the sources available for establishing such registration numbers and for establishing cell numbers. It would be valuable to clarify this in a conclusive way. In this context, it would be appreciated if access could be granted to review the Lubyanka registry for the years 1945-1952. The Swedish side is grateful for the access given to the Lubyanka registry (kartoteka). As to the varying use of registration numbers for prisoners arriving to and kept in Vladimir/Ivanovo/Lubyanka/Lefortovo (some examples were given during the meeting) it would seem to be of interest for the investigation if the Russian side could give a clear picture of the various numbering systems used (we are not talking of the so-called numbered prisoners here). Enclosed, please find a further elaboration of this matter by Ms Mesinaï.

Furthermore, the Swedish side has understood it so, that information on cell occupancy of a prisoner is to be found mainly in the personal file or, if such a file is missing, in the documents relating to exchange of correspondence between authorities. Sometimes cell occupancy can also be seen from the prisoner registration cards. Can this understanding be confirmed? Are there any other sources for establishing cell numbers?

about Vladimir;

where we know also that there existed Corpus Cards for assignments made by the head of the Corpus, for prisoners in isolation. This might be used for certain periods where no cells indicated on the prisoner card. There were also isolation lists.

2. For Franz Rudolf Gfrorener, the Russian side has indicated that he on 11 February 1952 was sentenced to be executed by a firing squad and that the execution was carried out on 30 April 1952. It would be important to find the document confirming this in the prescribed legal way and also the document confirming if he was cremated and where he was buried. ~~The requested additional information was given at the meeting. Could a copy of this document be handed over?~~ Furthermore, considering the research undertaken in American, British and JOINT archives by Ms Mesinai and notwithstanding that Mr Lyrvall and myself were kindly given the possibility to study the investigative file of Gfrorener, it would be appreciated if Ms Mesinai could also be permitted to go through this file once. The same access is asked for the investigative file of Ernst HUBER.

3. Concerning numbered prisoners. It was earlier established in the Working group, that prisoner no.1 in Vladimir was a Hungarian, born 1909, but later there appeared to have been some uncertainty concerning the birth year. Could this be confirmed again?

In one of the working group meetings Mr Galitsky said that he had been able to establish the identity of all numbered prisoners in the so called Op Fund 451. Could the full list be made available (we presume that it does not only refer to Vladimir). At the meeting it was claimed that Mr Galitsky had only been able to establish the identity of some numbered prisoners. What is correct?

In april 1947 a group of numbered prisoners was sent to Ivanovo. In a document instructions and guidelines for numbered prisoners were established (this will be presented at the meeting). This document might lead to the discovery of similar documents for Vladimir and other special prisons/camps/institutions. Some comments were given by the Russian side to these questions during the meeting. As much further information on guidelines etc for numbered prisoners

2. (On Gfrorener, they showed me all the paperwork with the fourteen other names, while I was at Lubyanka. He was shot.)

1999-03-15 08:32

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Utrikesdepartementet 02015 page 9(14)

#3 - Mr. Magnadov took the Danovs documents and promised to get back to us. as possible would seem important.

4. In its reply of 16 December 1998 on the questions of Ms Susan Mesinai, the Russian side says that Otto Hatz, i a, was interrogated on 27.01, 29.01; 08.04 and 19.04 in the year 1947. However, in accordance with lists previously presented by the Russian side, Hatz was also interrogated on 08.08 in 1947 (by Solovov).

It was also stated in the Russian answer that Hatz was interrogated on 18.07, 22.07 and 23.07 1947. These dates can not be found on the above-mentioned list earlier presented. The necessary clarification was given during the meeting. However, given the

5. It would be valuable to have a clear idea about which files/documents exist for the Swiss diplomats Feller and Maier and to be given access to these.

~~also~~ To this question the requested response was given. Files were shown. As Elmer Bercezes/EMIL

BURKIAS was brought to Moscow with Meier + Feller

6. It seems that for Walter Schlüter/Scheuer the sequence of pagination in his file is broken. This should be discussed. I understand that the file of Schlüter/Scheuer has been given back to the Special Archive. A clarification would still be appreciated.

7. According to the Russian answer, no file has been found on Field Noel. It should be pointed out that the first name is Noel and the surname is Field.

It has been agreed to check also in Budapest. Ms Meier will provide more data.

8. On 17 November 1997 some written questions were given to Mr Pitovranov. Have any answers been received? In view of the explanation given by the Russian side this question does not require any further action for the time being.

9. In one of the working group meetings the Russian side said it could not grant the Swedish request to be able (through independent experts) to review archive documents in original in their archive context (this mainly, but not only, is valid for the FSB archive). It would be important to have this policy confirmed in written. This question could be left open and pending until the final stage of the work.

10. In his letter to Mr Dahl, Minister at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, of 10 August 1998, Mr Kuznetsov said, in response to a letter from the Swedish Embassy, that search for and handing over of medical documents signed by the MGB Doctor Mr Smoltsov can only be done on the basis of a decision by the working group. It would be valuable to discuss this.

Coincidence

interrogated on the 22/23rd

and Richter on the 17th

Hatz on the 18th

we reserve the

right to study this

in more depth as

per Ms.

Mesinai's

discussion

of grouped

or overlapping

interrogations

attached.

1999-03-15 08:52 UD

Utrikesdepartementet 02015 page 10 (14)

4

This is not in order to be able to establish with more certainty the authenticity of Dr Smoltsov's signature but rather to understand his importance and role in Lubyanka in relation to Abakumov, Mironov and others. Also we would like to see the file from which the OKULICKI sample was taken as it is not on his person. 11. Another reply in that letter was that it is at present impossible to put together a list of the prisoners who were transferred from Butyrka to Lefortovo, as the investigation on this is not completed. Has it been completed by now? ~~It is understood that most documents from Butyrka have been destroyed, but some conclusions might be drawn from Lefortovo documents?~~

12. It is obvious that the Soviet Union during the last year of the war managed to intercept, by way of signal intelligence, cable and telegram/radio traffic between Budapest-Berlin and Budapest-Bukarest, including OKW field cables, communications of the German Embassy Budapest, Abwehr, Gestapo, Stab Becher, SD, Sonderkommando Eichmann with RSHA. We could discuss how access to this material could be arranged in the most practical way.

13. It would be valuable to study any Smersh/NKVD/MGB memoranda on prisoners of war, from the period 1945-47 (relating to the Conference on reparations). This involves both international meetings in Moscow + communication. 14. The Russian side has earlier, without success so far, been trying to locate protocols of interviews/interrogations conducted by Frontline Red Army Units (incl. Smersh) of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, with certain persons in Budapest who either worked in the Swedish Legation or with Raoul Wallenberg's relief efforts.

The names discussed so far have been:

- Ivar Danielsson
- Per Anger
- Lars Berg
- Denes F. von Mazey
- Yngve Ekmark
- Goete Carlsson
- Margareta Bauer
- Birgit Brulin (all from the Swedish legation)
- Valdemar Langlet (Swedish Red Cross)

It might also be worthwhile to try to locate any material from interrogations with the following persons:

- Nina Langlet
- Asta Nilsson
- Simon Margel

Please provide the destruction document for the registries in question. In the meantime, we will try to recreate this series of numbers through the personal files or prisoner cards of those whose names are attached.

between the MGB and MVD in 1946-47-48

see MGB, Meoni's proposed work attached

-Sixten von Bayer
-Weyermann
-Friedrich (Fritz) Born
-Ernst (Erno) Kugel
-Antonio Vidmar (all Swedish or International Red Cross)

Peter Hain, Karoly Szabo, Evald Maxson Engestrom, Laszlo Kelemen, Laszlo Geiger, Ivan Szekely, Pal Hegedus, Tibor Vador, Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, Miklasz Krausz, Pal Szalai, Peter Zuercher, Erno Peto, Laszlo Ferency, Laszlo Falk, Razso Mueller, Otto Fleischmann, Jozsef Benes, Andor Balog, Max Fleischmann, Hugo Wohl, Vilmos Forgacs, Gyula Simon/Stephanie Simon, Vilmos Tarcsai, Helene and Razso Falk, Stefan Engelmann, Karoly Wilhelm, Peter Sugar, Konstantin Takasczy (all from Raoul Wallenberg's staff or his international contacts). For the new names the Swedish side will try to establish more personal data.

15. Has any correspondence, including communications on behalf of third parties, relating to the Swedish Legation's in Budapest role as Protective Power of Soviet interests in Hungary, been discovered in Russian (mainly MID) archives? It would be of interest to have access to this.

16. Documentary sources indicate that Mellaneuropeiska AB, the company where Raoul Wallenberg was co-director, had numerous contacts with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm. There are sources indicating that Raoul Wallenberg even had plans to travel from Budapest to Moscow in 1944 (before his mission) and that the Trade Delegation had been informed about Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission. Could access be given to the files of the Soviet Trade delegation in Stockholm, for the years 1942-1947?

17. Access to records of the Hungarian Political Police, Section for War Criminals, headed by Gabor Peter, 1945-46; records of the Russian Liaison Agency in Budapest for these years, concerning the interrogations of Kurt Andreas Becher conducted from November 14-December 1, 1945 (we know that the Russian side has been trying to locate these interrogation protocols before). A document on Becher recently received from Hungarian archives is enclosed.*)

18. The working group has several times discussed the possible links between Raoul Wallenberg and his fate and Walter Schellenberg. Materials on Schellenberg is still being reviewed in several international

1999-03-15 08:54 UD

archives and it would be appreciated to be given access also to the documents relating to Schellenberg available in Russian archives.

19. In the working group we have discussed the contacts in Ankara between the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Pavel Erzine, and a Finnish diplomat, Mr Ake Frey, as well as later contacts between the Soviet diplomat in Helsinki, Mr Vladimirov and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, relayed to Stockholm, concerning Raoul Wallenberg. These contacts took place in 1955-56 and, in short, indicated an interest or readiness on the Soviet side to discuss, in the early phase, the possibilities of finding Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union, and in a later phase, after Swedish Prime Minister Erlander's visit to Moscow, to have informal Swedish-Soviet discussions on the Soviet reply to the Swedish "demarche", including new testimonies, already before such a reply was worked out on the Soviet side. So far, the Russian side has been able to find three documents on Mr Erzine's contacts with Mr Frey, which give a somewhat different and less sensational picture of these conversations than the reports of Mr Frey. Furthermore, in a conversation I personally had with Mr Vladimirov in 1993, he confirmed the Soviet attempts to have informal discussions with Sweden in late 1956, in order to be able to work out "the most suitable answer", an answer also described by him as approximately a "half-truth".

It would be of great interest to investigate if any further material on these contacts could be located in Russian archives. For example, it appears that, at the time, Mr Boris Fedorovich Podtserov was Soviet ambassador in Ankara. He was earlier the Head of Mr Molotov's secretariat in the Foreign Ministry, and was probably the only person, apart from Mr Molotov himself, who might have been able to read the letter from Mr Abakumov of July 17, 1947. There are also indications that Mr Podtserov was personally in contact with Moscow from Ankara on the Raoul Wallenberg matter. Could there, in the MID archive, or in any other archive, be any documents relating to Mr Podtserov, either from his time as Ambasssador in Ankara or from earlier times, containing anything about Raoul Wallenberg?

20. Some of the questions from Ms Mesina to the Russian side have not been commented upon in the replies of December (FSB) and January (MVD). ~~Inter alia, this is the case for~~
~~-the question on foreign prisoners shot during the~~
~~period when rasstrel was not carried out (May 1947)~~

Hans -
 I have gone
 through
 all the questions
 they are ready

Anders I think
 has sent them to you. Please attach
 them with corrections because they are very
 clear.

until February 1952).

- the question on the "American" departments of Smersh/MEB, whether they could at any time have been indirectly involved or consulted in the Raoul Wallenberg case.
- the question relating to Schandl and Ionov.
- the question on the respective competence of the Internal prison, the Transport Directorate and the prison department in emergency cases like the suicide attempt of Gudenko or the death of Roedl.
- the need to have a clearer understanding of the deaths of Jankowski and prisoner no. 11 on March 13, 1953.
- the question why Loyda (1947), Backerle (1952) and Konoye were brought back to Moscow from their respective destinations. Who ordered this? A complete list of Konoye's cellmates.

New questions, raised orally during the meeting on February 22, 1999.

21. This related to the continuation and conclusion of the study of personal files included in the list of approximately 100 files given to the Russian side. It is extremely important for the investigation and for its credibility that as many as possible of the remaining files are made available for Ms Mesina. This is fully in accordance with the agreement already made. The absence of any file should be justified/explained in written, separately for each file.

22. This concerned the finalization of the analysis of the Vladimir registry cards. This question would also be brought up with the Ministry of Justice. A positive answer has now been given. This is very gratifying.

23. Referred to a request relating to the so-called Trophy files, in accordance with the original agreement with the Russian side. The written request will soon be presented to the Russian side.

24. The Swedish side informed that it would prepare an additional request to the SVR (taking into account the informal views - non-paper - presented by the Russian co-chairman of the Working group). The request is enclosed.

25. A request was presented to have access to all documents describing the death of the prisoner Oggins

Hans;
What about
my Request
to complete
Vladimir 1947
to Sean
Granova

and the circumstances surrounding it. This case is of particular interest in view of the time aspect and the documents describing a "conspiratorial" solution on the highest political levels.

26. The Swedish side asked the Russian side to give a description of the character of the camp at Krasnogorsk to introduce Ms. Mesina to an expert

27. There was a discussion whether any additional documents or information existed on the prisoner of war Katona, who sat together with Langfelder.

28. According to a Comintern foreign prisoner who was imprisoned for some time in Lubyanka (she has published a book about this), Lubyanka had in the forties its own crematory. Could this be confirmed.

29. The Russian side is reminded about the very important suggestion to make available to Ms Mesina a counterpart with access to and good knowledge about the key archives. Such a person could on a continuous basis answer questions and take necessary additional measures, thus speeding up the work and reducing the need for presenting long written lists of questions.

Hans Magnusson
Ambassador

See attached
Since the meeting Ms. Mesina has found mention of Katona in her prisoner file data with a specific reference to an order to place him in Cell 156 before July 4 1945 with Gelstenberg and Spalke. This order is in the file of Schmidt-Demund. Please make this file available

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (5)

1999-03-17

Aambs A. Wallberg

aa

R

EC

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: rekryfax amb Riga ✓

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds Susan Mesinais kommentarer till intervju med en företrädare för det ryska statsarkivet med anledning av hennes delundersökning i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet.

HIRDMAN

March 17, 1999

SPECIAL FAX TO: Ambassador Jan Lundvik - Stockholm
Ambassador Hans Magnusson - Riga

FROM: Susan Ellen Mesinai

QUITE CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Jan and Hans:

Attached please find a portion of the interview which BBC did with an archivist or historian at GARF with documents, I believe from Fond 451. The raw footage of this is available to us, even though it was not actually aired (all the better). The producer is the one who also saw the registry of prisoners being brought in at the end of the War, those about whom Beria was informed. I would suspect Hans - given the details in this simple two pages -- that his other findings may prove to be more up our alley than we would expect.

Even if we consider this only the tip of the iceberg, I rest the case I made at our meeting in Stockholm on January 8, and as I wrote in my report. This also relates to the e mail I sent Hans last night as to my confusion re MGB and MVD. The Prison Department, as stated here, is under the Main Directorate for Camps and Corrective Colonies. And as I wrote then and as is proven here, this was under the jurisdiction or direction of Serov as of 1947 and on.

We see that records related to numbered prisoners existed already in 1943. But our concern starts in 1947. We see here also that the term Camps and Corrective Colonies included also Vladimir Prison. 'These are in fact the prisoners of the special contingent who were kept in the Vladimir special prison in 1951.' Please note that this includes Pap, Clement and Schandl and others whom we may not know. These were sentenced secretly via Pitovranov. Abakumov is nowhere to be seen here.

We see that as of the Fifties (and actually it began before the death of Stalin) some of these numbered prisoners were brought back under their name. Before that time, who they were could not be known.

"And here are documents (re Alliluyeva Anna Sergeyevna's tragic detention) that she was to be sent to Kazan Mental hospital....You see how... and there are more than one....You see here? According to instructions from Deputy Minister Serov....." And on.

Evidently she was not sent to Kazan but to Butyrka where her presence was denied. If she suffered from mental difficulties, then she most probably went from Butyrka to Serbsky to sit in the stack of numbered prisoners which originally they called upon ARK to help, and now they are dragging their feet. We must see their registries, and we must study those numbered prisoner files in Serbsky to seriously look for one who

could be Raoul. There cannot be a violation of rights of privacy when we do not know who they are.

I think you should bear the above testimony in mind also in terms of statements that have been made about Raoul or the case. There are a number of possibilities here when you read in the Molotov/Serov communications: 'considering what we know about Wallenberg.....' and 'Butyrka' which was then replaced with Lubyanka. You could have, as has been reported directly to the family, and as Myasnikow stated quite explicitly to Nanna Svartz, 'a man who is in very bad shape.' In such a case, the merchandise cannot be returned -- for reasons of public relations. No wonder Khrushchev had such a fit when the Svartz/Myasnikow controversy came up.....death could well have been considered the better scenario to present to the world, especially if by heart attack, than the truth. But old Raoul has support of another kind -- he will not die before his time. The case keeps coming up, keeps being pushed in their face.

Given our previous interest in Kazan, which helped us launch the medical, and the facts we are now learning about Butyrka as a place also of diagnosis before sending patients out to whatever special place for treatment.....I think we have some serious grounds for access and some heavy work before us. This includes very importantly all the funds for the various doctors including Myasnikow which Susanne Berger has requested.

I have found Anders and he will fax this to you. This letter replaces the one I intended to write about camps, Jan. That will come later. Best Susan

Susan

A. In the fund for the Prison Department, which by the way was part of the Main Directorate for camps and corrective colonies, there is a very interesting file. This file... In fact, it was all the time in a special fund. Because here there was correspondence of prisoners of a special group, kept in special prisons. With figures, figures showing how many prisoners there were in the prisons. Why this file... The thing is that here the prisoners were kept under numbers. The names, as a rule... they were not given. It is true though that in this file... Here it begins, this file, in '43. in '43. And in '43 they were kept under numbers. Well, for example there were sitting here Alliluyevas -- two sisters, Alliluyeva Yevgenia Alexandrovna and Alliluyeva Anna Sergeyevna. One had number 22, and the other -- number 23.

Q. This was the sister of Stalin's wife?

A. Yes, yes, yes, yes. And already later, in the '50, at the same time... There was even a directive, to ... At the same time, under numbers, and already in that time there was a directive, in the '50, to give already their names too. So, beginning with the '50s, in fact, the anonymous people, whose numbers did not say anything... Now they already knew who was sitting under those numbers, under the numbers 22 and 23.

Q. This means that they knew that the name was Alliluyeva.

[Before that] the people did not know who was sitting there?

A. Right. Who was sitting in the prison. In the Vladimir prison. These are in fact the prisoners of the special contingent who were kept in the Vladimir special prison in '51.

Q. This means they did not want the people who worked there to know who was sitting there?

A. Yes, those who worked. And those who sat there -- they did not know either. The number -- they just called the number -- 21, 22 -- and the person... In fact, the person was given a number, instead of his name. He forgot who he was, and what he was. And this system, of

course, was a horrible system. And only in the '50s. when already after Stalin's death there was a directive... I mean, at the same time there were numbers, and the names were given. The fate of Alliluyeva Anna Sergeyevna was also tragic, her fate. Because at first they wanted to send her -- after the Vladimir prison -- they wanted to send her to the Kazan mental asylum. But then the opinion of the leadership of the MVD changed, and they decided not to send her to the Kazan mental hospital. But here are documents that she was after all... [she] was to be sent to the Kazan hospital. You see how... And there are more than one. You see here? "According to the instructions from the City minister Serov"... And it was to send from the prison to the Kazan mental Asylum the prisoner Alliluyeva Anna Sergeyevna. But this not to happen, and she did not go to the Kazan mental asylum. Otherwise, no one knows ...

Q. What happened to her?

A. I think she was released, as far as I know. Yes. Here. "The prisoner kept in the prison..." And for a long time, when they requested the Butyrka prison -- she was there later -- the head of the Butyrka prison informed that "we do not have this prisoner at all, Alliluyeva." How can this be accounted for? It is hard [to say] too. Maybe they just wanted to conceal the fact too, that in fact Alliluyeva was there. That is why, her fate is of course, tragic, and for a long time she had to go through a lot of things, of course, because the fate was hard after... When [she] shot herself, it so happened. Stalin's wife... And so they were all sent as special contingent, to special prisons, the Vladimir and the Butyrka prison.

But nevertheless, this document here, this file is very detailed, and rather interesting. For the first time we learned what it was -- people under numbers. Because we had never known that in special prisons, as it turned out, there had been a special category of people who were kept only under numbers, who no one had known -- who was kept there.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-17

Sid. 1

(18)

P 2 Eu

(EC)

7

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Moskva ✓

RW: Abrasimov

1 bil

Ambassadören från Lundvik

Vid mitt besök i Moskva talade vi om Din kontakt med Abrasimov och möjligheten av att förnya den för att höra om han visste något om det av Svingel relaterade utväxlingsförsöket. Som underlag för ett sådant samtal bifogar jag här en rapport jag skickade från Berlin med en av Svingels koncisare sammanfattningar som bilaga. Vagheten i Svingels framställning förblev densamma i alla samtal vi hade i ämnet, och hans senare framförda uppgift att en "östrepresentant" också sonderat möjligheten av en utväxling mot Berglind ökade ytterligare den skepsis jag kände.

Cabinet

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1999-03-18

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jt.

Beigivning från

en. adresser i samt

UMK

BMK ME

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

B R Å D S K A N D E

Ans	Grupp	Mål
P	2	EU ¹

För ambassadör Jan Lundvik, EC

EC

Samtal om Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest

1 bil

Program för besöket bifogas. Professor Pók meddelar att Du kommer att få tillfälle till samtal med fem olika historiker med aktuell inriktning.

Lundvall

Programme of H.E.Mr.Jan Lundvik while staying in Budapest
between 22-26 March 1999:

On Monday, the 22nd of March:

at 15.30 p.m. to see the Canadian Ambassadress
Her Excellency Ms.Susan Cartwright
XII.Budakeszi ut 32 (Tel: 275 1200)

On Tuesday, the 23rd of March:

at 10.00 a.m. to see Mr Ernő Lazarovics
VII.Sip utca 12 (Tel: 322 6478)

at 14.00 p.m. to see H.E.Mr György Nanovszky
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
II.Bem tér 4 (Tel.: 458 1000)

at 16.00 p.m. to see or be visited by Mr Péter Bajtay
(tel.: EU-Delegation :209 9700.home: 214 6732)

On Wednesday, the 24th of March:

at 11.30 a.m. to see H.E.the Nuncio Karl-Josef Rauber
Apostolic Nunciature (Holy See)
XII.Gyimes u.1-3 (Tel.: 355 8979)
and be invited to a lunch by the nuncio

On Thursday, the 25th of March

at 10.30 a.m. to see the Australian Ambassador,
H.E.Dr. Mark Higgie
XII.Királyhágó tér 8-9. (tel: 201 8899)

at 13.00 p.m. lunch at the Swedish Embassy residence with
H.E.Mr.and Mrs.László Deseö.and H.E.Mr and Mrs
Staffan Carlsson.then later

at 14.30 p.m. discussions with Mr Deseö

at 16.00 p.m. to see Prof.Attila Pók,
I.Üri utca 53 (Tel.:mobile:06/309/642634)

On Friday, the 26th of March:

at 11.30 a.m. to see H.E.Mr.János Hermann.State Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
II.Bem rkp.47. I.cm.125 (Tel:(458 1000)



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (5)

1999-03-18

Handläggare: H Magnusson

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Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen,
enl. adressering/samt

UMK

BMK ME

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

B R Å D S K A N D E

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Till: EC(Lundvik)
Kopia: EI(L Olson), amb Moskva ✓

Bifogat översänds mina kommentarer till de senaste omgångarna promemorior från Susan Mesinai rörande efterforskningar i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet.

MAGNUSSON

1999-03-17

2 (S)

Comments to reports from Susan Mesinai dated March
15-17, 1999.

I Susan Mesinai's handwritten comments to my list of questions relating to the meeting in Moscow on February 22.

1. Should the handwritten note on Vladimir be included in the request? I am not against, but is it necessary?
2. Gfrorner: OK with proposed deletion.
3. OK with the proposed additional sentence.
4. Addition may be OK, but is it absolutely necessary?
5. OK, with the addition.
6. OK
10. Was the Okulicki sample relating to Smoltsov? Otherwise I don't think the extra sentence, which I have difficulties reading, should be included here.
11. OK
13. OK
20. OK to delete
22. Add a suitable sentence to this effect.
26. OK
27. OK

Your report on this was most interesting (my compliments). Although we have been given copies from these registries before, your report deepens our understanding and gives rise to a few intriguing questions.

Page 4, third paragraph: This a very vital point, actually it could be the only (close to) real evidence we have that RW never left Lubyanka (as I said already when we received a copy of this page).

You say that neither the name of the (a?) person nor the column corresponding to the date when the possessions were handed back have been blotted out. What you mean must be that these two columns are blank, i.e. nothing has ever been written in them? That is what I understood from the copy. As to your somewhat conspiratorial comment that "it was intended for the reader to see the empty space", I can just say that when Mr Vinogradov gave us the copy he did not comment upon or draw our attention to this at all, it was I who did it.

Page 6, last paragraph: What Vinogradov said about Vilmos Langfelder ("our investigation has to do with Raoul Wallenberg, not Vilmos Langfelder") is not correct. We have right from the beginning said explicitly that the investigation, for obvious reasons, also includes Langfelder, and the Russians have all along agreed to this.

page 7, second paragraph (this is also for Mats/Anders): It should be made very clear to Mr Nikishkin that we have a written agreement to see approx. 100 files, with very few exceptions for security reasons. It can not be accepted that this work is cut short, but it must be pursued to the end. Any explanation that no more files can be found is not credible. If some files can not be found, this must be stated and justified in written, in each case.

Page 9, fourth paragraph: I am somewhat hesitant to put forward this request concerning the correspondence of the Kartashov group. Perhaps it would be better to save such a suggestion to your discussions with a counterpart, if he ever appears. Start with a discussion of what might still exist of these papers.

Questions to be answered.

4. Impossible for the Russians to answer.

5. Perhaps, but not with certainty.

7. This I consider rather meaningless. In the unlikely situation where such a person would still be alive, it would be a miracle if he would remember such details. Generally we have concluded, that it is not worth the effort anymore to try to locate this type of auxiliary workers from the 40s.

10. So far, only roughly: late 40s to mid-50s. Please note that some blotting out was made not only with ink but also mechanically. Here the original text has not been possible to restore. I doubt it is today.

Hans Magnusson



REGERINGSKANSLIET


Stockholm, 18 March 1999

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

P 2 En

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Upon request it is hereby certified that for the period 1 August 1998 - 31 December 1998, Susan Mesinai has received the gross sum of US \$ 15 000:- from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Sweden. From this sum US \$ 2003:- has been deducted for tax payments in Sweden. The tax payment refers to the periods when Susan Mesinai has been working outside USA.


Nils Bjerke
First Secretary

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Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Exp. 99-03-22

Ku



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-18

P 2 Eu 1



Sid. 1 (3)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Riga

Kopia: Ambassaden Moskva (Foyer/Wallberg)

L Olson, ESEK

R
Kabs vidit

(unr) } EXP 990318 / 2

Raoul Wallenberg

För Magnusson från Lundvik.

1. Arbetsgruppens verksamhet präglas i hög grad av att medlemmarna är geografiskt spridda över åtskilliga länder och i flertalet fall har andra huvudsysslor. Därtill kämpar den mot en byråkratisk tröghet framför allt i Moskva men också på andra håll. Det är mot denna bakgrund föga förvånande att arbetet kraftigt dragit ut på tiden. Som vi konstaterade i Moskva bör emellertid en kraftanstängning göras för att avsluta de egentliga efterforskningarna under innevarande år, så att redigering och tryckning av slutrapporten kan äga rum under första hälften av 2000, dvs nio år efter arbetsgruppens tillkomst. Då jag nyligen för makarna Lagergren redovisade denna uppläggning hade de inga invändningar och konstaterade att den låg i fas med en synpunkt som framförts till dem av David Matas, nämligen att först sedan den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen framlagt sina resultat kan andra forskare ta vid och arbeta vidare på grundval av vår rapport.

Från rysk sida hävdades med viss emfas vid mötet i Moskva att arbetsgruppens uppgift var att klarlägga Raoul Wallenbergs öde, ett öde som han mött i Moskva. Alltså var det dit arbetet borde koncentreras. Jag känner en viss sympati för det argumentet. Tänkbara motiv för ryssarnas arresteringsorder måste naturligtvis analyseras i ljuset av de omständigheter som är kända om hans personliga bakgrund och hans verksamhet i Budapest, och det har Du också mycket förtjänstfullt gjort i Ditt rapportutkast. Men behöver arbetsgruppen gå så mycket djupare?

1999-03-18

De olika uppslag rörande dessa ämnen som nu undersökes eller föreslås undersökas av framför allt de oberoende experterna har alla det gemensamt, att de är spekulativa och vittsyftande med endast begränsad relevans för den centrala uppgiften att klarlägga vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg. Även om de skulle leda till vissa nya rön kommer också dessa endast ha indiciekaraktär och på sin höjd leda till några mindre korrigeringar i Ditt utkast. Till den del dessa forskningsuppslag gäller Raoul Wallenbergs privatliv före avresan till Ungern skulle jag dessutom på goda grunder hävda att det inte är UD:s uppgift att undersöka detta. Det är, liksom också de storpolitiska förgreningarna av räddningsinsatsen i Budapest, en uppgift för historieforskarna att ta itu med.

Detta betyder, såvitt jag kan se, att vi i likhet med Naziguld-kommissionen borde koncentrera våra begränsade resurser på prioriterade delar av materien och förbereda överlämnande av resterande frågeställningar till historikerna. Prioritet bör ges Mesinai's dossier-forskningar i Moskva, Makinens datoriserade analys av kartoteket i Vladimir och de frågor Du presenterat på MID. Det psykiatriska klinikprojektet har redan konstaterats vara av sådan karaktär att det kan väntas ta åtskilliga år i anspråk, och troféarkivprojektet förefaller mig vara av samma slag. Det har så vitt jag kan se av handlingarna redan diskuterats i flera år utan att vi kommit till skott, och även efter den senaste tidens expertinlägg tycket jag syftet är tämligen nebulöst. Jag delar också Mesinai's åsikt att en framställning till ryssarna i ämnet måste vara klart och motiverad för att inte bli kontraproduktiv.

Uppmärksammas bör också att Berger tillträder en heltidstjänst i Washington den 15 augusti med endast begränsade uppföljnings-möjligheter därefter. Ett väsentligt led i en definition av hennes uppdrag borde därför vara att hon inte skall äta sig mer än hon med säkerhet kan slutföra innan hon tillträder sin nya tjänst. Det vore olyckligt att komma med en vidlyftig begäran till ryssarna som vi sedan - om de mot förmodan skulle bevilja den - saknar resurser att följa upp.

2. Vad Din reviderade frågelista till ryssarna beträffar berör den till större delen frågor av en sådan komplexitet att det väl egentligen bara är Du själv och Mesinai som är fullt insatta i dem. Från Mesinai har Du nu fått kommentarer, och jag begränsar mig därför till några punkter jag själv har insikt i, nämligen

1999-03-18

14. Här uppräknas en lång rad namn, av vilka en del är uppenbarligen felstavade, utan närmare angivande av vilka dessa personer är. Att beteckna Peter Hain, den ökände nazistvänlige chefen för detektiva polisen i Budapest, bara som en av RW:s internationella kontakter förefaller mig något olyckligt. Vi bör nog klargöra att vi själva vet vilka personer vi efterfrågar. Jag tar därför med mig listan till Budapest och granskar den där med sakkunnig hjälp nästa vecka.

19. Du bör vid det här laget ha fått mina översättningar av finska UM:s material om Frey/Erzin. Där återfinns vissa tidsmässiga preciseringar om t ex Podtserobs (obs. att namnet faktiskt slutar med b och inte v) telegram till Moskva, som vi bör utnyttja. Det verkar som om de tre dokument vi fått av ryssarna är vad Erzín rapporterade till MID för att upprätthålla sin diplomatiska täckmantel, medan korrespondensen med den egentliga uppdragsgivaren gick andra vägar.

28. Varför inte ange att det rör sig om Aino Kuusinen och att uppgiften återfinns i hennes bok?

Cabinet

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (21)

1999-03-19

Aambs A. Wallberg

aa
p

EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: rekryfax Amb Riga

B R Å D S K A N D E

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Bifogat översänds utkast till brev till den ryska sidan i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet som författats av den obereonde experten Susan Mesinai. Tacksam synpunkter om möjligt under dagen eller morgondagen med tanke på att Mesinai avreser från Moskva söndagen den 21 mars.

HIRDMAN

March 22, 1999

Mr. Vyacheslav Tuchnin
Chief of the Section, Finland and Sweden
Second European Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square
Moscow 121200

Dear Mr. Tuchnin:

First I want to thank you not only for hosting the meeting of the Working Group on February 22nd, and for encouraging your colleagues on the Russian side to answer some of the various questions put forth in my First Preliminary Report. The dialogue which this written communication has generated has indeed had a positive effect, not only in terms of the diplomatic exchanges but in establishing the Russian government's willingness to cooperate even beyond the parameters which originally were defined by the Working Group in order to provide the global community with a more substantial result.

What we have now, as a result of this past year's research in the Prisoner Files, (combined with previous work at Vladimir and in certain psychiatric facilities) is the blueprint or plan of a working method. As this may not yet be so clear to your colleagues who out of respect have answered some of the questions I submitted, I would like to take the time to outline the steps below and to discuss it with you a little further.

As this coincides with your office's request that I specify how I think best to follow up on a number of the requests we reviewed at the meeting, I am using this occasion to provide you with both plan and particular items in context. The answers to these questions -- particularly those of the most fundamental and practical nature related directly to Wallenberg's fate -- will put us in a very good light. As the gathering of data needed to fill in the various gaps --- which for whatever reason have existed for years -- must be completed forthwith if we are to meet the deadline for submitting reports by early next year, may I also urge you to name a counterpart -- or a number of possible counterparts -- as soon as possible. From the outline of the questions to date, I think you can make a clearer assessment of what type of individual is best suited to serve in this role.

Finally, I hope you can recognize from the plan below that I have heeded your request for focus from our first meeting in December. In turn, I must ask for full cooperation to complete this work. This will mean not only providing the data outlined below but a preparedness for dealing with whatever results begin to emerge -- namely additional follow-through steps. We have all committed ourselves to establishing the truth which to us in the West, beginning with Dr. Guy von Dardel, means the real details of Wallenberg's death if such is the case. The purpose of the

Working Group as I understand it, at least in this phase, is to do this research without media involvement in order to have the proper forum in which to handle whatever realities emerge. We must however be willing to go 'all the way', to ask questions that are difficult, to dig still deeper under specific circumstances in order finally to put this to rest.

I wish us all the utmost in success.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

4

PROPOSED WORK
PRISONER FILES & RELATED DOCUMENTS
May - August 1999

Introduction:

As the primary goal of our work, stated by Mr. Ziborov in our meeting, is the "practical investigation to determine Wallenberg's fate" I have focused my current research to defining and filling in the 'blank spaces' in that knowledge. This, combined with important transition points in the fate of others with whom Wallenberg and his colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, sat -- weighed against the serious issues raised by the 1947 death claim can yield us a firm result.

While overall I am responsible for analyzing the various eyewitness reports of Wallenberg into the Eighties, I am doing this methodically -- that is working from 1945 on, where we know Wallenberg to have been for an actual fact. This provides a foundation or context in which to relate the movements and interactions of the prisoners, starting with those who actually sat with Wallenberg and Langfelder, and verifying the claims of those who alleged to have met them along the way. In this manner I am systematically considering the alternatives to Wallenberg's fate so that those who review the Final Report can see that we have done as thorough an effort as possible to retrace their steps.

It is therefore extremely important that I be given access to the remaining files on the Original List -- many of whom are witnesses for the later periods -- as well as to a limited numbers of related files which have proven important to our recent research. It is equally important that where these documents are not available, this fact and the reason for it, be put forth in writing.

While we all recognize the Wallenberg case to be 'exceptional'; until we can precisely define in what way it is exceptional, I intend to deal with it as a norm. That is, we know that Wallenberg was held under his name -- at least until early 1947 and therefore was not a numbered prisoner from the onset. Until such time as we can resolve the debate between death and/or disappearance in 1947, I am projecting a man who was kept within the MGB and/or MVD systems, albeit under exceptional circumstances of isolation, until his death at a later date or his release under another name by the Courts for medical or psychiatric reasons.

Where analogs are concerned, I would like to make it clear that these -- like the unverified eyewitness reports -- are only springboards for arriving at the truth. We need to start somewhere in dealing with the empty spaces or unknowns. The files of these parallel cases act as 'slides' for placing different points or sightings in the Wallenberg case "under the microscope." This is not a method I would choose but in the absence of documentation it is the only course that can still yield an appropriate result. In certain instances this enables us to compare in such a way that we can define how the Wallenberg case is different from another case. In others, we are able to go deeper into the darker aspects of this mystery. This is based on the very

common sense view that if a special method for execution, or for concealment, has been applied once, it will be employed again in yet another exceptional case. This is especially true when the two cases fall within the same time period.

Along those lines, I again raise the case of Oggins' execution. Oggins 'file' (but not his personal file) offers sufficient documentation to show that Abakumov recommended to Stalin and Molotov that Oggins be executed and his medical record falsified. Does not such a file also clarify -- if only with a simple instruction -- how he was to be executed? Or how his body was to be disposed of -- for example, as it says in the file of Okulicki, 'on general grounds as usual.' These small phrases define procedures which existed and which could be employed again. They also make it clear that there are other possible options under consideration. These possibilities need to be defined.

Finally there are issues related to 'disappearance' as the alternative procedure for 'liquidatsia' during the 1947 time period. These are raised by (1) the April 19, 1947 document hanging in the Sakharov Museum instructing the MGB chief of Ivanovo Prison how to deal with his numbered prisoners, (2) the fact that we have been able to track a 'host' of prisoners whose cards should be in the Vladimir kartotecha during the month of May 1947 but are not, (3) the gap that persists around July 22, 1947 at that same prison, combined with the named and/or numbered prisoners who appear or reappear at Vladimir in 1952, several of whom I know to have been held at Ivanovo during the interim. These include numbered prisoners who could be either Raoul Wallenberg or Vilmos Langfelder.

Further substantiation of the disappearance route persists not only in the testimonies of heads of psychiatric prison hospitals who reported a group of 'diplomati' treated in the Sixties whose files and or persons were removed in the early Eighties. It has also been strengthened by recently documented archival collections which exist in Soviet archives related to selection of prisoners of war of interest to the top levels of Soviet leadership in the Stalinist era and others which show correspondence between outlying prison like Vladimir and Ivanovo and Moscow Central on the subject of numbered prisoners. We are reluctant to draw any conclusions until the resources we know to exist that could be of direct relevance to the fates of Wallenberg and Langfelder have been satisfactorily examined.

A certain portion of our early findings on this subject will be presented in a separate Report, bearing their own questions. In the meantime, we wish to resolve those questions which remain under discussion as presented by Ambassador Magnusson at the February 22, 1999 meeting, and as raised in Preliminary Report One with follow up questions in relation to the responses from FSB and the MVD on the Russian side.

QUESTIONS ON THE INFORMATION AS WE KNOW IT

Registration Numbers for Internal Prison - Moscow

We wish to express our appreciation to FSB for their kindness in acquainting us with the alphabetical registries for Lubyanka Prison 1945 - 1947 as well as the Alphabetical Registry of those Detained in Lubyanka, 1945, from which we were able to see both the jurisdiction and personal registration numbers of two prisoners whose names have been cut out of the registry but, because of the chronology, would appear to be those of Wallenberg and Langfelder respectively.

Our task now is to access those archival materials where these registration numbers could be put to their optimal use. This will entail clarification of what card files, registries, correspondence, directories, corpus and isolation lists, transport records, medical records did survive the apparent destruction of the late 50s and 60s. We must emphasize this point because even in the past week we have been made aware of a number of important collections relevant to our work which evidently still exist and to which others seem to have access. These do not refer directly to FSB, but as a general principle we feel that it is necessary to meticulously pursue the question of what does and does not exist.

Registration Numbers for Lefortovo Prison

Regarding the Transport from Internal Prison to Lefortovo of Wallenberg, Roedl and Lada-Yakushevich on May 29, 1945, we note in the copy of the registry provided by the Russian side that Lada-Yakushevich's was assigned the number 619, Wallenberg's 620, but next to Roedl's name it says 'returned.' From what kind of registry was this copied? Do these numbers refer to receipts for possessions? If so, what is meant by the word 'returned' compared to the numbers next to Wallenberg and Lada-Yakushevich's names?

Are these the registration numbers assigned to Lada Yakushevich and Wallenberg as newly arriving prisoners whereas Roedl, who was returning to Lefortovo, would pick up his previous registration number? Would we be correct in concluding from this that both Wallenberg and Lada-Yakushevich will have the same registration number as appears in the transport registry although their corresponding numbers to the right of the slash will be added upon their arrival? (Gfroener, for example, arrived in Lefortovo on July 6, 1945 and his registration number is 796/36. Meier and Feller arrived together in March of 1945 and their numbers are 212/5 and 213/13. Assuming that the two men traveled in the same transport, to what do the numbers '5' and '13' correspond? (This question was raised at the meeting on February 22, 1999 when I presented the handwritten list I had compiled of the prisoners registration numbers in Lefortovo.)

7

If this calculation is correct, can we also determine Langfelter's registration number by consulting the appropriate registry for his arrival on March 18 - 22, 1945? (The date varies on different documents). Please could you give us this information from the corresponding page in the registry? Thank you.

Possessions

To Be Discussed Separately

C/3 Registration Numbers and the Comparison of Wallenberg and Roedl's Prisoner Cards.

We note the C/3 numbers of Wallenberg (206) and Roedl (205) for their crossing over from Lefortovo back to Lubyanka -- for Roedl on February 27, 1947 and for Wallenberg (whose name is crossed out under the previous date) on March 1, 1947.

What is a c/3 number? Is it a transport number for one passage or is it an internal number for processing a particular prisoner under investigation that follows him throughout that process? We understand that it does not correspond to his prisoner registration number for any particular prison. That is, as Roedl was previously in Lefortovo after his arrest in 1944, his Lefortovo number and that of Wallenberg should not so closely resemble each other. We do not have Roedl's file but we do have his prisoner card which shows quite clearly that he arrived in Internal Prison from Lefortovo for the first time December 5, 1944. Therefore his prisoner registration number for Internal Prison could not be sequentially close to that of Wallenberg either.

Nor would the numbers 205 and 206 seem to correspond as receipts for the same reason -- that Roedl was brought to Internal Prison in December 1944 while Wallenberg came two months later. If this is not the case, we wish to be corrected.

We note that this same type of number appears in the entry when Katona and Langfelter were brought from Lefortovo to Internal Prison on 23 July 1947. Here Katona is c/3 835 and Langfelter c/3 834. We would like to see the full page of the registry. What numbers are written further to the right? What other types of information are shown on each of these pages as part of the processing of prisoners of a special contingent between Lubyanka and Lefortovo?

Comparison Between Wallenberg and Roedl's Prisoner Cards

We note that the c/3 number for Roedl is recorded on the back side of Roedl's prisoner card, on the same line as his move back to Lefortovo on February 27, 1947 -- crossed off, meaning completed. This number is not repeated on the line for his move to camp on October 15, 1947 (which is not crossed off, presumably because he never reached his destination). Wallenberg's prisoner of war card, on the front side, is comparable to that of Roedl's. However on the reverse side it lacks not only the c/z

number but any record of the move from Lefortovo back to Internal Prison on March 1, 1947 and, on the previous line, the move from Internal to Lefortovo Prison on May 29, 1945. As he made this move together with his cellmate Willi Roedl, this line at least should be identical.

This lack of information on Wallenberg's card would suggest that this card was started and never completed. Another card must have existed which showed these various moves, and possibly more.

Please provide the card which records Wallenberg's movements between Internal and Lefortovo corresponding to the model provided by Roedl's card attached.

Also, as Wallenberg did not in fact return to Internal Prison on February 27, 1947 with Roedl, where was he held in Lefortovo between February 27 and March 1, 1947 -- since we know for a fact that Hatz and Kitschmann were by then occupying Cell 203?

Jurisdiction over Wallenberg and Roedl

A question which I have raised in various forms in the questions presented in my First Preliminary Report is that of consistent or inconsistent jurisdiction over Wallenberg and Roedl, where Roedl's case serves primarily as a parallel. We can see from the documents which do exist from Kartashov that Wallenberg was initially under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Department, Third Main Directorate - i.e. 'Smersch' which in 1946 became the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate. Those in this group were handled primarily by Kartashov. Others, like the Polish leaders, Akikusa or Roland Gottlieb for instance, were under the Special Investigations Unit for Especially Grave Matters under the direction of Leonov, Schwartzmann and Likachov who were ousted with the arrest of Abakumov in July of 1950.

The Russian claim, or implication -- at least through the testimony of Kondrashev -- is that Wallenberg was under the Especially Grave Matters Unit. However, Wallenberg's interrogation on March 11, 1947, Page A31 of the documents turned over by the Russian side, shows that the interrogation by Kuzmishin from 14:15 to 16:00 was under the jurisdiction of the 3rd YHP, meaning Main Directorate, while others listed in the registry are under the C/Y unit or the 5th Dept (?), the Transportation Directorate, OKF, MVD, or the oc/COB or the oc/IH of the 2nd Main Directorate. (A simulation of this list in English is attached to the copy from the Registry Page, with this portion blocked off).

The July 17, 1947 communication from Abakumov to Molotov 3044A is also listed as concerning business of the Third Main Directorate.

It is my understanding that when the term 3rd Directorate is used, it refers to the 4th Department, not the Investigation Unit, Especially Grave Matters which had its own prisoners, such as Leopold Okulicki or Roland Gottlieb, both of whom were sentenced much earlier. Please clarify and expand upon this matter.

Further to this, the death of Roedl in October 1947 falls under the competency of Mironov as head of Moscow Internal Prison (presumably because Roedl had not yet reached Krasnogorsk) and of Kartashov of the 4th Department Third Main Directorate. In my Preliminary Report, I have raised the question of whether Roedl remained throughout his second detention in Internal under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate or was passed over to the Especially Grave Matters Unit for an interim period.

I have also asked to see the Emergency Registry where Roedl's death was presumably reported and whether or not this in any way would fall under the competency of the Transportation Directorate, as was the case of Gudenko's suicide attempt of July 17/18, 1947.

It should be noted that the suicide attempt of Pelkonen on August 15, 1947 was immediately reported to Colonel Kartashov by telephone (Pelkonen, Page 54) and that when Okulicki died, the decision of how to cremate him, 'on general grounds as usual' was shared with Likuchov of the Especially Grave Matters Unit who was also the last to interrogate or meet with Okulicki.

I make this point to establish that my interest in jurisdiction is not simply formal but to show that had Wallenberg died in Lubyanka on July 17, 1947, whether from natural causes or worse, this event would have had to be reported in a number of different directions and the responsibility shared among a number of different competencies -- at least Mironov as Head of Internal Prison, if such was the place, and Kartashov as Head of the 4th Department.

As this is an important issue, we would like access to the correspondence of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate on prisoners of war 1945 -47 which exists at Glavnoye Upravleniye 3.

Unconfirmed Cell Occupancy in Lubyanka and Lefortovo Prisons

Through eyewitness reports and through the Kartashov document found in Kitschman's file, Page 99, we have some confirmation for Wallenberg and Langfelder's cell occupancy in Lefortovo, 1945 -1947. Additional information related to the Lefortovo period is being requested through our revised list which appears in Item 22 of the 1945-1947 section of my Preliminary Report. This includes requests for files from a number of witnesses who claim to have seen Wallenberg in Lefortovo or in Internal after the alleged death date of 1947, through the early 1950 period when many of those with whom Wallenberg and Langfelder sat previously were sent to Butyrka.

We ask that the appropriate archivists check not only for personal files, prisoner of war files or arrest files -- but also prisoner cards for Lefortovo in those cases where they exist. In a number of cases, both from the original and revised lists, where the witness is less known and not clearly of the same 'contingent' as those with whom

Wallenberg or related prisoners were placed we are really only trying to define their cell occupancy. A xerox of such cards, if permissible, will do.

The Revised List Will Follow This Submission As It Has Its Own Supporting Materials.

Interrogations

Missing Interrogations in Lubyanka - 1945

The witnesses who sat with Wallenberg during the early phase of his detention have testified that he was interrogated at times for which we have no documentation. Richter, for example, stated that Wallenberg was called more than once by an interrogator described by some as Sverchuk, by others as Weindorf, about whom Wallenberg commented in German that this was 'a terrible man.' These interrogations would have taken place in February 1945 or the first week in March, as Richter was moved as of March 6, 1945.

Loyda in his testimony to Dr. Makinen has not mentioned if Wallenberg was interrogated or how many times during the approximately six weeks they were together. He has only mentioned in his own interrogation during that period when, asked to describe with whom he sat, he responded the diplomats Roedl and Wallenberg. The interrogator then told him: 'Roedl is a diplomat but Wallenberg is not.' Does the Russian side have any inkling of the source of such knowledge, so soon after Wallenberg's arrest?

Interrogations in Lefortovo

In the various registry journals showing interrogations for Wallenberg, Langfelder and other prisoners in Lefortovo, there are small numbers noted on each entry as follows:

15	VIII 45	Langfelder	Bubnov	8
30	VIII 45	Sultan	Morosov	19
30	VIII 45	Wallenberg	Kopelyansky	21
30	VIII 45	Tanaka	Kuklin	11
15	XII 45	Langfelder	Livchak	11
3	VII 46	Metsherin	Zaitsev	2
3	VII 46	Langfelder	Weindorf	23
17	VII 46	Wolfen	Landishev	28
17	VII 46	Wallenberg	Kopelyansky	19
17	VII 46	Langfelder	Kopelyansky	21
17	VII 46	Karmeliuk	Milovanov	4
17	VII 46	Sheplito	Novosiolov	27
17	VII 46	Pankratov	Kuvaldin	35

To what do these numbers to the right correspond?

11

Kindly inform us of the name of each journal from which each of these entries were derived. To which operational office did they belong? Under whose jurisdiction were each of these prisoners when their interrogations were conducted?

If this represents the full number of interrogations of Wallenberg while in Lefortovo prison, we note that there is an interval of almost a year between calls -- i.e. from August 30, 1945 until July 17, 1946. Was there a minimum requirement for interrogations per annum, as would be suggested by Ionov's protest of Schandl's long term detention? Would one expect there to have been regular prolongation of custody slips in the interim?

Does the Russian side feel that there may well have been more interrogations for both Wallenberg and Langfelder or do they consider this the full set for Lefortovo? If there existed other registries for interrogations which now are missing, we would like to be informed of them in order to document the cause of this gap in our knowledge of Wallenberg's interrogation history.

Interrogations of 17 July 1946 and 30 August 1946.

On 30 August 1946, Raoul Wallenberg was interrogated by Kopelyansky in 21, (assuming this is a room number), following his earlier interrogation overlapping with Langfelder's by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946. We note among the documents handed over by the Russian side A25 dated 12 August 1946 to Department Head, Third Main Directorate Counter-Intelligence Mjr General Budarev from Deputy Head, Titov and Head of the 5th Division Krotov. This document states: *'We send you the request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR/No. 11 47/5...of July 17, 1946 concerning the Swedish citizen Wallenberg, Raoul who is under the jurisdiction of your Directorate. Attachment according to the text.'*

Given the supposed gap in communication between the Foreign Ministry and Abakumov's Directorate on the fate of Wallenberg, which according to other documents was only broken -- at least to the Swedes -- when it was revealed in February 1947 by Rodionov that Wallenberg was in the hands of the Security Organs, how can one explain this synchronicity of interrogations? That is, was the July 17, 1946 interrogation immediately prompted by the so dated request of the Foreign Ministry? If so, who ordered it? Does this interrogation in any manner indicate a close cooperation between Molotov and/or Vishinsky and Abakumov or another person within his Directorate?

Was the 30 August 1946 interrogation a follow up to the August 12, 1946 letter to Major General Budarev from Titov and Krotov? Is there anyway to clarify this that would show us how deeply involved quasi autonomous figures such as Molotov may have been in this process?

Also on the 12 August 1946 document there is a handwritten number which appears to be either '124' or /24. To what does that number refer? Also, please breakdown the address for the USSR/No. 11 47/5. To what does the 47/5 correspond?

Finally, in the 3rd issue of the 1999 Volume of Top Secret, there is an article regarding the memoirs of Boldin Valery where it states that Stalin kept the stenographic notes of interrogations, particularly Wallenberg's, in his safe along with letters from Abakumov about intelligences and agents. In particular they refer to Abakumov's communications about Muller who was in a 'special object' () in the Urals, saying that 'they had received all the data they needed and wanting to know if the person should be kept on or if the case should be 'closed for good' () so that the information about the person 'does not leak' ().

First, we would like to know if there is any evidence that these documents actually existed, if any trace of them has been recovered among the Presidential Archives reviewed by FSB and if so, when can we begin to study them.

If there is any strength to the claims above, it is noteworthy that the article does not link Abakumov directly with Wallenberg's interrogations but rather with those of Muller -- whom we assume to be in this case Gestapo Chief Heinrich Muller whose fate is completely unknown. This IS an especially important prisoner, that is if there is any truth to the claim, which was first introduced after the War by Schellenberg. Schellenberg, Head of RSHA VI, was convinced that Muller, Head of RSHA IV, had already gone over to the Soviets as early as December 1943. According to Schellenberg, Himmler shared these thoughts -- as least as of his receiving word from Etta Bonde, Raoul Wallenberg's aunt and wife of the head of Swedish Intelligence, via Felix Kersten in Stockholm that Muller was now a Soviet agent.

Along these lines, I repeat my question if Gestapo Muller, Gustav Richter's chief, was in fact the 'especially important prisoner' with whom he -- Richter -- was connected. This is relevant to dispel the view that said prisoner was Wallenberg with whom he was only a cellmate. This would not seem to be the case. The view that Wallenberg could be that person only works when one is not aware that Muller was also being held in the Soviet Union.

All of this is important to lend further insight into the kinds and degrees of important or grave cases or matters.

Wallenberg's Letter to Stalin - Late 1946

We know through those witnesses with whom Wallenberg and Roedl had wall tapping communication at Lefortovo that in the late Fall of 1946, Wallenberg wrote a letter to Stalin -- I believe in French -- to protest his detention. It was reported that the Commissar told Wallenberg to wait until March 1947 when, at a meeting in Moscow, important decisions would be made regarding the fate of prisoners of war.

We have neither the letter -- which I would expect not to have been in his personal file but filed elsewhere among Stalin's papers¹ -- nor any documentation of a meeting or interrogation that took place at the appropriate time to discuss the letter. It should be noted that at the meeting on February 22, 1999, we presented again our request to have access to the minutes of the international meetings in Moscow related to prisoners of war, as well as to the MGB/MVD memorandum supposed to exist on this subject. This is especially important as we would expect it not only to provide guidelines as to Soviet thinking regarding the repatriation of these men, but also the competency of the various agencies overseeing their detention and the direct roles of their chiefs or deputy directors -- starting with Abakumov and Serov but to better understand the roles of Kartashov and Kuzmishin, for example.

Juxtaposed or Overlapping Interrogations

How frequent is it for prisoners to be interrogated simultaneously by the same interrogator as in the case of the overlapping sessions between Wallenberg and Langfelder on July 17, 1946 with Kopelyansky as interrogator? Are they in the same room or different rooms? If in different rooms, would this imply that the questions and answers are being used back and forth between two room? What other functions could this movement back and forth imply?

Wolfin, Wallenberg and Langfelder - July 17, 1946

In the sequence of interrogations at Lefortovo on July 17, 1946 which begins with Wolfin's interrogation by Landishev and moves on to Wallenberg's interrogation by Kopelyansky, then Langfelder's interrogation by the same with some overlapping time:

Is Landishev the correct name for the interrogator of Wolfin on 17 July 1946? Between what hours was the Wolfin interrogation conducted on that date? Is there any connection in unit, or department between Kopelyansky and Landishev or any detailing which could draw a closer connection between these three interrogations?

As we have now seen in the Alphabetical Incoming Registry for 1946 for Lubyanka Prison, Wolfin was brought to Lubyanka on July 25, 1946 and sent on to Lefortovo after a day. This information was confirmed by the Russian side in their recent response to my questions. It would therefore seem then that Wolfin was not under arrest when he met with Landishev on July 17, 1946.

As Wolfin's Vladimir card shows him to be a 'Swedish spy' we would like FSB to comment on this sequence of events. For one, I would like to know if Wolfin served in any way as a translator for the subsequent interrogations. For another, I think it

¹ Okulicki's file contains a draft of his letter to Stalin on which he had spilt ink blobs. This may have been included in the file to justify giving more paper and pen. The final letter however is not in his personal file -- at least not the one we have examined. By like token, we would expect Wallenberg's letter to be stored by those who received it.

would be significant to uncover whether or not Wolfin's arrest was in any way a consequence of these seemingly interconnected interrogations.

Would the Russian side be so kind as to examine the interrogation of Wolfin for this and other dates to see how much of his interrogations related to Swedish-Soviet Trade Delegations, Sweden or Hungary, Swedish-Hungarian industry, Wallenberg or Wallenberg family related activities? How much related to Jewish networks?

Alternatively, in the absence of Wolfin's file, would the Russian side be able to reconstruct Wolfin's interrogation schedule from the date of his arrest through Vladimir, including date of interrogation, place and time, interrogator and jurisdiction?

Schlitter/Huber - July 22, 1947

Is the overlapping of the interrogations of Schlitter and Huber on the night of July 22, 1947 by Kartashov parallel to the interrogation of both Wallenberg and Langfelder by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946? Are these events considered exceptional? What other overlapping interrogations of this nature exist which could be pertinent to our case?

As the files of Schlitter and Huber both exist, please define the content of these interrogations on July 22, 1947 and any subsequent interrogations which might explain why they were overlapping. Particularly in the case of Huber, please define any overlap which may exist between his activities for Abwehr and the activities of either Wallenberg or Langfelder.

Langfelder/Katona - July 23, 1947

As Langfelder and Katona(a) were both brought to Lubyanka together and presumably both underwent interrogation on July 23, 1947 as did Hatz and Richter, would the Russian side be able to reconstruct as best possible the line of questioning on that day to these different persons connected with the Balkans? Was Schmidt-Durmond also called for interrogation at that time?

As Langfelder's interrogation schedule has been reconstructed from the various interrogation registries, may we ask that the same be done for Katona while we search for his file. In this manner we could at least begin to study how closely related he was to other Hungarian prisoners.

Confirming the Presence of Raoul Wallenberg in Internal Prison After March 1, 1947.

Please note that we have no documentary evidence of Raoul Wallenberg's ongoing presence in Lubyanka Prison between March 1, 1947 and his alleged death date of July 17, 1947 exist -- with the exception of his interrogation on March 11, 1947 and the more compelling information that his possessions were brought over from Lefortovo but not released, at least according to this registry. Strictly speaking the

Smoltsov document does not constitute proof that Raoul Wallenberg was in Lubyanka at that time because a number of details to identify the prisoner are missing or inaccurate on the note and it is not witnessed.

In other words, Wallenberg's presence in Lubyanka is presumed without any cell occupancy history, any record of interrogation, or so on. This is the most serious gap that we face because it is quite possible that he could have been transported out of Lubyanka even before July 1947 and sent to a camp, as certain sightings would indicate; that he could have been sent to Ivanovo with the numbered prisoners alluded to in the MGB document of April 19, 1947, and kept there for close to five years before being sentenced; that he could have been sentenced extremely earlier and sent to Vladimir as has been reported; that he could have been sent to a special camp or prison to be isolated without being sentenced, as has been reported; that he could have remained in Internal or in Lefortovo for some time, both of which have been reported; that he could have been sent to Sukhanovo; or that he could have been sent to Butyrka Medical Service for reasons of health.

As this is the most significant deficiency in the pre-existing Soviet argument, we urge the Russian side to make every effort to substantiate Wallenberg's presence in Lubyanka or other Moscow prisons during this time period, including the Butyrka Medical Service. (We know for example that the Russian side has established that Raoul Wallenberg is NOT the prisoner in Cell Number Seven (known as 'Number 7') thus eliminating the theory put forth by Vadim Birstein in his article by that name.)

The importance of establishing Schlitter's cell occupancy in Internal Prison, 1947 (Preliminary Report One: 1955-57, Question Number) is to be more precise in the sharing of cells during this very important time period. It is noted that the Russian side (FSB) in their Number 5 has responded to my very specific question regarding Schlitter's cell occupancy with the general answer that Akikusa, Roedl, Wallenberg and Schlitter were all in Internal Prison during the relevant time period in 1947. This response neither confirms nor denies that Schlitter sat with these persons and therefore leaves us open to speculation. If we could go one step deeper in establishing cell occupancy during this time it would close the gap on this one important case of a man whose potential testimony upon release was deemed of great significance to the Soviet authorities. (See Preliminary Report, 1955-57).

I would like to point out that the Russian side has not at all responded to my question as to whether or not Schlitter sat with Langfelder in Internal Prison at any time, but particularly just after Langfelder's intensive interrogation on July 23, 1947.

The Relevance of More Information on the Death of Oggins

Particularly now that we have been informed that Oggins was being held in Lubyanka Prison from 1942 until his execution in 1947, I renew the request I placed at the meeting last week to follow this parallel case to the end. In particular I am asking how he was executed, how the execution was ordered (by phone, etc.) and if by injection whether Smoltsov or another doctor participated in its implementation. This

is a requisite study if we are to arrive at a clear-cut definition of the applications of the term 'liquidatsia' during this time period.

It should be noted that we are in possession of a copy of the Russian version of the Abakumov 2733A document in which he makes his recommendations regarding executing Oggins and faking his medical history. We note from his death certificate, which was filed over a year later at ZAGS of Penza, that his cause of death was not as was recommended by Abakumov to Molotov and Stalin. So there should be some paper trail between these different events. (Russian documents declassified by Volkogornov on Oggins are included here as an addendum).

THE DISAPPEARANCE ROUTE

Until such matters can be sufficiently explored to define with more certainty how and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died, we consider it our responsibility to develop the possibility that the term 'liquidatsia' as has been suggested by a number of former officials refers to the 'disappearance' route. To begin this research, particularly as relates to the 1947 - 1952 time period, we propose the following steps:

Vladimir Prison 1947 Incoming Registration Study. To Be Completed.

In my discussions with the authorities of Vladimir Prison, I was provided with documentation to establish that the incoming registries for the years 1952 and 1954 had been destroyed. However, he could neither confirm nor deny that the incoming registry for 1947 had been destroyed and therefore encouraged me to use the kartotecha, note taking only, in an attempt to reconstruct the arrival of prisoners during that time. We have at least one credible sighting for Wallenberg in Vladimir in that year based on reports from Swiss Intelligence archives.

For this reason, I am requesting permission and assistance in returning to Vladimir to complete my 1947 transport study in the kartotecha which requires only note taking and is already 1/3 complete. I would like to do this as soon as possible as this work is a pre-requisite to subsequent investigations. The Russian side should be informed that in preparing a graph of the data received to date, based on approximately 1830 entries out of an approximate 5500, the charts show an empty space throughout the month of May and also during the week after July 17, 1947. It is necessary to review all the cards in an attempt to fill these empty spaces.

Vladimir 1948 Incoming Registry, To Be Prepared in Connection With the Above.

Missing Series of Prisoners in 1947

While the prisoners entering in July may indeed be found, it would appear that an entire series of prisoners passed through Vladimir in 1947 whose cards are now missing from the kartotecha. At least, one would reason that samples of this series

17

would be found from time to time, scattered throughout the alphabetical drawers. Because of the significance of the year, combined with the fact that in mid-April preparations were being made to house numbered prisoners throughout the MGB system (see the Ivanovo document), we must account for and break down this missing series of numbers. I will assume that some went to local camps, some to labor camps, and some indeed were sent on to a special place as a group of numbered prisoners.

I should also draw the Russian side's attention to an old sighting recently brought to my attention in my research of the fate of Reginald Barrett, which appears in SAPO Chief Otto Danielsson's interviews with returning prisoners in the year 1951. This includes a report by Geza Palfy, Bela Luckacs andKaroly-Katona that Wallenberg was held in 1947 in a camp within a 100 km. radius of Moscow -- which was not Krasnogorsk. Danielsson for some reason makes reference to Klin, but in fact this camp remains nameless. We seek to identify this and other camps for foreign prisoners who existed then in this region -- particularly as it would seem a camp predominantly for Hungarians. (Mr. Vinogradov made the remark during the meeting that Krasnogorsk was a camp for Germans, there were other camps for other nationalities.)

Ivanovo Kartatecha.

I also would like the opportunity to review the kartotecha of Ivanovo, as Mr. Nikishkin suggested at the meeting. This pilot review will be done with a team taking notes for the initial research period. Our goal would be to see what kinds of cards remain in the kartatecha and whether they include any numbered prisoners, etc. from the relevant time period suggested by the April 19, 1947 MGB document.

It would be most helpful if both these trips could be combined with access to prisoner files believed to be in the regional archives rather than Moscow, death records and other medical records for that region. I would expect to do this in the Spring.

Overlapping Registration Numbers in Vladimir - 1952.

In the case of the various numbering systems evidenced in Vladimir in 1952 -- including the numbered H series interfaced with other prisoners with the same number but no H designation, Numbered Prisoners 1 and 9, as well as previously numbered prisoners who now appear under their name:

Mr. Vinogradov has suggested that the H might stand for German (nemetskii) which is a possibility although there are many German prisoners who appear later on the list who do not have this designation.² However, since the prisoners Hofstetter H1, Beckerle H4, Grossheim-Krisko H5, Richter H7; Fridman, Samuel H9 and Jansci H10 all seem to have a relevance to the Wallenberg case, with arrival dates of January 16, 1952; March 6, 1952; March 16, 1952; March 18, 1952; March 20,

² Also, Hoffstetter is Swiss and Fridman, I believe, a Rumanian Jew with no pro-German affiliations.

1952, April 1952 (that is, while these numbers are all low, their arrival dates are not sequential) it would appear that these numbers were pre-assigned in Moscow independent of their dates of arrival. This would seem all the more to be the case because Beckerle was called back 'most urgently' from Verchne Uralsk to take his place in Vladimir.

When the Vladimir cards are processed we will be able to show you with more precision these different series of numbers in one and the same year. We would like, however, if some effort could be made to determine who assigned these numbers to the above prisoners (person/unit/department/directorate), who called Beckerle back from Verchne-Uralsk, and if at all possible what defined this series of prisoners (the 'H' series) which included also others like Dering and Roeschle.

Discussion of the Fate of Gfrorener

In relation to the question of the execution of Gfrorener, I appreciate Mr. Vinogradov's report that Gfrorener was executed, as previously stated, on April 30 1952 in a firing squad along with fourteen other prisoners and our being able to review the AKT and other materials in the FSB Archives on March 10.

I would still be interested in determining if any of the fourteen prisoners sentenced with and executed with Gfrorener were accomplices in the exact same crime. This is particularly relevant in terms of the notation in his file to interrupt his investigation until further arrests could be made. It would be of great value in examining the extent of Wallenberg's connection with Gfrorener or the dangers to which it exposed him to have a fuller understanding of Gfrorener's network and operations in the Balkans, the specific crimes against the USSR that led to capital punishment and the identity of the counter intelligence network with which he was connected in the West and its immediate agents.

Also, referring to my Preliminary Report, can you explain why Gfrorener was sentenced to capital punishment when Hatz -- who was also a double agent -- was not? Or why Glazowski whose spy activities against the Allies was quite sensational, had his term of capital punishment commuted to ITL labor by July of 1945?

How heavily did Gfrorener's ties with American intelligence weigh in this decision? If very heavily, would it be possible to name who those connections were so that I might research them in the West to see if there are any direct or indirect connections with Wallenberg?

Finally, with the agreement of Ambassador Magnusson, I am asking permission to go over the investigative file of Gfrorener. While we appreciate that this has already been done by Hans Magnusson and Bjorn Lundstat, because of my extensive work in the American, British and Joint archives it is felt that I might be able to draw some valuable connections both here and in the West. I will of course honor my agreement not to reveal the content of the file and will share with the Russian side my findings in the West.

On the Issue of Numbered Prisoners

On the question of Numbered Prisoners, particularly -- but not limited to -- Prisoner Number One, the following should be noted:

The document of April 19, 1947 directed to the Chief of MGB Prison Ivanovo related to the handling of numbered prisoners at Ivanovo, would suggest that this corresponds to a directive to send a group of such prisoners to Ivanovo. We know for a fact that the Merkis family was there during that time, and presume that the other Baltic leaders were detained there as well. In addition to this we are trying to trace the whereabouts of certain numbered prisoners whose identities remain unknown but whose movements still prove of value until such time as we can identify them. As we have a number of sightings in which Wallenberg's movements is linked -- both by prisoners and by prison workers -- with that of the Baltic leaders, we are obligated to study this time period in Ivanovo. How long did they remain in the prison? Were they known to spend some of the time period in the camp? At what point exactly were they sent to Butyrka for pre-sentencing? Did they all go at once -- in which case how large is the contingent? Were they sent in waves?

In late 1998, BBC filmed documents and an interview with an expert regarding the 'special contingent' of numbered prisoners held in Vladimir Prison in the 40s and early 50s. These documents which are in a special fond, presumably in GARF, were from the Prison Department of the Directorate for Camps and Corrective Colonies. The order to send one of these numbered prisoners to Kazan Mental Hospital was signed by Deputy Minister Scrov.

It has become increasingly clear that an alternative to the execution/liquidatsia scenario which blames the death of Raoul Wallenberg on Abakumov and Smoltsov is indeed 'disappearance' under the careful control of special departments of this Directorate. As there is also clear use of the psychiatric system, we are obligated not only to request access to this same collection of documents, but that we be given full support of the Health and Justice Ministries, as well as the MVD and former MGB, in tracing this group and reviewing their records with the appropriate experts.

As Mr. Galitsky would seem to have amended his original statement to affirm now that he has established the identity of only certain of the numbered prisoners, we should be free to try and identify them ourselves -- or at least match them to those prisoners of direct concern to us in this case. At this time, we feel it is very important to pursue the identity of certain prisoners who could be Wallenberg or Langfelder or whose path could prove key to their respective fates. These are at present as follows: Prisoner Number One, Hungarian 'American Spy' -- arriving in Vladimir in May 12, 1952 with Anton Merkis; Prisoner Number Five, born 1896, sat with Wolf in Vladimir 15 X 52 until 24 X 52 and 8 XII 53 until 11 XII 53. Prisoner Number Nine, arriving in Vladimir May 14, 1952 and departing October 25th of the same year. Prisoner Number Eleven, who died March 13, 1953 at the same time as Jankowski, with neither death being reported to ZAGS of Vladimir and Prisoner Number 23 (1898) who came to Vladimir on June 19, 1948, fate unknown; Prisoner Number 31.

who sat with Wolfen and a number of Baltic leaders; Prisoner Number 32, Menshagin, who is on our original list.

Noting that Pap, Clement and Schandl are respectively numbered prisoners 24, 25, and 26 -- all Hungarians charged with being British spies, a fact that has been confirmed by the British archives; all held in long term isolation, in some cases with little to no interrogations or the proper arrest documents; all sentenced under Pitovranov and sent to Vladimir in 1951; I would like to inquire about the identity of Prisoners 20, 21, 22, and 23 (if not the same as Number 23 above) and 27 and about their respective fates (inasmuch as Pap, Clement and Schandl were all repatriated to Hungary).

Is this a group of prisoners arrested by SMERSH, picked up in Budapest for being officers in British intelligence/British army, and held by Abakumov? If so, how large is this group and who else does it include? If Van der Waals (who was arrested and processed with Schandl) had lived, would he have been part of this group? Would Reginald Barratt who was in reality a British Air Force officer been part of this group or only foreign nationals who were considered part of a foreign Army?

Is there any indication that Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder or any of those who arrested with them, including the Hungarians brought in with Meier and Feller in March of 1945 belonged to this group?

What was the specific intelligence and counter intelligence interest in Hungary that this group of nationals were dealt with such secrecy?

Medical Investigation

In view of the discoveries mentioned above, it is all the more urgent that we begin as soon as possible to examine the documents and files requested in our various Medical Proposals of 1997 and 1998, namely:

1. Access to the archival collections of Myasnikow and all the doctors who participated in the discussions with Swedish doctor Nanna Svartz about Raoul Wallenberg's 'mental health' as requested by Susanne Berger;
2. Review of the medical files of the prisoners whose name(s) we submitted;
3. Review of all the incoming registries for prisoners referred to Serbsky, most often through Butyrka, in the mid to late 40s, 50s, and 60s. to scan for patients who might have been Wallenberg.
4. Review of all the files of those prisoners during this time period who were numbered or 'indexed' prisoners for one who might have been Raoul Wallenberg -- according to the list of specifications I submitted to Serbsky in 1995. The same procedure should be applied to the Central Clinic and all Moscow institutions which diagnosed or treated such unknown patients during this period.

21

5. A review of all the outgoing registries for prisoners sent from Vladimir for psychiatric evaluation to whatever facilities -- Butyrka, Gorsky, Serbsky, Kazan, Leningrad Special and Special Hospital Number 5 are examples of those I have seen -- during this time period.

6. A review of the files which correspond to the evaluations by medical teams in Vladimir Prison which we have seen in the prisoner files to select those who show mental disorders, who should be sent to places for the infirmed particularly if they are to be 'under the watch of the Security organs, or deaths where the identity of the prisoner is unknown and/or it is not reported to ZAGS or only after a long period of time.

7. Examination of the kartotecha and registries for Special Hospital Number 5 and Kazan, assuming they include the 50s, 60s and 70s.

8. A serious effort by an expert to study and define Smoltsov's role or roles as chief of the Sanatorium Services of Lubyanka, in relation to the administration of that Prison, the various Departments having jurisdiction over the prisoners, and the MGB Special Medical Services /Tzitrinblat.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, MISSING FILES AND REGISTRIES

What follows here are a number of lists for materials which have been repeatedly requested, updated in the light of new knowledge, to qualify the urgency of these files and or registries.

Also included is a response on those questions which remain unanswered or which raised further questions, as we conclude this work.

Thank you for your attention in all these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

1999-03-19

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(EC)

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu

För: Jan Lundvik/EC

Kopia: L Olson/ESEK

Refax: Magnusson/Riga ✓

Raoul Wallenberg

Lundvik från Hirdman

Vill framhålla att jag till fullo delar resonemanget i Ditt
mars p.1 till Magnusson. Vi måste, som Du skriver, koncentrera
våra begränsade resurser på prioriterade delar av materien och
förbereda överlämnande av resterande frågeställningar till
historikerna.

HIRDMAN




SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

1999-03-11

Nr 17 ✓ R 18


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Ambassadör Jan Lundvik

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

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P



Raoul Wallenberg

miso 25 A 1999-03-04

P2 EN

Broder,

Bifogat återfinner Du, enligt åberopat miso, de dokument från World Zionist Organizations Central Zionist Archives beträffande Raoul Wallenberg som tillställts ambassaden av Israels utrikesministerium.

Dag Juhlin-Dannfelt



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (2)

1999-03-21

Handläggare: H Magnusson

aa p

EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Ans	Grupp	Mbl
P	2	Eu ¹

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Till: EC(Lundvik)

Kopia: kabs, EI(L Olson), amb Moskva(Foyer/Wallberg),
amb Budapest(Lundvik)

16U 1999-03-18

Jag är tacksam över Jan Lundviks synpunkter på
uppläggningsen av det återstående arbetet och upplever
dem som ett stöd i vårt vidare agerande, inte minst i
förhållande till de oberoende experterna. I allt
väsentligt delar jag Lundviks uppfattning.

Vad gäller arbetet i Moskva bör prioritet ges
Mesinais dossier- och kartotekgenomgångar, Makinens
registerkortsanalys och utestående frågo till MID.
Projektet rörande de psykiatriska klinikerna bör väl
åtminstone komma igång, men det ter sig idag tämligen
oklart hur det skall bedrivas och hur lång tid det
kommer att ta.

Vad gäller det s k troféarkivet vill jag först se ett
nytt utkast till ansökan. Denna punkt finns redan med
i överenskommelsen från 1997 med ryssarna, varför den
principiellt sett inte bör vara besvärlig, men
definitionsfrågan kan uppenbarligen ställa till
bekymmer. Jag är dock inte beredd att låta
undersökningen fördröja publiceringen av rapporten.
Det rör sig trots allt om en sekundär sak.

Vidare har vi utestående framställningar till Israel
och USA, som väl bör följas upp. Jag tycker också

svar skall ges på Bergers framställan i januari rörande svenska arkiv, även om svaret i huvudsak blir rätt så avvisande, särskilt vad gäller UD. I övrigt är det bättre att ytterligare efterforskningar överläts till historiker.

Vid lämpligt tillfälle under våren bör vår hållning till det återstående arbetet preciseras ytterligare för alla medverkande.

MAGNUSSON



1999-03-21

Handläggare: H Magnusson

aa
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(EC)

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

B R Å D S K A N D E

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Till: EC(Lundvik)
Kopia: EI(L Olson), amb London(Lyrvall fvb Susan Mesinai som kontaktar ambassaden vad avser bilagan), amb Moskva(Foyer/Wallberg), amb Budapest(för Lundvik)

PRIMO. Bifogat översänds kommentarer till Susan Mesinai utkast till brev till Tutjnin, insänt av Moskvaambassaden till UD med kryfax 157. Kommentarererna har dröjt p g a tjänsteresa till Stockholm den 19-21 mars.

SECUNDO. För ambassaden Moskva. Följande ändringar bör göras i listan över frågor inför mötet den 22 februari.

nr 14. Utgår t v(markera enl. förslag i bilagan)
nr 19. Precisera datum för Erzines och Vladimirovs kontakter enl Jan Lundviks uppteckning från genomgång av finska dokument. Korrigera stavningen av Podtserob(ej Podtserov). Lägg till en mening av innebörd att Erzine och kanske också Podtserob bör ha rapporterat även till KGB. Dokumenten bör rimligen kunna lämnas över till ryska sidan(tacksam få Lundviks kommentar härtill).
nr 28. Ange att uppgifterna kommer från en bok av Aino Kuusinen.

MAGNUSSON

1999-03-21

α(7)

Comments to Ms Mesinai's draft letter to Vyacheslav
Tuchnin, pre-dated March 22, 1999.

Before commenting upon the draft letter I would like to have established that we have the following draft letters/documents prepared for the Russian side.

1/ Comments to answers received from the FSB and MVD to preliminary report no.1(S Mesinai)

2/ Revised list of questions relating to the meeting in Moscow on February 22, 1999(NOTE, From this list I would, for the time being, like to delete question no 13. Just mark this in the text and say that we will revert to the matter, when we have more information about the persons mentioned in the list).

3/ The letter from Ms Mesinai to Mr Tuchnin.

I hope this is all(the report the Lubyanka registry is for internal use for the time being - but I would very much appreciate a response from Ms Mesinai on the points I have raised). It is anyway a considerable amount of text. I therefore believe the three letters should be sent together with a cover note from me apologizing for the very substantial number of questions and requests but also drawing the attention of the Russian side once more to our request for a counterpart to Ms Mesinai whereby most such questions could be resolved in a day-to-day working contact.

As to the letter to Mr Tuchnin I have the following comments.

General: Any further shortening of the text(without sacrificing substance) would be welcome.

Page 5-6. The whole question on the jurisdiction over Wallenberg and Roedl could be deleted in this letter. I feel we have sufficient information on this; part of it is already included in my draft report, additional details are in the protocols from interviews with former MGB officials etc and in the protocols from the working group meetings. Any further clarifications could be taken up at a later stage, and I am willing to go through this with Ms Mesinai when we meet next time.

page 7, the missing interrogations in Lubyanka 1945. I strongly feel this should also be deleted, simply because the Russian side can say no more about this than we can. We have discussed the matter in the working group.

page 7, interrogations in Lefortovo. The last numbers might refer to the number of the interrogation chamber, but I am not sure, so we could ask.

page 8: please delete the first two paragraphs, we have discussed also this in the working group. The Russian side has hardly anything to add.

page 8, Interrogations of 17 July 1946 and 30 August 1946.
First paragraph, line four: please delete "A25" (this is my internal numbering system).

second and third paragraphs should be deleted (same reason as above)

page 11; Schlitter/Huber-July 22, 1947: Delete at least first paragraph; We have discussed this in the working group; Overlapping happened relatively seldom.

page 11, Langfelder/Katona-July 23, 1947. As no interrogation protocols have been found relating to Langfelder and Katona I feel the question is unnecessary.

page 11-12, Confirming the presence of RW... We have also the order signed by Mironov for Roedl and RW to be transferred to Lubyanka (cell no 7), from which Kitschman and his cell-mate have been moved in the same transfer order. Apart from that we have, as you say, the interrogation by Kuzmishin on March 11 and the registry of RW's possessions. On top of that we have all the interrogations of co-prisoners on July 22-23. Would these have been necessary if RW had long before been transferred from Lubyanka? Does this not also give a strong credence to his presence in

Lubyanka up to July 17, when something important happened?

page 15, Discussion of the fate of Gfrorener. I think these questions are partly unnecessary. From the investigation file of Gfrorener no information on any connection with RW appears - other than a mentioning in passing of the Swedish Legation. Last paragraph: please correct: Björn Lyrvall (not Lundstat).

page 17-18: The list under Medical investigation may seem overwhelming. Please state that this request is being addressed mainly to the Ministry of Health, but that support from MID and FSB would be appreciated.

page 18, Unanswered questions.... Do you here refer to the other two letters mentioned in the beginning of my comments?

I have not seen the interview regarding the numbered prisoners.

Your suggestion on Mr Vinogradov becoming the "counterpart" is good.

Hans Magnusson

Author: INTERNET:asoderqu@pen.k12.va.us/ at INTERNET

Date: 1999-03-21 15:39

Priority: Normal

TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3

Subject: message from S. Berger

Dear Mr. Olson,

Just to clarify: My interview with the German advokat doe{s not fall under the four interviews I am conducting on behalf of the Working Group. This interview will take place at a different time, in a different locale alltogether. I mention this so there will not be any confusion/problem concerning finances etc. The Working Group's money in not involved in this issue.

But as I stated by phone, in the spirit of cooperation and a common goal, I would be very grateful for any advice or suggestions you and your colleagues could provide in preparations for this meeting. I will issue a full report.

'Another topic: Have you been able to establish what happened the tape of the interview with Gustac Richter, and other taped witness interviews. I think it would be of interest for us to listen to SOME of these tapes, like Richter, Brugger, etc.

Thank you for forwarding the formal decision re payments. The decision is not quite correct in stating that payments are approved for preparations for the work in ROS Archive. In addition to that I have been providing information and assisting with questions related to the prisoner file review in Moscow. Matter of fact, most of the compensated time has been allocated to those questions. So I think the decision whould be amended to reflect these activities. This would ensure that a) any future invoices I hand in related to the prisoner files would be covered under the agreement, and b) that the formal decision accurately reflects my activities on behalf of the Working Group.

Best wishes,
Susanne

80/007 21

P 2 Eu7

a.a./K

DELGIVNING FRÅN KRYPTOEXP.:
EC LUNDAVIK
MENA
UMK
BMK

aa/p

(EC)

AVD.	GR.	MÅL
P	2	Eu ¹

AMBASSADEN TEL AVIV

1999-03-22

UD STOCKHOLM

FÖR EC-LUNDAVIK, KOPIA TILL UD-MENA

RE RAOUL WALLENBERG

FORTS.

RE RAOUL WALLENBERG

AMBASSADEN HAR VARIT I KONTAKT MED
UTRIKESMINISTERIETS I JERUSALEM HANDLÄGGARE FÖR
WALLENBERG-FRÅGAN, TALYA LADOR-FRESHER FÖR ATT
EFTERHÖRA RESULTATEN AV DENNAS ANSTRÄNGNINGAR ATT
BEREDA TILLGÅNG FÖR SVERIGE TILL ISRAELISKA ARKIV
MED MATERIAL OM RAOUL WALLENBERG.

LADOR-FRESHER HADE APPROCHERAT FYRA ISRAELISKA
INSTITUTIONER, WORLD ZIONIST ORGANISATIONS CENTRAL
ZIONIST ARCHIVES, NATIONAL ARKIVET,
UTRIKESMINISTERIETS EGET ARKIV OCH BIBLIOTEK SAMT
UNDERRÄTTELSETJÄNSTEN MOSSAD.

FRAMSTÄLLAN HADE BEMÖTT POSITIVT AV DE TRE
FÖRSTNÄMDA INSTITUTIONERNA . WORLD ZIONIST ARCHIVES
HADE T O M SAMMANSTÄLLT RELEVANT MATERIAL OM RAOUL
WALLENBERG OCH LÅTIT KOPIERA DETTA. MATERIALET
TILLSTÄLLS DEPARTEMENTET MED NÄSTA LÄGENHET. PÅ
UTRIKESMINISTERIET FANNS INTE MYCKET ATT HÄMTA, MEN
DÖRREN STOD ÖPPEN FÖR SVERIGE OM VI ÖNSKADE TILLGÅNG
TILL DESS ARKIV OCH BIBLIOTEK. NATIONALARKIVETVAR
ENLIGT LADOR-FRESHER SANNOLIKT MEST INTRESSANT FÖR
SVERIGE.

FRÅN MOSSAD HJADE HONOM INTE MOTTAGIT NÅGON
REAKTION, TROTS ETT ANIAL PÅSTÖNINGAR. LADOR
FRESHER VAR OSÄKER PÅ OM VI KUNDE FÖRVÄNTA OSS
NÅGOT SVAR ÖVERHUVUDTAGET, MEN STÄLLDE I UTSIKT ATT
DET KUNDE BLI LÄTTARE MED EN SVENSK TJÄNSTEMAN PÅ
PLATS. HON HÄLSADE DENNE VÄLKOMMEN OCH LOVADE GÖRA
VAD HON KUNDE FÖR ATT UNDERLÄTTA DENNES
EFTERFORSKNINGAR.

FÖR DIN RESEPLANERING ÖNSKAR VI GÖRA DIG UPPMÄRKSAM
PÅ ATT DEN JUDISKA PÅSKEN I ÅR INFALLER DEN
31.3-11.4, DÅ STATLIGA INSTITUTIONER ÄR STÄNGDA.
UNDER MARS MÅNAD VÄNTAR AMBASSADEN BESÖK AV SR
SCHORI SAMT URP, VILKET GÖR ATT VI HAR BÄTTRE
MÖJLIGHETER ATT TA EMOT DIG EFTER PÅSKEN.

FORTS.

Author: INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at INTERNET
Date: 1999-03-22 08:18
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
CC: INTERNET:akaplan@interaccess.com/ at internet
Subject: data entry by ProSoft

87/005
22
1999-03-22

a-c /
P 2 En7

Lage:

I have received a message from Konstantin S. Nikishkin that they will be starting data entry by April 1, and that if Ari Kaplan and I are to review the work before they finish, we need to come to Moscow by April 20.

This is not an opportune time for me to have to go to Moscow as I have stated before since I am in the midst of lecturing for the Spring Quarter and I have two grant applications due on June 1, which require massive effort on my part.

Nikishkin has stated that even if I had to come only over a weekend, he would advise that we come. There is no way in which I can fly to Moscow, leaving on a Friday and returning to Chicago by Sunday evening in time for my Monday lecture. I have decided that I can reschedule one lecture which would have to be that for April 16. I could then leave Chicago on Wednesday, April 14, or Thursday, April 15, arrive in Stockholm on the next morning, pick up my visa from you on that morning, and then take the 13:30 SAS flight into Moscow that same day. That way I could spend at least the Friday and the Saturday reviewing the data input with Ari and leave on Sunday morning, April 18. If I leave Moscow on a 7:00 a.m. LH flight which I have done before, I can get to Chicago by mid-afternoon. In the event that there are additional problems to attend to, Ari Kaplan will arrange to stay in Moscow for 2-3 additional days after I leave, if necessary.

Could you please let me know whether you could arrange to obtain a visa for me (also for Ari Kaplan)? Is it possible to have this sent by Federal Express? Then I would not have to take the detour via Stockholm. (I have not had much success in getting visas from the Russian Embassy in New York in time for my travel departure, and the bureaucratic obstacles to arrange for them to send it to me, requiring first an order from MID in Moscow, I am afraid, would be too much.) Therefore if you could not send it, would you be able to arrange to have it for me to pick up from your office in the morning of either the 15th or the 16th whichever day I come? The other possibility is that you could arrange to have some one bring it to Arlanda for us so that we would not have to drive into the city.

I will send to you by Federal Express three pictures, the xerox copy of my passport page, and an application for the visa this week. Please let me know what are the best arrangements that you could make for us.

Thanks.

Take care,

Marvin Makinen

I have sent to you by Federal Express copies of my expenses to interview Hans Loyda. I presume that you have received them.

Marvin W. Makinen
Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Biology
The University of Chicago
Cummings Life Science Center

920 E. 58th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

Tel: 773/702-1080

FAX: 773/702-0439

e-mail: m-makinen@uchicago.edu



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (2)

1999-03-22

R 18

Handl. Juhlin-Dannfelt

u.c.
P

P 2 EuL
EC

UD-EC (Ambassadör Lundvik), Dnr 71

Kopia: MENA (Duhs)

Besök Israel RW-arkivstudier

Från israeliska UM (Lador-Fresher) har följande föreslagits vad gäller besök av ambassadör Lundvik för studier av dokumentation av relevans för Raoul Wallenberg-frågan i israeliska arkiv.

1. Med hänvisning till att åminnelse dagen för fallna soldater och nationaldagen infaller 20-21 april 1999, föreslås att besöket inleds söndagen 25 april och varar t o m torsdagen 29 april. Man förutser att fem arbetsdagar krävs för en någorlunda noggrann genomgång av relevanta arkiv. Utöver nationalarkivet föreslås även besök vid Yad Vashem för studier av där befintliga dokument. I World Zionist Organization's arkiv befintliga dokument har i kopieform tillställts ambassaden, varför besök där ej ansågs nödvändigt. Andra ev. arkiv av intresse kan diskuteras efter ankomst hit.

2. I nationalarkivet torde främst dokumentation från rättegången mot Eichmann vara av intresse. Denna inkluderar utöver protokollen från rättegången även dokument från av polisiära myndigheter gjorda undersökningar. Huvuddelen av denna dokumentation är på engelska, tyska och hebreiska. För studier av dokument i hebreisk språkdräkt krävs sannolikt tolknärvaro. Då nationalarkivet anmält att man ej har möjlighet att ställa tolk till förfogande, får annan lösning av denna aspekt undersökas.

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4, Weizmann Street
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16881001

T E L E F A X

Sid 2 (2)

3. Tentativt föreslås följande preliminära upplägg för ambassadör Lundviks besök:

- Ankomst 23-24 april. Inkvartering hotell i Jerusalem.
- Söndag 25 april. Besök på UM för genomgång av program. Besök Nationalarkivet.
- Måndag 26 april - onsdag 28 april. Studier i Nationalarkivet. Ev. andra institutioner.
- Torsdag 29 april. Besök Yad Vashem (institutionen för åminnelse av och forskning kring Förintelsen) och dess arkiv.

4. Tacksam synpunkter på det föreslagna upplägget, tiden för besöket samt vad gäller prioriteringarna för ambassadör Lundviks arkivstudier.

5. Från UM har framförts önskemål om att få ambassadör Lundviks curriculum vitae. Tacksam ambassaden tillställs CV inför besöket.

HAGARD

1999-03-23

Aambs A. Wallberg

Beigivning från

eni adressering/samt

JKK

BMK

RTG

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avt.	Grupp	Mål
7	2	Eu 1

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Riga

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Bifogat översänds intervju ur tidningen Sovetskaja
Sekretno med Michail Gorbatsjevs förre medhjälpare
Valerij Boldin, i vilken förekomsten av
förhöringsprotokoll avseende Raoul Wallenberg omnämns
jämför kommentar av Susan Mesinais medhjälpare
Andrej Allachverdov.

DAHL

TO SUSAN MESINAI
c/o Mats Foyer

VERY URGENT

Hi,

Yesterday Gennadi called from Memorial. He said that in the latest edition of the "Sovershenno Sekretno" he found an interview of Valeri Boldin, former Gorbachev's aide. Here are some quotations from the interview.

Stalin was not yet buried when Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria and Molotov rushed to the study of the leader and opened his personal safe. [...] There were files on many of the party leaders, including Beria. [...] What is the most important, reports of the agents among the top leaders of various countries, storthand protocols of interrogations, of Wallenberg in particular [...] Shuyski told me that there were Abakumov's letters written by him personally to Stalin on various questions of intelligence, agents, uncluding those kept by us. One read something like this: "Comrade Stalin, we have completed our work with the subject... (there was the number following and in the brackets the name "Muller"), kept in a Urals special site. At present we got all the data that we are interested in, of which you have been informed. Now the question is whether to keep detaining the person at special sites or in connection with the completion of the topics that are of interest to us and because of the danger of the leakage of information on this person to finally close the question. I need your instructions.

Isn't it interesting. I'm in the office until 6:00 pm

Andrei Allakhverdiv

4 pages

Старая площадь

ПАМЯТЬ

Воспоминания
Валерия БОЛДИНА,
бывшего помощника
Генерального
секретаря ЦК КПСС

Несколько лет в средствах массовой информации мы обсуждали вопросы, связанные с историей существования секретных протоколов, заключенных между Советским Союзом и Германией по поводу разграничения пограничной линии на территории Польши и некоторых стран Прибалтики. И сегодня не стал бы касаться этого вопроса, так как считаю, что в любой стране есть



oppage

ская кабинет и вскрыли его личный сейф. В этом сейфе было, как мне рассказывали, много любовного. Члены Президиума ЦК быстро разобрали бумаги, которые имели отношение лично к ним. Многие среди прочего изъять и подлинники секретного протокола. С 1933 года они находились в его личном сейфе. И только после освобождения от должности министра иностранных дел он переправил их в ЦК КПСС, и они попали во второй сектор Общего отдела.

ных дел Андрей Андреевич Громико, ин-формированный кем-то из своих сотруд-ников или членов Политбюро, запросил в ЦК КПСС секретный протокол. В это время на Западе всплыл вопрос о разделе Польши между Германией и СССР и появи-лась публикация копий секретного про-токола и секретная карта, подписанная Риббентропом и Сталиным, с определе-

страхование общество



Год основания 1994

Риски наших клиентов застрахованы.

Вы знаете своего страховщика?

Москва, Кузнецкий мост, 21/5, телефон 926-03-03.

Насколько мне известно, пакет с этими документами из архива ЦК КПСС был вторично направлен в МИД и пролежал там долгое время, прежде чем вернуться в ЦК КПСС. Позже мидовские работники еще раз достаточно долго держали его у себя.

Дал некие перипетии, связанные с подлинниками секретных протоколов, мне неизвестны. Однако, зная систему хранения документов в архивах ЦК, я предположил, что без разрешения генсека и за-должности в руки постороннему. Но обо всем этом я узнал много позже.

2 февраля 1987 года я был помощником Генерального секретаря ЦК КПСС. А 2 февраля, во время перерыва на Пленуме ЦК КПСС, посвященном вопросам кадровой работы, охрана отскакала меня, сообщая, что Михаил Сер-

отделом,

Горбачев все знал.

И познакомил его с этими документами Лукьянов.

...а он знает круг
...обязанностей и вопросы работы
...документами, контроля. Нет возраж
...ний? — Нет.

— Нет.

И вышел из зала, шокированный бесцеремонностью, с какой все было сделано, и думая о нелепой работе, в которой пока ничего не понимал. Под мисс начало переходил самый крупный отдел ЦК наркомывающей выше шестистое тело работы с документами. Лишь через семь — десять месяцев я смог раздобыть материалы, протоколы, решения.

Мои предшественники по работе в отделе, и прежде всего А. И. Лукьянов, К. М. Боголюбов, К. У. Черненко, полагаю, не раз докладывали различным секретарям ЦК, в частности Михаилу Сергеевичу Горбачеву, о материалах архива, в том числе и тех, которые были в закрытых папках. Сказал об этом и я, но Горбачев отмолился. Возможно, он



Delges:

Kals
Hellgren, UMK
van Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnussen, Riga

Lundvik, EC
Olson, EU-ESEK
RW-föreningen
Amb Moskva
Amb Budapest

exp. 99-03-25

RAOUL WALLENBERG

a. a. / 10



Bilden är hämtad ur Michael Nicholsons och David Winners bok "Raoul Wallenberg. The Swedish diplomat who saved 100,000 Jews from the Nazi holocaust".

Anna Johansson

Nv96c

Specialarbete i historia

1999-03-01

Handledare: Joachim Håkansson

INNEHÅLLSFÖRTECKNING

Kap.		Sid.
1.	INLEDNING.....	2
2.	VEM VAR RAOUL WALLENBERG?.....	3
2.1	Raouls uppväxttid	3
2.2	Studier och arbete, utomlands och hemma.....	3
3.	WALLENBERG SKICKAS TILL BUDAPEST.....	4
4.	HUR VAR SITUATIONEN I UNGERN 1944?.....	5
4.1	Allt värre för judarna.....	5
4.2	Omvärlden reagerar mot judeförföljelserna.....	6
5.	VAD UTRÄTTADE WALLENBERG I BUDAPEST?.....	6
5.1	En ovanlig diplomat med ovanligt sätt att jobba.....	7
5.2	Också kritiska röster.....	7
5.3	Räddade 100 000 människors liv.....	8
6.	WALLENBERG GRIPS AV RYSSARNA. VARFÖR?.....	8
6.1	Ryssarna tar över i Budapest.....	8
6.2	Många teorier.....	9
7.	VAD GJORDE SVERIGE DE FÖRSTA ÅREN?.....	11
7.1	Svenskarna inte oroliga, i början.....	12
7.2	Hur agerade UD och ambassaden i Moskva?.....	12
7.3	Svenska opinionen trycker på.....	14
8.	VAD GJORDE SVERIGE 1947-1957.....	15
8.1	En vändpunkt.....	15
8.2	Skarpare ton från svenskarna.....	16
9.	EFTER 1957.....	16
9.1	Många kontakter med ryssarna.....	17
9.2	Ökat intresse från USA.....	18
9.3	Större öppenhet, rysk -svensk kommission	18
10.	SLUTSATSER OCH AVSLUTANDE KOMMENTARER.....	19
10.1	Raouls erfarenheter gjorde honom lämplig för arbetet i Budapest.....	19
10.2	Raouls insatser i Budapest.....	19
10.3	Varför greps Wallenberg?.....	19
10.4	Varför var svenskarna så passiva i början? Många frågetecken.....	20
10.5	Den nya öppenheten, glasnost, ger nya möjligheter.....	21
10.6	Raoul Wallenberg - ett föredöme.....	21
	NOTFÖRTECKNING.....	22
	KÄLLFÖRTECKNING.....	25

1. INLEDNING

Den svenske diplomaten Raoul Wallenbergs öde har starkt engagerat många, både i Sverige och i utlandet. Genom sina insatser under den korta tid (juli 1944 - januari 1945) som han verkade vid svenska beskickningen (legationen) i Budapest skrev han in sitt namn i världshistorien. På ett halvår lyckades han rädda åtskilliga 10.000-tals judar undan nazisternas hemska och brutala förföljelser. Han har blivit en internationell symbol för kampen mot rasistiskt förtryck och diskriminering. Som Shihomo Argov, Israels ambassadör i Storbritannien 1979-1982 uttryckt det: "Wallenberg räddade 100 000 undan Hitlers rasistiska massaker. Om 60 personer till hade handlat som han, så hade nazistmördarna aldrig fått sina sex millioner offer." 1)

Inte minst under sommaren 1997 skrevs det mycket i tidningarna om Raoul Wallenberg, eftersom det då var 50 år sedan han enligt ryssarna påstås ha dött i Ljubljanskafängelset i Moskva. Ju mer jag läste om Wallenberg och hans insatser för judarna, ju mer intresserad blev jag. Därför bestämde jag mig för att försöka ta reda på mer om Raoul Wallenberg, hans insatser för judarna och vad den svenska regeringen gjort för att få klarhet i vad som hänt honom:

De frågor som jag fördjupat mig i är:

- ♦ Vad uträttade Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest under det halvår som han arbetade på svenska legationen?
- ♦ Varför greps han av ryssarna i januari 1945?
- ♦ Hur har Sverige agerat för att få fram sanningen om Raoul Wallenbergs öde? Framförallt: Vad gjorde svenskarna den närmaste tiden efter att han tillfångatogs i Budapest?

För att få en bakgrund till Wallenbergs insatser har jag sett det som nödvändigt att också ta reda på uppgifter om personen Raoul Wallenberg, liksom att kortfattat beskriva situationen i Ungern 1944 då Wallenberg kom dit.

För att få svar på mina frågor har jag varit i kontakt med Utrikesdepartementet (UD) åtskilliga gånger och därifrån fått låna två dokumentsamlingar (sk vitböcker) från 1957 och 1965. Jag hade också hoppats på att få fram ytterligare "fakta i målet" i den "vitbok" som tidigare utlovats komma ut hösten 1998, men där förseningar gjort att den beräknas komma ut först till hösten 1999. Enligt Lage Olson på UD så kommer det i denna vitbok bli att ingå någon form av sammanfattning av vad de grupper som forskat i ryska arkiv kommit fram till. Av Lage har jag också fått cirka 80 artiklar från svenska, tyska, engelska, israeliska och australiensiska tidningar 1995 då det var 50 år sedan Raoul försvann i Budapest.

Jag har även läst en mängd böcker som jag hittat på Stadsbiblioteket i Kalmar och har också fjärrlånat ett par böcker. Jag har även varit på Skolans Artikelservice, SA, och funnit en mängd tidningsartiklar om Raoul Wallenberg.

Jag har också vid två tillfällen haft kontakt med Sonja Sonnenfeldt på Raoul Wallenbergföreningen. Vi har haft både långa och intressanta samtal om Raoul Wallenbergärendet och jag fick t.o.m. en inbjudan att besöka föreningen i april.

2. VEM VAR RAOUL WALLENBERG?

Raoul Wallenberg tillhörde en släkt som under flera generationer tillfört landet biskopar, statsmän, diplomater och framförallt finansmän. 2) Sveriges mäktigaste finansfamilj var känd för att fostra Wallenbergarna till ansvarsfulla världsmedborgare, och Raoul som föddes den 4 augusti 1912 blev inget undantag.

2.1 Raouls uppväxttid

När Raoul föddes hade hans pappa dött i cancer tre månader tidigare, endast 23 år gammal. När Raoul var sex år gifte hans mamma om sig. Den nye mannen var byråchefen Fredrik von Dardel och han uppfostrade Raoul som sin egen son. Men det var nog framförallt hans farfar Gustaf som såg till att pojken fick den utbildning som släkttraditionen krävde. 3) Gustaf, som var minister (dåtidens ambassadör), tjänstgjorde på olika ställen i världen. Han ville att Raoul skulle uppfostras till en världsmedborgare som felfritt kunde tala främmande språk. Han ordnade så att Raoul fick vara utomlands på somrarna för att han skulle lära känna seder och bruk i andra länder. 4) Han var bara 13 år när han ensam tog tåget från Stockholm till Konstantinopel, för att hälsa på farfar Gustaf som var svensk minister där. När Raoul var 14 år for han ensam till London för att studera språk. 5)

Själv tror jag inte att många 13-14-åringar idag skulle våga göra detsamma och förmodligen var det ännu mera djärvt att göra de här resorna på 1920-talet. Jag tror också att Raoul hade nytta av de här erfarenheterna när han 1944-1945 ställdes inför många problem och utmaningar i Budapest.

Raoul tog studenten på Nya Elementarläroverket där han gick på den ryskspråkiga linjen. Han har beskrivits som ambitiös och humoristisk, förtjust i att läsa och delta i politiska diskussioner. 6) En av hans skolkamrater var Rolf af Klintberg som i februari 1946 skrev bl a följande: "Det dröjde inte länge förrän kamraterna märkte att Raoul i flera avseenden skilde sig från mängden. Redan hans utseende med de stora ögonen och det vågiga, mörka håret var iögonfallande, och hans intressen och sätt att uttrycka sig var ovanliga ... Under gymnasietiden framträdde allt tydligare hos Raoul hans speciella begåvning för att rycka med sig folk; gymnasistförbundets diskussioner blev genom hans medverkan roliga och stimulerande och åhörarna strömmade till efter Raouls uppmaningar på stora, arkitektoniskt uppbyggda och färgflammande plakat." 7)

2.2 Studier och arbete, utomlands och hemma

Ett år efter det att han tagit sin studentexamen började Raoul studera på universitetet i Ann Arbor i Michigan i USA. Där studerade han under fyra år till arkitekt och blev klar med sin examen 1935. 8) Under denna tid hann han bli en entusiastisk vän av Amerika, och "förbryllade många gånger sina gamla vänner, som ansåg Tyskland för världens navel, när han på sitt medryckande sätt försökte förklara för dem, att Amerika är centrum för vår tids civilisation och kultur och att det för varje dag som går ytterligare befäster denna ställning." 9)

Efter USA-studierna återvände Raoul till Sverige där han försökte slå sig fram som arkitekt. Bl a gjorde han förslag till ett bad på Riddarholmen men det blev inget av detta eftersom det var dålig fart på byggandet på 1930-talet. 10)

Raouls farfar ingrep på nytt och ordnade så att Raoul åter kunde se sig om i världen och få en möjlighet att utbilda sig till affärsman. Han fick arbete i Sydafrika hos Swedish African Company och firma Albert Florén. 11) Från Sydafrika flyttade Raoul till Haifa i Palestina, där han fick anställning på en bank som ägdes av en holländsk jude. Raoul var mycket kritisk mot bankledningens sätt att behandla de anställda, som kände sig utnyttjade av banken, och han tog deras parti. I Haifa träffade han också en del judar som lyckats fly från Hitler-Tyskland och han fick därmed ingående kännedom om judarnas situation i Europa. 12) Raoul blev upprörd över judeförföljelserna och beslutade att göra vad han kunde för att hjälpa de förföljda. 13)

En av Raouls släktingar, Jacob Wallenberg som var verkställande direktör i Enskilda Banken, föreslog att Raoul skulle anta en tjänst i Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB i Stockholm, som drevs av ungraren Koloman Lauer, som var jude. Företaget importerade livsmedel från Ungern, Frankrike och andra länder. Raoul accepterade tjänsten och blev firmans direktör i avvaktan på att Lauer skulle få ett svenskt medborgarskap. Under sitt arbete i detta företag reste Raoul mycket utomlands, bl a till Ungern. 14)

1942 och 1943 for han flitigt till Budapest för att förhandla om affärskontrakt. Han skaffade sig då många kontakter i den ungerska huvudstaden. 15)

3. WALLENBERG SKICKAS TILL BUDAPEST

I början av juli 1944 sändes Raoul Wallenberg till Budapest som svensk diplomat med uppdrag att rädda judar undan nazismens gaskamrar.

Förmodligen spelade slumpen in att det just blev Raoul som fick åka till Budapest. I varje fall får man det intrycket när man läser Elsa och Hans Villius bok "Fallet Raoul Wallenberg". I denna bok hänvisar paret Villius till ungraren Lauers första kontakt med Iver Olsen vid den amerikanska legationen i Stockholm. Eftersom legationen och Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB hade sina kontor i samma hus på Strandvägen 7A träffades de en dag i källan i april 1944. Olsen berättade då att han var humanitär attaché på amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm och att hans uppgift var att hjälpa ungrarna. "Det skulle ske på så sätt att UD i Stockholm skickade en humanitär attaché till svenska beskickningen i Budapest. Han frågade mig om jag kunde rekommendera någon pålitlig, energisk och intelligent person, som var lämplig för detta ändamål. Jag svarade honom spontant, att det kunde jag och nämnde Raoul Wallenberg. Raoul Wallenberg hade varit i Budapest åtskilliga gånger under kriget och jag berättade för Mr. Olsen om Raoul Wallenbergs karaktär och inställning till humanitära frågor." 16)

Iver Olsen var ombud för president Roosevelts speciella flyktinghjälpkommitté, WRB (War Refugee Board). Från sitt högkvarter i Stockholm ledde han WRB:s hjälpaktioner runt om i Europa. Amerikanerna arbetade för att få den svenska regeringen att starta en hjälpaktion för de ungerska judarna. Washington bad Olsen och USA:s minister i Stockholm Herschel Johnson att påverka svenska UD att öka antalet diplomater i Budapest. 17)

De förhandlingar som fördes skedde mellan representanter för World Jewish Congress, WRB i Washington, svenska UD, svenska privatpersoner, flyktingar och i slutskedet USA:s minister i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson. Det första mötet mellan Raoul Wallenberg och Iver Olsen ägde antagligen rum i slutet av april eller början av maj 1944, och inte långt därefter möttes Raoul Wallenberg och Herschel Johnson. Den amerikanske ministern besökte sedan svenske

utrikesministern Christian Günther, och det dröjde inte länge förrän Wallenberg utnämndes till förste legationssekreterare i Budapest. 18)

Innan Raoul lämnade Sverige vände sig kung Gustaf V till Ungerns statschef Horthy med en begäran att han skulle göra slut på judeförföljelserna i Ungern. När Raoul den 6 juli 1944 lämnade Sverige hade han med sig ett budskap från kungen till Horthy. Raoul for med flyg till Berlin och fortsatte stående i en överfylld järnvägs kupé till Budapest. 19) Där blev han på den svenska legationen chef för C-avdelningen som hade hand om de humanitära frågorna. 20)

4. HUR VAR SITUATIONEN I UNGERN 1944?

Ungern hade ställt sig på Tysklands sida i andra världskriget. 1942 krävde tyskarna skärpta åtgärder mot judarna. Detta orsakade en kraftig opposition och i Ungern började man efter hand öppet tala om att landet borde avveckla det intima samarbetet med Tyskland. Man skickade ut en del signaler att man ville ha fred. Hitler började nu skärpa kraven på Ungern. Han begärde att Ungern politiskt och militärt skulle visa fullständig lojalitet mot Tyskland. Hitler kallade till sig den ungerske statschefen Horthy för att tala honom tillrätta. Tyskarna försenade sedan hans återresa till Ungern och när han kom tillbaka hade redan tyska trupper ockuperat Ungern. 21)

Ett specialkommando under ledning av Adolf Eichmann kom till Ungern. Han hade gjort sig känd som "Mästaren" när det gällde att lösa judefrågan. "Som chef för Gestapos sektion IV B4 - som sysslade med judefrågor - hade han varit som en kirurg, när det gällt att planera och genomföra vartenda stadium av Tysklands förföljelse och likvidering av den europeiska judendomen. 22)

Under de utrensningsaktioner som följde på den tyska ockupationen greps många framstående judar. Eichmann försäkrade emellertid, att ingen skulle bli illa behandlad bara för att han var jude. Vad som var viktigt för Tyskland var att Ungerns industrier ökade sin produktion. 23)

4.1 Allt värre för judarna

I mars - april 1944 beslutades om en rad antijudiska lagar. Alla judar över sex år tvingades bära davidsstjärnan, judarna utestängdes från de flesta arbeten och alla judiska företag stängdes efter hand. I april 1944 förklarades att alla judar skulle avstängas från avlönade arbeten inom industrin, handeln, jordbruket etc. Alla judiska tillgångar spärrades och kontantsummor över 3000 pengö beslagtogs. Summor som översteg 10 000 pengö skulle deklarerars. Judarna försågs med speciella ransoneringskort, som gav dem mindre ransoner än övriga medborgare.

I slutet av april kom tyskarna med nya krav. De militära zonerna skulle helt rensas från judar, dvs ghetton och läger skulle förflyttas till det inre av Ungern. Den 29 april kom order om att segregation av judarna i hela Ungern skulle genomföras. Alla samhällen med 10 000 invånare eller mera skulle samla sin judiska befolkning i ghetton. I mindre samhällen och på landsbygden skulle judarna samlas i läger. 24)

Liksom i andra ockuperade länder försökte nazisterna genomföra likvideringen av ungerska judar så friktionsfritt som möjligt och med minsta möjliga insats av de egna styrkorna, vilka behövdes vid fronten. Därför användes de ledande inom judeförsamlingarna som slavdrivare och de fick en hel del förmåner och fördelar. 25) Eichmann lyckades få judarna att bilda ett judiskt råd som bestod av ledande medlemmar av det judiska samhället. Han försäkrade att det huvudsakliga syftet var att öka krigsindustrins effektivitet och produktion. Judarna skulle arbeta men inte råka illa ut. Han förklarade att familjer skulle deporteras "av hänsyn till judarnas starka familjekänsla". 26)

Deportationerna av judar till Tyskland började den 15 maj, och redan den 7 juli hade mer än 275 000 judar deporterats. Transporterna ägde rum under vidriga förhållanden. Tågen överlastades, och judarna låstes in med ytterst lite mat och dryck och med endast en spann för naturbehov. Man räknar med att av de drygt 450 000 judar som deporterades från Ungern kan i bästa fall 120 000 ha överlevt. 27)

4.2 Omvärlden reagerar mot judeförföljelserna

Främmande länder började nu få upp ögonen för vad som hände de ungerska judarna. I juni 1944 protesterade samtliga främmande beskickningar i Budapest utom de tyska, italienska och kroatiska. Påven sände en personlig protest, detsamma gjorde chefen för det internationella Röda korset, och nio biskopar undertecknade en protestskrivelse från den protestantiska kyrkan. Vidare sände den amerikanska presidenten Roosevelt en begäran att deportationerna och andra antijudiska åtgärder genast skulle upphöra, annars hotade han med militärt ingripande.

Även den svenske kungen begärde att den ungerske statschefen Horthy skulle göra slut på judeförföljelserna i Ungern och uppmanade honom att "rädda dem som ännu kunde räddas av judarna". 28)

I detta läge när judeförföljelserna ökade och omvärlden hade fått upp ögonen för detta anlände Raoul Wallenberg den 9 juli 1944 till Budapest. Per Anger, på den svenska legationen berättar i sin bok "Med Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest" att Raoul hade en något ovanlig utrustning för att vara diplomat: två ryggsäckar, en sovsäck, en vindtygsrock och en revolver. 29)

5. VAD UTRÄTTADE WALLENBERG I BUDAPEST?

När Raoul kom till Budapest den 9 juli 1944 var deporteringarna från den ungerska landsbygden slutförda medan huvuddelen av Budapests judar ännu inte berörts. På den svenska legationen ansåg man dock att det knappast var troligt att tyskarna gick med på att i långa loppet skona huvudstadens judar.

Per Anger berättar att en av de första frågor som Raoul ställde till honom var: "Vilka dokument har ni utfärdat för judarna?" Anger visade då honom de provisoriska passen, viseringsintygen och rödakorsskyddsbreven. "Wallenberg synade dokumenten och svarade efter en stund: 'Jag tror jag har fått en idé till ett nytt och kanske effektivare dokument'. Så föddes vid vårt första möte tanken på de sk skyddspassen, det vill säga de legitimationshandlingar i de blågula färgerna med Tre Kronor som emblem vilka skulle komma att bli räddningen för tiotusentals judar. Raoul Wallenberg organiserade genast efter sin

ankomst den fortsatta hjälpverksamheten under beskickningschefens ledning. Denna verksamhet kom huvudsakligen att finansieras från War Refugee Board i Washington som genom USA:s beskickning i Stockholm ställde betydande belopp till Wallenbergs förfogande. Men även genom insamlingar i Ungern inflöt avsevärda summor på frivillig väg." 30)

När Raoul kom till Budapest organiserades en särskild avdelning, den sk C-avdelningen, på den svenska legationen. Denna avdelning hade som uppgift att ta hand om hjälpaktionen för de ungerska judarna. Wallenberg skötte C-avdelningen närmast under beskickningschefen, envoyén Ivan Danielsson. 31)

I Stockholm hade svenska UD svårt att svälja Raouls sätt att tackla sin uppgift. Bl a rapporterade Iver Olsen vid den amerikanska legationen hem till Washington att UD tyckte att Wallenberg "plumsat i" lite väl hårt i Budapest. Även om Olsen tyckte att Wallenberg borde göra så lite ringar på vattnet som möjligt, förklarade han att "Wallenberg arbetar utav bara helvete och gör en del nytta, vilket är avgörande". 32)

5.1 En ovanlig diplomat med ovanligt sätt att jobba

Raouls arbetade mycket okonventionellt, han agerade inte som diplomater brukade göra. Det har sagts att Raoul var beredd att "sluta förbund med djävulen själv" för att genomföra sina planer i Ungern. Detta lyckades han med genom att använda de pengar som han fick från i första hand amerikanerna.

Raoul startade med att snabbt skaffa ett trettiotal hus i stadsdelen Pest öster om Donau. Det var de sk svenskhusen, där han inrättade kontor och bostäder för sina judiska medarbetare och för andra judiska familjer som erhöll svenskt skydd. Efter överenskommelse med den ungerska regeringen kunde även de andra neutrala beskickningarna få köpa fastigheter i Budapest för att ta emot ungerska judar och skydda dem. Detta område blev det sk Internationella ghyttot under de neutrala staternas beskydd.

Det fanns också det sk Allmänna ghyttot - utanför de neutrala beskickningarnas kontroll - och här sökte Raoul sörja för att de cirka hundratusen judarna inte svalt. 33)

Det som gjorde Wallenberg mest känd var utfärdandet av de sk skyddspass. De som fick sådana skyddspass stod under den svenska beskickningens beskydd. Hjälpaktionen omfattade till att börja med bara cirka 650 judar med nära anknytning till Sverige. Den utsträcktes så småningom till att omfatta omkring 5000 personer och man höll då heller inte så hårt på kravet på nära släktskap till personer i Sverige eller affärsförbindelser med svenska firmor. De ungerska myndigheterna lovade att de som hade skyddspass inte skulle deporteras. De fick istället bo i de sk svenskhusen som den svenska legationen ordnat. Senare fördes ytterligare personer till dessa hus eller gömdes på annat sätt så att det vid årsskiftet 1944/45 fanns cirka 20 000 judar som svenska legationen på något sätt skyddade. 34)

5.2 Också kritiska röster

Det fanns de som var kritiska mot att Wallenberg och hans medarbetare började dela ut en massa skyddspass, liksom att den svenska rödakorsdelegaten Valdemar Langlet delade ut Röda-korsskyddsbrev. Kritikerna, och många av dessa fanns på den svenska legationen, ansåg att det blev inflation i skyddspapper. De kom i orätta händer, förfalskades etc. Wallenberg

brydde sig dock inte om detta utan drev ständigt på. När han inte fick den svenske ministern Danielsson att skriva under fler gick han förbi honom och utfärdade själv olika intyg om att det skulle komma att utfärdas skyddspass. 35)

5.3 Räddade 100 000 människors liv

I en intervju i Svenska Dagbladet den 15 januari 1995 svarade en av Wallenbergs kolleger, Per Anger följande på frågan om vad uträttade Raoul Wallenberg:

"Direkt och indirekt räddade han 100 000 människors liv. Han hittade på detta med skyddspass till alla judar som på något sätt kunde ha beröring med Sverige. Han mångdubblade den humanitära verksamhet vi på legationen inlett. Raoul hyrde eller köpte ett 30-tal hyreshus, som han hängde svenska flaggor eller plakater på och som han hävdade var svensk egendom. I de husen gömde han närmare 20 000 judar. Han var så gott som varje dag på stationen och slet ut judar ur redan lastade tåg till Auschwitz, Birkenau och andra förintelsläger. Han var runt i fångelser och uppsamlingsläger, mutade och bluffade sig fram. Och han hindrade i början av januari 1945 att det stora gettot med 70 000 judar sprängdes i luften." 36)

Jenő Levái har i sin bok "Raoul Wallenberg - hjälten i Budapest" lovordat Wallenbergs insatser för judarna och samtidigt tillfört ytterligare en aspekt: "Den största betydelsen har det faktum att nazisterna och pilkorsarna inte fingo härja fritt - de voro tvungna att se, att varje deras steg övervakades och följdes av den unge svenske diplomaten. För Wallenberg fanns det ingen hemlighet. Pilkorsarna kunde inte lura honom. De kunde inte handla fritt, de ställdes till ansvar för de förföljdas och dödsdömdas liv. Wallenberg var 'världens observerande öga', den som ständigt ställde förbrytarna till ansvar. Detta är den stora betydelsen av Wallenbergs kamp i Budapest." 37)

6. WALLENBERG GRIPS AV RYSSARNA. VARFÖR?

I mitten av oktober 1944 tvingades den ungerske statschefen Horthy att avgå. Ferencz Szálasi, som var ledare för det ungerska nazistpartiet pilkorsarna, efterträdde honom. Läget försämrades nu för judarna och för de som arbetade för att rädda dem. Eichmann återinkallades nu till Ungern och Wallenbergs avdelning fick gång på gång rycka ut för att förhindra att judar fördes bort eller att begära tillbaka de som redan förts bort. Wallenberg samarbetade under den här tiden med den schweiziska legationen. Det var alltså inte bara svenskarna som hjälpte judarna utan också övriga neutrala länder och Röda korset gjorde storartade insatser. 38)

Under den här tiden ökade oron för Wallenbergs säkerhet. Pilkorsarna hatade honom och Adolf Eichmann meddelade vid samtal med en av de anställda i svenska Röda korset att han hade för avsikt att låta skjuta "judehunden" Wallenberg. 39)

6.1 Ryssarna tar över i Budapest

Vid jultiden 1944 omringades Budapest av ryssarna och på julaftonen hemsöktes också den svenska legationen. Wallenberg hade då redan flyttat över till ett skyddat hus i Pest, den östra stadsdelen i Budapest.

Den 13 januari 1945 besatte ryssarna den del av Benczurgatan i Pest där Wallenberg höll till. Wallenberg sammanfördes där med den ryske majoren Demtjinkov. I sällskap med denne och sin chaufför, Vilmos Langfelder, återvände Wallenberg senare under rysk eskort för att hämta sina tillhörigheter. När han på nytt gav sig av hade han med sig sin portfölj, som innehöll en mycket stor summa pengar. Enligt de uppgifter han lämnade skulle han bege sig till det ryska högkvarteret. Från denna resa återvände han aldrig. 40)

Den 16 januari 1945 underrättades den svenske envoyén i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom av den ryske vice utrikesministern Dekanosov om att Raoul Wallenberg tagit sig över till den av ryssarna erövrade delen av Budapest. Söderblom fick också besked om att de sovjetiska myndigheterna hade vidtagit åtgärder för att skydda Wallenberg och hans egendom. 41)

6.2 Många teorier

Det finns många teorier om varför ryssarna grep Wallenberg. Många av dessa bygger på att ryssarna misstänkte att Raoul Wallenberg var spion och sysslade med underrättelseverksamhet. Några av teorierna är:

- ♦ *Ryssarna trodde att Wallenberg bedrev spionage för tyskarna och var tyskvänlig.* Bl a uppgav den svenska rödakorsdelegaten Valdemar Langlet att när han förhördes av en sovjetisk officer tog denne upp Raoul Wallenberg och hade beskyllt svenskarna för att vara tyskvänner. Även vid förhör med Lars G:son Berg och anställda vid den svenska legationen hade ryssarna påstått att Wallenberg spionerat för tyskarna. 42)

Historikern Helene Carlback-Isotalo har i en debattartikel 1991, som återopas i Expressen den 16 juli 1997, hänvisat till ett KGB-dokument som talar i ungefär samma riktning. Enligt detta dokument fick även nazister och fascister hjälp för att komma undan ryssarnas framryckning mot Budapest. Helene drar slutsatsen att "Raoul Wallenberg kanske blev ett offer för denna oneutrala och pronazistiska inriktning hos den svenska legationen." 43)

- ♦ *Ryssarna trodde att han spionerade för amerikanarna.* Lars G:son Berg skriver i boken "Boken som försvann" att han först varit naiv nog att tro på teorin att ryssarna trodde att Wallenberg var en tysk spion. Han förstod senare att ryssarna misstänkt Wallenberg för att vara spion för amerikanarna: "När man tänker på, att Wallenberg faktiskt kommit till Budapest på president Roosevelts personliga begäran, och att de medel, som stod till hans förfogande, härrörde från War Refugee Board i Washington, kan man nu bättre förstå, att ryssarna i själva verket främst betraktade Raoul som en amerikansk spion! Och det var i ryssarnas ögon betydligt värre än att arbeta för tyskarna!" 44)

Per Anger konstaterar i sin bok "Med Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest" att Wallenberg i ryska ögon redan var komprometterad genom att ha tagit emot amerikanska pengar till sin hjälpverksamhet. Ännu mer misstänksamma blev ryssarna när Wallenberg hade presenterat sina planer på att bilda en organisation, "Wallenberginstitutionen för Räddning och Återuppbyggnad". Dess syfte skulle vara att sörja för familjeåterföring, skapa arbetsmöjligheter för hemvändande, ge rättshjälp för krigsskadade, bostadshjälp, sjukvård etc. Ryssarna trodde inte att det stod rätt till och tänkte kanske på att de själva brukade använda sina humanitära organisationer som täckmantel för spioneri. De ansåg det förmodligen självklart att andra länder använde sig av liknande metoder. Wallenbergs återuppbyggnadsplan var för ryssarna sannolikt ingenting annat än ett försök till fortsatt förtäckt spioneri och när han beskrev sin

ditillsvarande humanitära verksamhet samt talade om en fortsättning, trodde de alltså inte på honom. 45)

Även docent Rolf Karlbom har i sin bok "Raoul Wallenbergs fångenskap i Sovjet" tagit upp Wallenbergs planer för en humanitär hjälpinsats, också efter det att ryssarna ockuperat Ungern. Karlbom anser att detta kunde ha varit ett skäl till att ryssarna grep Wallenberg och att de anklagade Wallenberg för spionage. 46)

I ett memorandum som den svenske ambassadören i Moskva Rolf Sohlman överlämnade till vice utrikesminister Zorin den 29 september 1954 framgår att också svenska UD kommit fram till att ryska polisen kan ha misstänkt Wallenberg för att ha uppträtt som spion. Ambassadören redovisade tre omständigheter som möjligen kunde ha gett upphov till ryssarnas misstänksamhet mot Wallenberg:

- ⇒ Den svenska B-avdelningen på legationen i Budapest hade också hand om skyddet av vissa ryska krigsfångar. För att identifiera dessa utfrågades de om namn, hemvist och vilka militära förband de kan ha tillhört. Denna utfrågning kan möjligen av den ryska polisen ha uppfattats som försök att utröna militära hemligheter. Syftet med utfrågningen var inte detta och Wallenberg var inte inblandad i dessa frågor.
- ⇒ Wallenberg utfärdade skyddspass för att hjälpa personer som tyskarna utsatte för rasförföljelse. Många av dessa pass hade stulits eller överlåtits från de ursprungliga innehavarna och på så sätt kommit i händerna på nazister och pilkorsare. När ryska polisen påträffade sådana pass hos dessa kunde den ryska polisen fått den felaktiga uppfattningen att Wallenberg skyddade fascistiska element.
- ⇒ Den ryska polisen kan ha haft svårt att tro på berättelsen om Wallenbergs humanitära verksamhet. Den kan ha trott att Wallenberg hade några andra hemliga syften. Den omständigheten, att amerikanska judar delvis finansierat hjälpaktionen för de ungerska judarna, kan av den ryska polisen uppfattats som bevis för att Wallenberg "spionerat" för amerikansk räkning. 47)

- ◆ *Wallenbergs räddningsaktion i Budapest ingick som en del i en storpolitisk sammansvärjning mot Sovjetunionen.* Bakom denna sammansvärjning stod både nazisterna och de kapitalistiska makterna i Europa och USA. Räddningsaktionen var en täckmantel för tyska försök att diskutera en ensidig kapitulation i väst. 48)

Denna teori har framförts av historikern Bernt Schiller i sin bok "Varför ryssarna tog Raoul Wallenberg". Han skriver: "Genom de ryska glasögonen framträder en vrångbild av Raoul Wallenberg som en person som på amerikanskt uppdrag utnyttjade humanitärt arbete för att samarbeta med tyskarna mot Sovjet". 49) Även den polske historikern Artur Eisenbach har framfört liknande synpunkter: "Raoul Wallenberg var agent för USA. WRBs sk humanitära verksamhet tjänade som en täckmantel för de verkliga amerikanska målen att föra förhandlingar med tyskarna riktade mot Sovjetunionen". 50)

Bernt Schiller tror att ryssarna var mycket misstänksamma mot Wallenberg eftersom han var utsänd av amerikanarna, samtidigt som han hade kontakter med det tyska nazistpartiets elitstyrka SS. De hade också svårt att förstå att ett neutralt land som Sverige kunde engagera sig i en räddningsaktion för judarna i Ungern. Ännu mer misstänksamma blev

ryssarna av att tyskarna tolererat Wallenbergs verksamhet. 51)

Även Per Anger framför i en intervju i Svenska Dagbladet den 15 januari 1995 ungefär liknande synpunkter: "Jag tror att ryssarna tog honom för en spion. En svensk som med amerikanska pengar räddar judar - nej. KGB misstänkte nog att hans mission var svepskäl för något annat. Enbart namnet Wallenberg var ju, enligt rysk syn, detsamma som "en folkets fiende". När de sedan läste i hans anteckningsbok om en middag med Eichmann och möten med andra tyska potentater blev de naturligtvis än mer misstänksamma. Det ena gav det andra. Snart kom prestige in och väven av lögnar blev allt tätare." 52)

- ♦ *Wallenberg greps för att användas för utpressning mot finansfamiljen Wallenberg för att få fram pengar till Sovjetunionens uppbyggnad.*

Stalins spionchef Sudoplatov skriver i sin bok "Direktoratet, Stalins spionchef berättar" att gripandet av Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest inte var slumpmässigt. Stalin och hans utrikesminister Molotov ville kunna utöva utpressning mot familjen Wallenberg; de ville använda familjens kontakter för att nå fördelaktiga uppgörelser med väst. Stalin ville få Wallenberg rekryterad för att hjälpa till med att samla in det kapital Stalin med "judefrågan" som bete hoppades kunna få fram för att återuppbygga Sovjetunionen efter kriget.

Kutuzov, en rysk emigrant i Budapest, arbetade på Röda korsets kontor och observerade där Raoul Wallenbergs agerande. Han rapporterade att Wallenberg samarbetade med den tyska underrättelsetjänsten. I det mycket riskabla arbete med att befria judar var det nödvändigt för Wallenberg att ha täta kontakter med tyska säkerhetsofficerare. Men Kutuzov tolkade detta som om Wallenberg spelade dubbelspel. Därmed skulle Wallenberg ha givit ryssarna en chans att tvångsrekrytera honom som agent: Gör gemensam sak med oss eller bli avslöjad som tysk agent. Det var så man måste ha planerat att rekrytera Wallenberg för att få hans familj att samarbeta med Sovjetunionens representanter i Skandinavien. 53)

Självklart är det inte lätt att veta exakt varför Wallenberg greps av ryssarna. Efter att ha läst många böcker tror jag att det ligger mycket i teorin att ryssarna betraktade honom som en spion antingen för USA eller Tyskland eller för båda länderna. De betraktade honom som en bricka i ett större spel som var riktat mot Sovjetunionen. Ryssarna var misstänksamma mot Wallenberg. Det kanske blev så att Raoul Wallenberg blev det första offret i det Kalla kriget mellan Sovjetunionen och Västmakterna som följde efter andra världskriget.

7. VAD GJORDE SVERIGE DE FÖRSTA ÅREN?

Det första beskedet som Sverige fick om vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg kom i form av en skrivelse från vice utrikeskommissarien Dekanosov till svenske ministern i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom. Dekanosov skrev:

"Enligt meddelande från Budapest har i den av sovjettrupperna erövrade delen av staden vid Benczurgatan påträffats svenske undersåten herr Raoul Wallenberg, som uppgav sig vara den sekreterare vid svenska beskickningen i Ungern, varom Ni underrättat mig i Edert brev av den 31 december förra året. Enligt uppgift av herr R. Wallenberg befinna sig övriga

medlemmar av svenska beskickningen i stadens västra del. Åtgärder till skydd av herr R. Wallenberg och dennes egendom hava vidtagits av de sovjetiska militärmyndigheterna." 54)

7.1 Svenskarna inte oroliga, i början...

Med anledning av detta meddelande fick svenska UD intrycket att Wallenberg var i säkerhet och man var inte orolig för hans öde. Däremot var man inom UD mycket orolig för vad som hänt de övriga på den svenska legationen i Budapest. Detta framgår bl a i UD:s telegram den 17 februari 1945 till konsulatet i Wien, där det sägs att "Wallenberg vore i säkerhet sedan en månad tillbaka men att varje underrättelse beträffande de övriga saknades". 55)

Även Raoul Wallenbergs mamma, Maj von Dardel, fick försäkringar om att hon inte behövde vara orolig för sin son. Den sovjetiske ambassadören i Sverige, Madame Kollontay, sa till Raouls mamma att hon inte skulle oroa sig. "Såvitt jag har fått veta befinner sig er son väl. Han kommer hem snart igen."

Madame Kollontay inbjöd också Ingrid Günther, fru till den svenske utrikesministern, till te i sitt residens. Vid detta tillfälle försäkrade hon ännu en gång att Wallenberg befann sig väl och stod under sovjetiskt beskydd. 56)

Den 15 mars underrättades UD om att den ungerska Kossuth-radion en vecka tidigare tillkännagivit att Wallenberg troligen hade mördats av agenter från tyska Gestapo. Den 23 mars fick UD meddelande från den svenska beskickningen i Bukarest om att den svenske ministern Danielsson och ytterligare personal från den svenska legationen i Budapest anlänt till Rumänien. Sedan UD fått veta vad övrig personal befann sig men inte fått ytterligare underrättelse om Wallenberg började departementet att vända sig till de sovjetiska myndigheterna. Bl a telegraferade UD den 27 mars till beskickningen i Moskva "att det i anslutning till meddelandet om Danielssons m. fl. ankomst till Rumänien vore särskilt angeläget erhålla upplysningar om Wallenberg". 57)

7.2 Hur agerade UD och ambassaden i Moskva?

Inte förrän den 21 april 1945, dvs mer än tre månader efter det att Sverige fått en försäkran om att Wallenberg omhändertagits av de sovjetiska militärmyndigheterna, fick den svenske ministern i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom en definitiv instruktion att uppsöka Dekanosov och begära att de ryska militärmyndigheterna skulle göra en noggrann undersökning av vad som hänt Wallenberg. 58)

Söderblom tog under den närmaste tiden vid flera tillfällen upp frågan med ryssarna om Wallenbergs ärende. Även om han gjorde detta kan man samtidigt konstatera att han vid olika tillfällen verkade tvivla på att ryssarna skulle sitta inne med förklaringarna. Hans agerande vid ett par tillfällen tyder på detta:

⇒ I ett telegram till UD den 24 april skrev Söderblom:

"Wallenberg, som var dödsdömd av pilkorsarna och tyskarna, smög på eget initiativ över till ryssarna. Så snart han anträffades fick jag officiell underrättelse. Därefter synes Wallenberg ha avrest med bil till Debreczen och befaras ha omkommit under resan. Olika teorier finnas: bilolycka (mycket sannolikt), rån-mord, bakhåll av pilkorsare etc. Jag fruktar att klarhet aldrig vinnes." 59)

⇒ Den 6 juli skrev Söderblom att han "på uppgiven grund - ryktet om att Wallenberg skulle i 'säker' förklädning vistas i Buda - ansåge sig icke böra tillsvidare företaga något i saken." Detta föranledde dock UD att skriva till honom att detta inte borde "föranleda Söderblom till passivitet". 60)

Det finns också andra saker som har diskuterats om Söderbloms agerande och som tyder på att den svenska beskickningen i Moskva inte drev Wallenbergärendet tillräckligt energiskt:

- ♦ Amerikanerna visade under våren 1945 intresse för vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg. Den 4 april 1945 telegraferade den amerikanske ministern i Stockholm Herschel Johnson till UD i Washington om Raoul Wallenbergärendet. Med anledning av detta telegram sände State Department och WRB den 9 april ett telegram till den amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman: "Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta, om ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde. Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern."

Ambassadör Harriman rapporterade några dagar senare hem till Washington: "Svenskarna säger, att de icke har någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anser att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd." 61)

- ♦ I juni 1946, strax innan Staffan Söderblom skulle sluta sin tjänst i Moskva begärde han en avskedsaudiens hos den sovjetiske diktatorn Josef Stalin. Under detta samtal framförde Söderblom som sin personliga uppfattning att han var övertygad om att Wallenberg fallit offer för en trafikolycka eller ett rånöverfall. Genom detta uttalande kan Söderblom gett Stalin en chans att bekräfta en sådan teori och att Sverige skulle nöja sig med ett sådant uttalande. 62) Långt senare uttalade den svenske statsministern Tage Erlander i en intervju i dagens tryneter bl a: "Det hade varit bättre om samtalet i Kreml mellan svenske Moskva-ambassadören Staffan Söderblom och Josef Stalin aldrig förts. Det var ett farligt samtal som kunde ha varit ödesdigert." 63)

- ♦ Sverige begärde inte att ryssarna skulle lämna ut Raoul Wallenberg till Sverige. Som riksdagsledamoten Ingrid Gärde-Widemar påpekade i en debatt i den svenska riksdagen gjorde man inte detta trots att man från svensk sida redan i januari 1945 hade kvitto från vice utrikeskommissarien Dekanosov på att Wallenberg omhändertagits av ryssarna. 64)

I så gott som alla böcker och tidskriftsartiklar jag läst finns det kritik mot att Sverige och inte minst ministern Staffan Söderblom inte agerat tillräckligt aktivt. Ett par av dessa kritiska röster är:

- * Per Anger, en kollega till Wallenberg, skriver i sin bok "Med Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest": "Det bristande engagemang och den flathet som karakteriserade svenska regeringens handlande under efterkrigsåren kan knappast ha undgått att påverka den ryska attityden. Det finns all anledning att tro att ett kraftigare agerande från svensk sida ifrån början hade lett till Wallenbergs frigivande, i varje fall om, som tidigare nämnts, en utväxling föreslagits med någon i Sverige ertappad Sovjetspion. Man får mellan raderna känslan av att även ryssarna väntat sig ett förslag i dylik riktning från Sverige. Dessa är de

förlorade åren i Wallenbergärendet. Men det borde även senare ha funnits och alltjämt finnas möjligheter, ehuru inte lika stora, att sätta hårt mot hårt för att återfå Wallenberg eller vinna klarhet om hans öde. 65)

- * I en intervju i Östgöta-Correspondenten framhöll förre rikspolischefen Carl Persson: "Politiker på den svenska sidan var så till den grad flata att det säkert är en förklaring till att Stalin kunde göra vad han ville med Wallenberg. Sverige trodde på allt ryssarna sa, man drev inte på i frågan när Wallenberg fortfarande kunde ha räddats."

Han är också kritisk mot den svenska regeringens agerande när Sverige 1966, via en kontakt i Berlin, erbjöds en utväxling av spionen Stig Wennerström mot Wallenberg. Persson ville utreda möjligheterna, men regeringen under Tage Erlander vägrade att ens låta polisen undersöka om det fanns någon verklighet bakom erbjudandet. 66)

Rolf Karlbom tillhör dem som inte är lika kritiska mot den svenske ambassadören Staffan Söderblom. Karlbom anser visserligen att Söderblom i sina rapporter gärna anlade en prosovjetisk attityd. Han var dock inte den ende som framförde spekulationer att Wallenberg kunde ha omkommit i en olycka. Det gjorde t ex också militärattachén Bennedich.

Karlbon anser också att det är missvisande att påstå att Söderbloms samtal med Stalin i juni 1946 skulle ha fördröjt efterforskningarna. Han tycker istället att det tvärtom förefaller klart att månaderna december 1946 och januari 1947 tillhör de få aktiva skedena i de sovjetiska myndigheternas behandling av Wallenbergaffären. 67)

Envoyé Arne Lundberg framhöll i en radiokommentar i Dagens eko den 7 februari 1957 att enligt hans uppfattning hade det inte varit möjligt "att genom ytterligare intensitet i efterspaningarna och démarcherna på ett tidigt stadium uppnå Wallenbergs hemsändande eller åtminstone ett klarläggande från den ryska regeringens sida. Min personliga uppfattning är, att under Stalins tid föga utsikter fanns att från Sovjetunionen återfå en fånge, som anklagades för spioneri. Inga länder, inte ens stormakterna, har haft framgång i sådana företag. ... Det var först med regimskiftet efter Stalins död och den allmänna omläggningen av politiken i fråga om utländska fångar, som utsikterna började te sig åtminstone något ljusare att kunna nå klarhet om vissa intressanta fångars öde." 68)

7.3 Svenska opinionen trycker på

Under 1946 och 1947 började den svenska opinionen mer och mer ställa frågor om vad som hänt Wallenberg och svenska regeringen tryckte därför vid flera tillfällen på ryssarna för att få besked om vad de sovjetiska myndigheterna kommit fram till vid sina undersökningar. Först den 18 augusti 1947 kom svaret från vice utrikesminister Vysjinskij. Han framhöll att noggranna undersökningar och efterforskningar inte hade lett till något positivt resultat. Wallenberg fanns inte i Sovjetunionen och han var okänd för dem. Han förde istället fram en förmodan om att "Wallenberg under striderna i staden Budapest omkommit eller blivit tillfångatagen av Szalasis anhängare". 69)

Elsa och Hans Villius sammanfattar i sin bok "Fallet Raoul Wallenberg" det svenska agerandet under perioden från Dekanosovs skrivelse den 16 januari 1945 till Vysjinskij's not den 18 augusti 1947, som kan sägas vara den första fasen i Wallenbergärendet, på följande sätt: "Ser man på den som helhet ger den inte intryck av svensk inaktivitet men väl ineffektivitet. Det

görs ett antal hänvändelser, inte så få, men saken drivs inte med någon energi. Tönen i de svenska förfrågningarna är älskvärd, inga krav ställs, långt mindre uttalas något hot om svenska motåtgärder av något slag." 70)

8. VAD GJORDE SVERIGE 1947-1957?

Beskedet från Vysjinskij att Wallenberg inte finns i Sovjetunionen och att han var okänd för ryssarna var självfallet ett hårt slag för Wallenbergs familj och övriga engagerade på den svenska sidan. Från denna tidpunkt inställdes under nära fem år praktiskt taget alla ansträngningar från svensk officiell sida att få klarhet om Wallenbergs öde. 71) Det var först den 11 februari 1952, sju år efter Raouls arrestering, som den svenska regeringen för första gången krävde att "Sovjetunionens regering vidtager de för Wallenbergs snara återförande till Sverige erforderliga åtgärderna". 72)

Något som bidrog till Sveriges nya framstöt till ryssarna var att Arne Lundberg tillträtt som kabinetssekreterare på UD 1951. Med stor energi drev han frågan vidare och det hölls många förhör med hemvändande fångar. Dessutom hade den italienske diplomaten Claudio de Mohr berättat att han suttit i Lefortovskajafängelset samtidigt med Wallenberg så sent som 1948 och där stått i knackningsförbindelse med honom. 73)

Den svenska noten till Sovjetunionen besvarades med att sovjetmyndigheterna inte förfogade över några ytterligare uppgifter om Raoul Wallenbergs öde utöver de som redovisats i svaret från Vysjinskij i augusti 1947. Det innebar att ryssarna förnekade att Wallenberg fanns i Sovjetunionen och att han var okänd för dem. 74)

Utrikesdepartementet fick under följande åren flera uppgifter som pekade på att Wallenberg under en längre tid suttit i fängelse i Moskva. Ett stort antal samstämmiga uppgifter lämnades från olika personer. En av de viktigaste uppgiftslämnarna var tysken Gustav Richter som under våren 1955 och de första månaderna 1956 bearbetades uppgifterna ytterligare och de båda justitieråden Rudolf Eklund och Erik Lind kom fram till att de enligt deras mening "ej föreligger något tvivel om att Raoul Wallenberg, efter det han i mitten av januari 1945 ställts under effektivt ryskt förvar, senare befunnit sig som fånge i Sovjetunionen, och att det återopade materialet enligt svensk rätt innefattar bindande bevisning därom". 75)

8.1 En vändpunkt

I samband med att statsminister Tage Erlander och inrikesminister Gunnar Hedlund besökte Moskva i april 1956 inträffade en vändpunkt i Wallenbergärendet. Den ryska regeringen lovade då att göra en omfattande utredning om Wallenbergs öde och att resultaten av den skulle meddelas den svenska regeringen. 76)

Den sovjetiska regeringens svar lämnades av vice utrikesminister Gromyko den 6 februari 1957. I svaret meddelade ryssarna att det påträffats ett dokument undertecknat av chefen för sjukvårdstjänsten i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset, Smoltsov. Av detta dokument framgår att Wallenberg skulle ha avlidit den 17 juli 1947, förmodligen till följd av en hjärtinfarkt. På rapporten fanns också en anteckning: "Har personligen underrättat ministern. Order har givits om likets kremering utan obduktion. 17.7 Smoltsov." 77)

I det ryska beskedet hänvisades till att chefen för ryska säkerhetstjänsten Abakumov tidigare hade lämnat det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet oriktiga upplysningar. Man meddelade också att Abakumov avrättats i samband med upprepningar inom säkerhetspolisen efter Stalins död. 78)

En intressant iakttagelse är att det finns ett märkligt parallellfall till Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande och som skildras i de dokument som UD släppte fria 1982. Det gäller Österrikes sändebud i Prag, dr Marek, som i maj 1945 försvann tillsammans med ryska officerare. Först efter det att olika bevis redovisats erkände Sovjets regering att dr Marek funnits i sovjetiska fängelser, men sände samtidigt en dödsattest som skulle visa att dr Marek avlidit i maj 1947 av hjärtfel. Samma omständigheter vid försvinnandet, samma dödsår och samma dödsorsak som Raoul Wallenberg... 79)

8.2 Skarpare ton från svenskarna

Efter ryssarnas besked i februari 1957 började svenskarna använda en betydligt skarpare ton än vad man gjort tidigare. Bl a framhölls: "Om den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten kunnat handla så egenmäktigt, att den gjort ett neutralt lands diplomatiska tjänsteman till fånge och hållit honom i fängelse under 2,5 år utan att rapportera därom till sovjetregeringen eller till utrikesministeriet, så är detta i och för sig ett förhållande för vilket sovjetregeringen icke kan avlasta sig ansvaret. Genom sitt beklagande har sovjetregeringen också erkänt sitt ansvar. Härtill kommer att så länge Wallenberg var internerad i ett fängelse i Moskva, sovjetregeringen icke kan ha varit ur stånd att i anledning av de många demarscherna från svensk sida skaffa sig tillförlitliga upplysningar i saken, ifall den hade verkställt de noggranna undersökningar, som den försäkrat svenska regeringen upprepade gånger att den företagit." 80)

Om man jämför hur Sverige agerade fram till 1947 och hur Sverige agerade från 1950-talets början finns det stora skillnader. Elsa och Hans Villius konstaterar: "Regeringen har, trots den irritation man kunnat räkna med på sovjetisk sida och den belastning ärendet varit för de svensksovjetiska förbindelserna, drivit saken vidare. Kritiken mot handläggningen har heller inte varit av samma omfattning eller skärpa som tidigare. 81)

9. EFTER 1957

Den svenska regeringens reaktion på det ryska beskedet att Wallenberg skulle ha avlidit i juli 1947 var att den hade svårt att förstå att det inte skulle finnas fler dokument om Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser. Svenska regeringen förbehöll sig också rätten att överlämna ytterligare material om Wallenberg som kunde vara betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

I samband med att UD i september 1965 redovisade en dokumentsamling om efterforskningarna efter 1957 framhöll statsminister Tage Erlander: "Under de år som förflutit sedan dess har vi fullföljt våra efterforskningar och ansträngningar. Vi har inte lämnat något spår oprövat, hur svagt det än må ha synt. Vi har begagnat alla tillfällen att på diplomatisk väg eller genom personliga kontakter ta upp frågan. En intensiv prövning av allt material och ingående interna överväganden har hela tiden ägt rum." 82)

Efter utrikesnämndens möte den 1 oktober 1965 uttalade statsminister Tage Erlander i en kommuniké bl a att "i dagens läge synes man inte kunna komma längre genom framställningar

till den sovjetiska regeringen". Samtidigt framhölls dock att nya omständigheter och upplysningar skulle kunna motivera ytterligare åtgärder och att regeringen skulle följa frågan med stor uppmärksamhet. 83)

9.1 Många kontakter med ryssarna

De svenska påtryckningarna på Sovjetunionen under åren 1957-1965 har framför allt byggt på två olika vittnesmål:

⇒ Många uppgifter framkom om att Wallenberg under 1950-talet skulle ha befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir. Kontakter togs med hemvändande krigsfångar från Sovjetunionen som kunde tänka sig ha befunnit sig i Vladimir under denna tid.

⇒ På nyåret 1961 framkom ett vittnesmål från en svensk läkare, professor Nanna Svartz som besökt Sovjetunionen för att föreläsa om sina forskningsresultat. Hon hade då samtalat med en framstående sovjetisk vetenskapsman. Han hade då upplyst henne om att Wallenberg var i livet och befann sig på ett sinnessjukhus i Moskva. 84)

Nanna Svartz skriver i sin självbiografi Steg för steg: "Det råder inte något tvivel om att Wallenberg var i livet i januari 1961. Det tidigare meddelandet om att han skulle ha dött i myokardinfarkt 1947 är tvivelsutan oriktigt." 85)

Svenska regeringen tog upp Wallenbergärendet vid olika tillfällen, bl a vid samtal med ministerpresident Chrustjov sommaren 1964 och ministerpresident Kosygin i juni 1965. Statsrådet Ulla Lindström berättar i sin bok "Och regeringen satt kvar!" att Chrustjov vid sitt statsbesök i Sverige blev han utomordentligt upprörd när svenskarna tog upp frågan om Raoul Wallenberg. Han fick "näst intill ett vredesutbrott". Hade han anat att frågan skulle tas upp skulle han aldrig kommit till Sverige. Skulle han behöva ställas till räkenskap här för vad som hände under Stalin-tiden? 86)

Även Tage Erlander har i sina memoarer redovisat att Nikita Chrustjov blev mycket irriterad över att den svenska regeringen fortsatte sin aktivitet i Wallenbergaffären. Vid sitt besök i Sverige 1964 framhöll Chrustjov att den svenska regeringen borde förstå att den sovjetiska regeringen gjort allt för att få klarhet i vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg. När Erlander under sitt besök i Moskva 1965 tog upp ärendet med ministerpresident Kosygin fick han samma svar som av Chrustjov fast i kyligare och strävar ordalag. 87)

De svenska ansträngningarna ledde inte till några framsteg. Sovjetledningen hävdade bestämt att Raoul Wallenberg inte fanns i Sovjetunionen - varken i fängelse, på sjukhus eller på någon annan plats. Den vidhöll att inget material fanns angående Wallenberg utöver den korta anteckning om hans död år 1947 som svenska regeringen fick del av i det ryska beskedet 1957. Man sa sig ha vidtagit upprepade nya undersökningar men att det inte hade kommit fram något nytt. Man förklarade att Wallenberg aldrig funnits i Vladimir och att den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannens uttalande till Svartz missuppfattats. Man framhöll att det inte fanns något som helst skäl varför Sovjetunionen skulle kvarhålla Wallenberg, i vilket tillstånd han än befann sig, och hänvisade till alla de krigsfångar och andra som fått återvända från Sovjetunionen under senare år. 88)

9.2 Ökat intresse från USA

Under 1970-talet ökade intresset för de mänskliga rättigheterna och var bl a en viktig del i USA:s utrikespolitik. Många amerikanska politiker engagerade sig i Raoul Wallenbergs öde och president Jimmy Carter tog t.o.m. upp frågan om Raoul Wallenberg vid ett toppmöte med statschefen Bresjnev. Det bildades också Wallenberg-kommittéer över hela världen.

9.3 Större öppenhet, rysk-svensk kommission

När Michail Gorbatjov kom till makten i Sovjetunionen på slutet av 1980-talet började den nya öppenheten glasnost göra sig märkbar också när det gällde fallet Raoul Wallenberg. Medierna i Sovjetunionen tog upp Raoul Wallenbergs öde och Raouls halvsyskon Nina Lagergren och Guy von Dardel inbjöds tillsammans med Per Anger till Moskva. De fick där av företrädare för KGB (ryska säkerhetspolisen) ta emot en del av Raouls personliga ägodelar och som enligt KGB bara en kort tid dessförinnan återfunnits i en säck i KGB:s arkiv. 89)

Sedan 1991 arbetar en svensk -rysk kommission med att få fram sanningen om vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg. I en intervju i DN den 15 januari 1995 berättar f d rikspolischefen Carl Persson, som är en av de fyra svenskarna i Wallenberg-kommissionen, om hur man försöker få fram nya fakta. "Ryssarna forskar i olika arkiv åt oss, bl a dåvarande KGB:s. De försöker få fram svar på de frågor vi ställer. Vi har till exempel fått fram en namnteckning, som varit överstruken med tusch, i en förhørsjournal. Däremot har intervjuer med personer som borde veta något, mest gamla KGB-officerare, inte gett så mycket som väntat." 90)

I en annan intervju i tidningen Östgöta-Correspondenten den 14 januari 1995 hoppas Carl Persson fortfarande att hitta lösningen på gåtan Raoul Wallenberg. Han framhåller: "Sovjet har varit en fulländad byråkrati och arkiven är i mycket noggrann ordning. Så jag tror att i något arkiv, någonstans, finns det avgörande uppgifter om vad som hände Wallenberg. Jag hade hoppats mycket på Stalins privata arkiv, men det är bara en person som får söka där och han har inte hittat något, konstigt nog. För Stalin kände till frågan och där borde ännu finnas dokument. I sådana fall är det säkert topphemliga uppgifter med namn på dem som varit ansvariga för en eventuell avrättning med mera." Han fortsätter: "Det väsentliga är att nå sanningen och fortfarande finns det folk från den här tiden som lever. Dessvärre är de fortfarande lojala mot KGB, den organisation de gav sina liv till, och hävdar att de inget vet. Däribland finns en man som genomförde det sista kända förhöret med Wallenberg." 91)

Trots stora ansträngningar har det ännu inte lyckats att med säkerhet klarlägga Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Arbetet med att ta reda på detta fortsätter dock och kanske kan man i de ryska arkiven finna pusselbitar som bidrar till att komma närmare lösningen. Ryssarnas besked är dock fortfarande att Raoul Wallenberg avled i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i juli 1947.

10. SLUTSATSER OCH AVSLUTANDE KOMMENTARER

Det har skrivits mängder av böcker och artiklar om Raoul Wallenberg och hans öde. Själv har jag läst åtskilliga sidor och spaltmetrar för att få en bild av hur historiker, politiker och andra intresserade ser på frågan. Inte helt oväntat finns det många teorier om varför Wallenbergs verksamhet i Budapest väckte en sådan uppmärksamhet och varför han greps av ryssarna i januari 1945. Jag konstaterar också att det finns olika uppfattningar om hur svenska myndigheter har skött Wallenberg-ärendet och vad som hänt Wallenberg.

10.1 Raouls erfarenheter gjorde honom lämplig för arbetet i Budapest

När jag läst om Raoul Wallenbergs barndom och ungdom har jag förstått att han uppfostrats att bli något utöver det vanliga, inte någon "Medelsvensson". Det är kanske heller inte så förvånande eftersom han tillhörde den kända finanssläkten Wallenberg. Jag är övertygad om att de erfarenheter som Raoul skaffade sig under barndomen, studietiden och i sina tjänster på olika företag gjorde honom mycket lämplig att få det uppdrag i Budapest som gjorde att han gick till historien. Det var kanske inte bara slumpen som gjorde att just han fick åka till Budapest, det var kanske inte bara för att amerikanska legationen i Stockholm och Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB hade sina kontor i samma hus på Strandvägen 7A.

10.2 Raouls insatser i Budapest

Under den korta tid som Raoul Wallenberg verkade i Budapest lyckades han och hans medarbetare under svåra omständigheter genomföra en enastående humanitär gärning. Med risk för sina egna liv lyckades de rädda tiotusentals judar undan förintelsen. I det anförande som statsminister Ingvar Carlsson höll i Sveriges riksdag i januari 1995, på 50-årsdagen av Raoul Wallenbergs gripande i Budapest, poängterade han bl a vilken svår uppgift som Raoul Wallenberg ställdes inför. Samtidigt konstaterade Ingvar Carlsson: "Han växte med sin uppgift på ett sätt som gjort honom till en symbol för den enskilda människans kamp för humanitet, mänskliga rättigheter och en bättre värld. Hans insats för att hindra nazismens onda krafter att fullfölja judeutrotningen visade prov på en oerhörd styrka." 92)

När jag läst olika böcker har jag dock förstått att det också fanns de som var kritiska till den verksamhet som Wallenberg bedrev. En del av dessa kritiker fanns på den svenska legationen och de var framför allt bekymrade över att det blev inflation i antalet skyddspapper. De kom i orätta händer, bl a hos nazister och pilkorsare.

10.3 Varför greps Wallenberg?

Vid jultiden 1944 omringades Budapest av ryssarna och den 13 januari 1945 besatte ryssarna den del av Benczurgatan där Wallenberg höll till. Det finns många teorier om varför ryssarna grep Wallenberg. Många av dessa bygger på att ryssarna misstänkte att Raoul Wallenberg var spion och sysslade med underrättelseverksamhet. Några av teorierna är:

- Ryssarna trodde att Wallenberg bedrev spionage för tyskarna och var tyskvänlig
- Ryssarna trodde att Wallenberg bedrev spionage för amerikanarna
- Wallenbergs räddningsaktion i Budapest ingick som en del i en storpolitisk sammansvärjning mot Sovjetunionen och där både nazisterna och de kapitalistiska makterna i Europa samarbetade mot Sovjetunionen. Räddningsaktionen var en täckmantel för tyska försök att diskutera en ensidig kapitulation i väst.

Det finns också andra teorier, bl a har Stalins spionchef Sudoplatov fört fram teorin att Sovjetunionen ville använda finansfamiljen Wallenbergs kontakter för att få fram pengar för att återuppbygga Sovjetunionen efter kriget.

Självklart är det inte lätt att veta exakt varför Wallenberg greps av ryssarna. Själv tror jag dock att det ligger mycket i teorin att ryssarna betraktade honom som en spion, antingen för USA eller Tyskland eller för båda länderna. De betraktade hans verksamhet som en bricka i ett större spel som var riktat mot Sovjetunionen. Ryssarna var misstänksamma mot Wallenberg. Det kanske blev så att Raoul Wallenberg blev det första offret i Kalla kriget mellan Sovjetunionen och Västmakterna som följde efter andra världskriget.

10.4 Varför var svenskarna så passiva i början. Många frågetecken...

Det första beskedet som Sverige fick om vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg kom den 16 januari 1945 i en skrivelse till svenske ministern i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom. Den ryske utrikeskommissarien Dekanosov meddelade då att Raoul Wallenberg påträffats vid Benzcurgatan i Budapest och att de sovjetiska militärmyndigheterna vidtagit åtgärder för att skydda Wallenberg och hans egendom. Svenska UD fick då intrycket av att han var i säkerhet och man var inte orolig för hans säkerhet. Det var först i slutet på mars 1945 som svenskarna började bli aktiva för att få fram uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg. Det dröjde dock till den 21 april 1945, dvs mer än tre månader efter det att Sverige fått en försäkran om att Wallenberg omhändertagits av de sovjetiska militärmyndigheterna, innan den svenske ministern i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom fick en definitiv instruktion att begära att de ryska militärmyndigheterna skulle göra en noggrann undersökning av vad som hänt Wallenberg.

Det är självklart lätt att med facit i handen vara kritisk mot hur passiva svenskarna och inte minst Staffan Söderblom var under den första tiden efter det att Wallenberg tagits om hand av ryssarna. Trots detta tycker jag att man verkligen kan fråga sig varför Staffan Söderblom och svenska UD inte gjorde mer, för att i ett tidigt skede, få tillbaka Wallenberg till Sverige. Jag tycker att man, precis som många framfört i böcker och tidningsartiklar, kan ställa en hel del kritiska frågor:

- ⇒ Varför dröjde det tre månader innan svenskarna på allvar började driva på att få besked om Wallenbergs öde? Liksom i många andra fall gäller det ju att "smida medan järnet är varmt" och eventuella heta spår blir ju lätt kalla. Är det inte ungefär som Palme-mordet, där är inte lätt att reparera de fel man gjort i första skedet?
- ⇒ Varför begärde inte Sverige att få Wallenberg utlämnad till Sverige redan i början på 1945, då man fått ett kvitto från ryssarna att Wallenberg omhändertagits i Budapest? Varför dröjde man med detta till den 11 februari 1952, sju år efter Wallenbergs arrestering? Hur kunde man låta bli att begära att få en av sina diplomater utlämnade?
- ⇒ Varför nappade svenskarna inte på amerikanarnas erbjudande i april 1945 att hjälpa till med att få besked om Wallenbergs öde?
- ⇒ Varför utnyttjade Sverige inte möjligheterna att få Wallenberg utväxlad mot någon spion i Sverige?
- ⇒ Varför dröjde det till juni 1946 innan svenskarna tog upp frågan med Stalin, den högste makthavaren i Sovjetunionen?

Min uppfattning är alltså att svenskarna och framförallt ambassadör Staffan Söderblom var mycket passiva. Det framgår också av olika uttalanden som Söderblom gjorde. Det verkar som om han inte trodde att det fanns mycket att göra och att det inte skulle kunna gå att få klarhet i

hans öde. Samtidigt är det kanske lätt att glömma bort den situation som rådde vid den här tiden. Sverige var kanske väldigt rädda för stormakten i öst och diktatorn Josef Stalin. Det verkade som om man aktade sig noga för att stöta sig med ryssarna. Kanske trodde man att man skulle nå bäst resultat med tyst diplomati.

I augusti 1947 meddelade ryssarna att de inte funnit Wallenberg och att han var okänd för dem. Det verkade då som om "luften gick ur svenskarna". Det var först på 1950-talet som Sverige började agera mera bestämt mot ryssarna för att få besked om Wallenbergs öde. I februari 1957 kom så ett meddelande från ryssarna att de hittat ett dokument där det framgick att Wallenberg skulle ha avlidit den 17 juli 1947 förmodligen till följd av en hjärtinfarkt i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset. Efter detta besked började svenskarna använda en betydligt skarpare ton än vad man gjort tidigare. Inte minst under åren 1957-1965 tryckte svenskarna på för att få besked men resultaten av dessa ansträngningar blev tyvärr negativa. Sovjetledningen hävdade bestämt att Wallenberg inte fanns i Sovjetunionen - varken i fängelse, på sjukhus eller på någon annan plats. Detta har ryssarna hållit fast vid även efter det att det trätt fram många vittnen som berättat om Raoul Wallenberg och att han skulle vara vid liv långt efter 1947.

10.5 Den nya öppenheten, glasnost, ger nya möjligheter

När Michail Gorbatsjov kom till makten i Sovjetunionen i slutet av 1980-talet, började den nya öppenheten, glasnost, göra sig märkbar också när det gäller fallet Raoul Wallenberg. En följd av detta är att sedan 1991 arbetar en svensk-rysk kommission med att få fram sanningen om vad som hänt Raoul Wallenberg. Förhoppningsvis borde det i de ryska arkiven finnas en hel del dokument som innehåller pusselbitar som kan föra fallet Raoul Wallenberg närmare sin lösning. Vad som möjligen kan oroa är att den gamla generationen "efterforskare" snart försvinner. Ett generationsskifte bland "spårhundarna" kan dock också vara positivt - nya oförbrukade krafter kan se på frågan med nya ögon.

10.6 Raoul Wallenberg - ett föredöme

Jag tycker att det finns all anledning att instämma i förre statsminister Ingvar Carlssons tal i Sveriges riksdag på 50-årsdagen av Raoul Wallenbergs gripande i Budapest:

"Raoul Wallenberg lämnade ingen möda ospard för att rädda människoliv i Ungern 1944 och 1945. Vi får heller inte lämna någon möda ospard när det gäller att skapa fullständig klarhet i hans öde. I detta arbete ska vi hålla Raoul Wallenbergs humanitära mission levande och hålla fram den som ett föredöme också i framtidens värld".

Jag vill gärna avsluta mitt specialarbete med ytterligare två citat:

- Kabinettssekreterare Jan Eliasson på UD konstaterar i förordet till boken "Räddningen Budapest 1944. Rapporter ur UD:s arkiv":
"Raoul Wallenbergs gärning, både i Sverige och internationellt framträder som ett exempel på vad en enskild människa kan åstadkomma för att värna om liv och mänsklig värdighet." 93)
- Den sovjetiske nobelpristagaren och en av dem som kämpat hårdast för de mänskliga fri- och rättigheterna, Andrej Sacharov, har sagt:
"Jag betraktar Raoul Wallenberg som en av de personer under 1900-talet till vilken hela mänskligheten står i stor skuld och som man bör vara stolt över". 94)

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- 35) Schiller, 1991, s 14
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1999-03-23

Aambs A. Wallberg

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Enl

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

EC

Kopia: rekryfax amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

kryfax amb Riga 1993-03-14, punkt 24 re Tolstoj-
Kutuzov
(1 bil.)

Wallberg och Mesinai diskuterade i fredags på nytt frågan om ändamålsenligheten med att göra en förnyad framställan till SVR med anledning av Tolstoj-Kutuzov. Mesinai var av den meningen att SVR:s varit så entydigt avvisande i sitt svar (se bifogade non-paper) att det under nuvarande omständigheter inte var meningsfullt att på nytt väcka frågan. Mesinai skulle under sin USA-vistelse göra nya efterforskningar i arkiv i Washington, som förhoppningsvis kunde ge ytterligare detaljer om Tolstoj-Kutuzovs verksamhet och därmed underbygga vår framställan ytterligare. Ambassaden föreslår därför att vi utelämnar punkt 24 i ovancit tills vidare eller noterar SVR:s svar och ber att få återkomma med frågan vid ett senare tillfälle.

HIRDMAN

Вопрос о причастности Службы внешней разведки Российской Федерации к судьбе Р.Валленберга и наличии в архиве СВР России материалов, имеющих отношение этой проблеме, неоднократно обсуждался со шведской стороной на различных уровнях руководством службы, в т.ч. Е.М.Примаковым и В.И.Трубниковым.

Хотели бы еще раз подтвердить, что СВР России и ее предшественники не имели никакого отношения к Р.Валленбергу. Неоднократно проводившийся поиск материалов в архиве СВР России, в т.ч. исследование всех документов, относящихся к интересующему шведскую сторону периоду времени, еще раз показал, что СВР России не располагает документами, проливающими свет на судьбу Р.Валленберга.

В материалах М.Толстого-Кутузова нет никаких сведений о его деятельности в Будапеште по линии шведского Красного креста и имеющих отношение к Р.Валленбергу.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-23

Utrikesdepartementet

EU-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Ambassaden OSLO

19990323/B P 2 Eu¹

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

När kan svar förväntas på våra ovancerade om de fortsatta undersökningarna i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet beträffande bl.a. den norskättade finansattachén vid den amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm under kriget och RW:s kontaktman Iver C. Olsen samt den norske affärsmannen Erik Kristoffer Bjertnes, född den 19 maj 1916? Enligt uppgift vi erhållit nyligen skall Bjertnes ha avlidit i Schweiz den 29 april 1998.

Cabinet

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (3)

1999-03-22

Aambs A. Wallberg

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu ¹

För: UD-EC (Gullgren) EC

Kopia: UD-EC (Lundvik),

amb Riga

B R Å D S K A N D E

[a.a/gb]

Inför avdelningschef Titovs besök

Ert 1999-03-18
(1 bil.)

Härmed insänds bakgrundspromemoria författad av
Anders Wallberg jämte förslag till talepunkter i
Wallenberg-ärendet inför överläggningar i samband
med rubricerade besök.

DAHL

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

PROMEMORIA

1999-03-22

Aambs A. Wallberg

Delges:
UD-EC

**Underlag om Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet inför
avdelningschefen Titovs möte med utrikesrådet
Hjertonsson den 26 mars**

1. Arbetet inom den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen för att bringa klarhet i Raoul Wallenbergs öde är inne i sitt slutskede. Under ett arbetsgruppsmöte i Moskva den 22 februari 1999 uttalade båda sidor avsikten att under innevarande år avsluta arbetetsgruppens arbete. Slutresultatet kommer att redovisas genom att vardera sidan publicerar sin slutrapport. På svensk begäran återstår i första hand tre delprojekt innan gruppen kan anses ha avslutat sitt arbete.

2. a) Ett av dessa rör bearbetning av ett större antal **registerkort** (drygt 10 000) i **Vladimirqängelsets arkiv** för att undersöka trovärdigheten hos de vittnesuppgifter som föreligger om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits i Vladimirqängelset under en viss period efter 1947.


Den avslutande databearbetningen av informationen från registerkorterna har fördröjts med nästan ett år p.g.a. diverse oförutsedda komplikationer på rysk sida. Slutgiltigt tillstånd från Justitieministeriet att utföra den avslutande fasen av arbetet erhöles först i februari 1999. Arbetet, som leds av den oberoende experten Marvin Makinen, kommer preliminärt att utföras i april år.

- Vi välkomnar beskedet att tillstånd meddelats för den avslutande fasen av undersökningen i Vladimirqängelsets arkiv.

b) Ett annat projekt rör genomgång av ett större antal **persondossierer** i den ryska säkerhetstjänstens (FSB) och det ryska inrikesministeriets (MVD) arkiv för att undersöka trovärdigheten hos de vittnesuppgifter som föreligger om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits i sovjetiska fängelser/arbetsläger efter 1947. Undersökningsarbetet utförs på svenskt uppdrag av den oberoende experten Susan Mesinai. Mesinai har hittills studerat ca hälften av de persondossierer hon efterfrågat, men har av delvis oklara skäl ännu inte givits tillgång till återstående 41 dossierer. Vid ett möte med inrikesministeriets representant den 19 mars gavs dock beskedet att Mesinai skulle få ta del av dessa i juli månad.

- Det är med tillfredsställelse vi noterat att genomgången av återstående persondossierer kommer att ske under sommaren. Genomförandet av denna undersökning utgör en av förutsättningarna för att arbetsgruppens slutrapport skall bli trovärdig.

c) Det tredje projektet omfattar undersökningar i olika psykiatriska klinikers arkiv för att följa upp vittnesuppgifter om att Wallenberg skulle ha hållits inspärrad på psykiatrisk klinik under vissa perioder efter 1947. Undersökningsarbetet kommer att genomföras av de oberoende arkivforskarna Susan Mesinai och Susanne Berger.


Anders Wallberg



1999-03-24

Handläggare: H Magnusson

aa
P

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	EC 1

u

EC

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Till: EC (Lundvik, Gullgren)
Kopia: EI (L Olson), amb Moskva (Foyer/Wallberg)

PRIMO. Framställan till SVR re Tolstoj-Kutuzov. Då jag själv också hyser starka tvivel betr ändamålsenligheten med en framställan till SVR har jag inget emot att vi skjuter på begäran och således utesluter punkt 24 i frågelistan. OBS punkt 14 (ej 13 som jag skrev) bör också utgå t v, dock med angiven markering.

SECUNDO. Inför avdelningschefen Titovs besök. I underlaget bör i första stycket en koppling göras mellan avslutande av arbetsgruppens arbete i år och fortsatt samarbete fullt ut från rysk sida, dvs. att vi kan genomföra allt vi föresatt oss (detta kan väl formuleras på ett diplomatiskt sätt). I stycket som handlar om genomgång av persondossierer bör väl markeras att de uppföljningsfrågor av vikt som följer av detta arbete bör hanteras på ett effektivt sätt.

TERTIO. Intervjun med Valerij Boldin. Uppgiften om RW-förhörsprotokollen i Stalins kassaskåp är naturligtvis högintressant och inte alls osannolik, även om man får ta Boldins utsagor med en stor nypa salt. Det vore bra om ambassaden i Moskva kunde fästa de ryska arbetsgruppsmedlemmarnas uppmärksamhet på artikeln. Ett samtal med Boldin bör också komma till

stånd - antingen med någon på ambassaden eller med mig själv vid nästa Moskvabesök.

QUARTO. Uppföljning av samtal med RW-vittnet Rozkalns m fl (för L Olson). Det vore bra om ambassaden Ottawa kunde ges i uppdrag att till Josef Terelya ställa frågan om han i läger(och i så fall vilket) 1986-87 berättade för Janis Rozkalns om R Wallenberg.

MAGNUSSON

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
LONDON
Handläggare: Björn Lyrvall

sid 1 (6)

ESEK

Ans	Gör	M
P	2	Eu ¹

Till: ESEK (Olsson)
Kopia: EC (Lundvik)
Rekrypto (via UD): Riga, Moskva

Re Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet: brev från Mesinai till
Magnusson

Bifogat översänds brev som ambassaden mottagit från
Susan Mesinai fvb amb Magnusson, Riga.

BERGQUIST

March 23, 1999

2/6

FACSIMILE TO --Ambassador Hans Magnusson

FROM --Susan Mesina in London

For the time being I am experiencing technical difficulties so the actual changes on the Tuchnin document I will have to make later, possibly as late as this weekend. In the meantime, I am concerned because it would appear that you do not have the most essential piece of information, namely the excerpt of the BBC interview which does not have the name of the person speaking (per network request) but which makes the essential points of whose jurisdiction the numbered prisoners were under at Vladimir and elsewhere during the essential period from later 40s into the 50s, which could suggest that they were known as that number wherever they went, and especially shows who signed special moves as Deputy Director MVD, supervising Directorate of Camps and Correction Colonies, into Kazan Mental Hospital, Butyrka and the likenamely Serov.

Even though we did not go over the Serov section of my submission to you of January 8 1999 when we met in Moscow, it was mainly because of the time factor and the fact that, at that time, we were zeroing in on the more practical details like registration numbers. The point is that one cannot study the disappearance trail without crossing into Serov's domain. It was my impression and that of all the independents when we met in Stockholm that the Swedish Government was giving new credence to the disappearance trail, strengthened by 1) the April 19 1947 numbered prisoner document to Head MGB Ivanovo, 2) by the graph which Marvin presented based on my 1947 transport study in Vladimir showing two significant gaps, one in May (which is an entire series of numbers beginning with 2000 and ending with 2999...the Vladimir numbering in their cards picking up again on June 1 1947) and the small gap just after July 17 1947 which is when it was stated that RW came in at the same time as Shulgin...although our study would indicate it would have had to have been under separate and enforced convoy if true. (Further submissions on Disappearance will be forthcoming, obviously my Second Report is quite overdue.)

This BBC interview which includes at least one document on film added to the above would indicate that an answer to a number of the unanswered questions may exist in the form of Serov's special work upon his return from Germany in April 1947 as Deputy Director of the Prisoner of War and Interned Directorate and overlapping or slightly later of the Directorate for Camps and Correction Colonies. And his Special Department which existed for only a few years, then vanished, but that is unclear as yet.

Until the Russians can substantiate their death claim I can only assume that there is real merit to the disappearance route, which no one until now has been able to document in any form. It was when I began studying this route, starting with Camps, that the serious questions about alternative values to the July 1947 interrogations and also a clearer understanding of the kind of factual data of the most ordinary kind which does not exist surrounding the 1947 death date went into high contrast. Even if it does turn out that there is truth in the 1947 death claim, it is essential to put it to the acid test if we are to have done a serious job. That test is to juxtapose or superimpose the two possibilities ...death and disappearance... through real and finite detail and let that which has no veracity eliminate itself forthwith.

3/6

I say all of this because, as I told you on the phone Monday morning, if I could study these materials in GARF which were shown to BBC ...materials I suspect from Fond 451 MVD...regarding the Prison Departments communications on numbered prisoners and if I could study that which Galitsky saw but obviously does not really know who the numbered prisoners were in full as claimed, I think then that we could accelerate this whole process and avoid the more sweeping searches from the ground up (other than pilots) as they are time consuming and if we are not careful could turn into another Vladimir. What we have here is I think important complementary material to Marvin's cell occupancy search which would give the entire research being conducted a real focus and even greater depth and unity, in short the impressive state of the art quality I think we should put out. For once we would be moving from the middle up and down, rather than from the bottom up which could indeed take years.

This is really really important and I am even hopeful that with the new keys we've been given it could work. So I was hoping that this request could be brought up if not at the end of this week ...as soon as possible with added force from the highest places toward the end of April. I would like to devote May and June to the actual study of this material. Even though it is seemingly way off limits, if they can show it to the media...or wave it in their faces .. they can show it to us.

The way I see this is as follows....If Raoul died in July 1947 in Lubyanka, his death would have had to have been reported to whoever was in charge of whatever division he was under which according to VCV was Kartashov, and to Mironov, etc. Apart from the fact that RW's presence in the Soviet Union had not been acknowledged, I do not see how his death could be anymore exceptional or controversial than Okulickis where the procedures, or at least the actions taken, are quite clear and where Smoltsov's name does not appear.

If Raoul did not die in July 1947, his removal from Moscow could have taken place anytime starting early May 1947 in keeping with the system that we see being implemented at that time, whether at Ivanova or Vladimir or elsewhere. Again, holding to the systems in place at that time ... we have two basic possibilities, namely that Raoul was held with the diplomati, including the Balts ...Munthers, Urbshis, etc. all of whom were brought to Vladimir or brought back to Vladimir now under their name in 1952, although we see that there are some numbered prisoners with them who keep their numbers which I have listed in my request....(here the BBC interview reinforces what I can see and in fact was showing about the four systems of numbering at Vladimir in 1952 at our meeting on February 22).

The other is that rather than being kept exclusively in the Moscow-Vladimir-Ivanovo regions he was sent out to the Far Away Places at some point, which links up with Bratsk or the various February 1949 transit depot (probably Kirov) sightings and with Verchne Uralsk. (Here we must also consider and inquire regarding the recent Top Secret article stating that Muller was being milked in a special site in the Urals).

What is interesting about the Komi sighting, which could have a great deal of value, is that it combines the diplomati with the Far Away Place. As we see from Merkis the youngers file, over ten years in unaccounted for. In addition to a great deal of prison, some special camp life is not out of the question. This defines the finite scope of my work in preparation for my final report on the Prisoner Files. I cannot write anything, knowing that this stash exists in GARF and not having seen it.

②

4/6

Regarding the question of the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate. I cannot eliminate the whole thing. I am prepared to boil it way down as follows 1) We must get in writing what VCV said to me in Lubyanka that RW was under the 4th Dept 3rd M.D. throughout. That means no Especially Grave Matters Unit. This must be set forth in a way that all can see. 2) VCV reference in his second set of answers to Preliminary Report One referring to the correspondence files of the 4th Dept. 3rd M. D., giving the address of the archive is an opening for deeper access. We must ask for it and nothing he says is by chance and also because if it is true that RW was under the 4th Department throughout, even an examination of the correspondence around the critical time periods would show either some reference or absence of reference and this we must document, to prove that we have followed through. 3) It is also another possible way around the Butyrka Registrz dilemma and would clarify for me the various crossing points where prisoners of war under Kartashov were selected out -- grouped, sentenced, or sent out without sentencing for deep freeze for a while. (For example, according to Marvins print out on those coming to Vladimir in 1948 appears Rudiger Adelman who nonetheless reappears in Lefortovo to cross into Butyrka on March 30-31, 1950 with the rest. This being the case, we then have a precedent of certain prisoners being put aside for a while, and I think that RW could easilz fall into that category. This is another reason why I am asking for Adelmans file on the very short revised list). 4) I have made a very important point about the notification of Kartashov of the death of Roedl and of the suicide attempt of Pelkonen in October and August of 1947. This should be followed up with a systematic review to show how often this was done and whether these were only around RW related prisoners or systematic,...so again I need the same files. And 5) there is an important mystery around the fact that Kartashov did not know that Loyda had left Krasnogorsk when he called Hille and Loyda back to Moscow at the same time he sent Roedl out. It would indicate that Loyda worked for someone else and I want to see if I can find out who because again we may be losing a valuable opportunity to find out who was really pulling the strings.

(Related to this, I repeat my point that Ionov in his protest against the long term detention of Schandl and Clement did not address either Abakumov or the 4th Département of the 3rd Main Directorate. On the one hand, it would be possible to say that Abakumov was the problem and so Ionov was turning to others who could contravene. But it is at least as likely if not more so that he was writing to those whose competency it was to do something about this problem....Here too I raise a second point which has to be probed a bit more thoroughly and that is whether or not the 4th Department Third Main Directorate was deemed as intimately close to the work of Abakumov as was the Especially Grave Matters Unit. In other words when Abakumov was arrested, was Kartashov in the same boat as Leonov and Schwartzmann... Perhaps you know the answers to these questions from previous meetings, but unless you have it in writing (in which case may I study it because there might be more) I think we should take advantage of the good will and my role as a latecomer to secure it again in the context I need, just to be on the safe side. It wont be the first time the Russians have handed over something a second time to me.)

CELL OCCUPANCY: Mironovs note re Roedl and Raul in Cell Number 7 works onlz for Roedl in that Raoul was held back for three days or so. We do not know where he sat in Lefortovo during that time, 203 being occupied, and we no longer know that he rejoined Roedl in Cell Number 7. The chances are much stronger that Roedl was put with Schlitter during that time. RW could just as easilz been off on his own.

5/6

OVERLAPPINGS: I will take out the question of how frequent they are on the basis of minutes you give me that puts it in writing that it was exceptional. Moving on from there, I would like to say that the Huber Schlitter overlap looks to me like it is very Langfelder directed, not toward Raoul(which does not mean that the earlier part of the Schlitter interrogation was not Raoul). I would say the same thing about the Katona Langfelder overlap, although it could be Hungarian networking connection with RW work from Budapest pointed toward Bucharest. I DID NOT ASK FOR KATONA S PROTOCOLS; ONLY FOR HIS INTERROGATION SCHEDULE AS THEY WERE ABLE TO COMPILE FOR LANGFELDER: BOTH OF THEM LACKING A FILE: In my work in Chicago I intend to run all the interrogation schedules through the machine, even without knowing their content, to see the time points where for example Hungarians are called in as opposed to Germans. The reason for this I will explain after it is done, but I need Katona s schedule. Besides, I would like to point out that we already have a date of birth, birthplace and other things on him and there is a possibility that he was repatriated late.....He is not a dead matter by any means..in spite of the Russians best effort to make it seem so.

Regarding your question as to why else they would call the witnesses together if RW were not in Lubyanka.....I am afraid you scared me in that I saw quite readily that the Government of Sweden does not seem really to give much weight at all to the realities of disappearance. According to a number of former Russian officials, including my former colleague, if Wallenberg had just been killed....the rounding up of witnesses would have been to kill them too or silence them forever about being with RW, that is to disappear them as witnesses just as Menshagin was disappeared because of Katyn. The fact is a large number of them went home and talked. If Wallenberg had disappeared, the protocol would have been to round up the witnesses, isolate and intimidate them Quote End Quote. And this is what actually happened. I think the case is very strong that they disappeared him and were just doing a little sweeping up afterwards in preparation of the Vishinsky Memorandum. I also think that this business about MID, Molotov etc. not knowing where RW was is quite shakey as per my questions related to the July 17 and August 1946 interrogations.

I am asking the Government of Sweden to be open to the possibility that while Abakumov was obviously involved in certain ways which the Russians have documented for us, he may not have been the key player. Scapegoat after the fact, most certainly. We must seriously examine the questions whether or not RW died in the 50s as I pointed out in my First Report, whether from natural causes or from later elimination...in which case by whom.

We must also deal with the very real and important question of Raoul s usefulness as collateral for an eventual exchange which would be very important given the fact that as of 1949 at the latest and probably earlier Stig Wennerstrom was emerging as a very important Soviet asset. I think we can safely say that Abakumov was not running Stig Wennerstrom. Whoever was, there had to be someone in reserve for an exchange.....Are there other Swedes in the Gulag who could possibly prove of the same valuta....Here too I would emphasize the importance of Serov in that he had already while in Germany taken on a very deep interest in air technology which carried over even into his responsibilities in Gulag camps. This has direct bearing on the modus operandi by which the Soviets availed themselves of air technology secrets across the board.....a cross between shootdowns and pirating the plans and copying them in Washington and elsewhere. Serov s interests were already in place by April 1947 when he returned to Moscow and according to Petrov were

6/6
ered by Stalin. Even if Raoul absolutely refused to be recruited, his value in an
rangeor to apply pressure on certain quarters ... could not have escaped anyone.

ch leaves Pitovranovaccidental mishap during interrogation. and my question as to
ther the reason RW was not sent home in the late 50s early 60s, besides the fact that he
ld have been held in reserve for collateral, was not he WAS in very bad shape and
efore could not be returned and therefore it became more humane to call him dead.

se are the possibilities as I see them .

ractical terms this means that it would short cut things alot if one could examine certain
ortant collections, the numbered prisoners of the Prison Department of the Camps and
rectional Colonies combined with the 4th Dept. correspondence re POWs combined
MVD MGB correspondence on POWs combined with the Butyrka Registry being the
corners of my elimination program. As I said before, Susanne in the Mzasnikow and
rs doctors fonds is critical also, and also the investigative files of Gflorener and Huber.
nks.

rw Pss. I will take out the missing interrogation in Lubzanka, but would like a copz of
r minutes. Thanks for your help on Lefortovo....I agree it is probably chambers but
l to get it on record. The next item, first two paragraphs on Page 8.....I do not know to
t this refers because for some reason when I put in my disc it has taken on new
ination. So please would you clarify.

rr comment on the Medical being too overwhelming I hope I have answered with my
test to see the Numbered Prisoner files. Please bear in mind that I identified Victor
nilton on the most bizarre pieces of information imaginable. Think I can do this. Give it
ot. The reason I hit them with all of the above is that Karpov emphasized the point
sh I knew already that while still in the system as prisoners of MGB or MVD these
rds are not necessarily to be found in the Health Ministry at all. Besides which the
B had its own safe houses.....for special prisoners. So dont please let them off the hook
easily. Thanks.

Test-

Suzan Mesina/

Author: INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at INTERNET

Date: 1999-03-25 18:58

Priority: Normal

TO: Anders (UD) Wallberg at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1

CC: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3, Mats (UD) Foyer at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1

Subject: Re: visit on the 16-18 April (fwd)

P 2 Eu¹
a.a. / H

Anders:

I have checked with Ari Kaplan and have included his answer below. It seems that this will prove to be useful as long as we can work on the weekend as you described and Ari can go with Nikishkin to the Osobii Arkhiv on Monday (and Tuesday if necessary).

I shall be arriving in Moscow on Friday, April 16, leaving April 19. Ari will probably arrive on the 16th but because of his talk at the computer meeting in Denver which is scheduled for 3:00 p.m. Thursday afternoon, he may not be able to leave the US until Friday to arrive in Moscow on Saturday. When our flight plans become more concrete, we shall inform you. George has stated that our visas should be ready by April 6th.

Can you reserve separate rooms for us at the Gostinit'sa Instituta Teoriticheskoi i Eksperimental'noi Fiziki, Profsoyuzhnaya 15, tel: 124 19

01.

Thanks.

Marvin Makinen

----- Forwarded message -----

Date: Thu, 25 Mar 1999 08:48:58 -0600 (CST)
From: Ari D Kaplan <akaplan@interaccess.com>
To: makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu
Cc: akaplan@interaccess.com
Subject: Re: visit on the 16-18 April (fwd)

Marvin,

From what I understand, the 1500 cards already scanned and entered will be in the same format as the remaining cards. So, I think that if Prosoft has already entered 1500 then it would be worth it to review now. If we find any problems or miscommunications, then it would be best to address them now before too many cards have already been entered. Also, we can test the general procedure of loading them into my program and running the algorithms against the data.

It would also be helpful for me to stay extra, at least 1-2 days, to ensure that there are no further problems, logistical or otherwise, with working at the Osobii Arkhiv.

Regards,

-Ari

On Thu, 25 Mar 1999 makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu wrote:

>
> Ari:
>
> Could you comment on this, so that I can get back to Anders. Do you feel
> that this will be adequate?
>

Marvin

----- Forwarded message -----

Date: 25 Mar 1999 14:35:41 +0000
From: anders.wallberg@foreign.ministry.se
To: makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu
Cc: mats.foyer@foreign.ministry.se
Subject: visit on the 16-18 April

Marvin,

I just talked to Nikishkin. On Saturday the 17th April it would be possible to come and check Prosoft från 10 to 15 approximately. Unfortunately it is impossible to arrange for access to the Osoby

Arkhib on Sundays. Nikishkin suggested that you spend Sunday the 18th separately with Prosoft going over the 1500 cards already scanned i

Vladimir. If needed it would possible for Ari to continue monitorin

in the Osoby Arkhib premises on 19-21 April should time during the week-end prove insufficient. Would this proposal be acceptable to y

ou?

Regards

Anders

1999-03-26

Aambs A. Wallberg

Bew. 1999-05-05

R

EC

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: UD-EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Riga

Eventuellt RW-minnesmärke

Ert 35 1999-03-04

Wallberg talade idag med Nikolaj Kortjunov från MID:s andra europeisk avdelning med anledning av den av ambassaden framförda reaktionen på Vinogradovs propå i enlighet med ovancit. kryfax. Från rysk sida ville man gärna ha ytterligare vägledning i form av material om hur Raoul Wallenbergs minne hade hedrats på andra platser i världen.

LUTHMAN



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1999-03-29

P 2 Eu¹

ESEK

Utrikesdepartementet

EU-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Ambassaden
OTTAWA

20 790329 / 12

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Ambassaden ombeds kontakta Raoul Wallenberg-vittnet Josef Terelya, som intervjuats av ambassaden den 22 december 1987 i sitt hem i St. Catherines, Ontario (adress: Saint Sophiareligious Association of Ucranian Catholics in Canada, 85 Lakeshore Rd, St. Catherines, Ontario L2N 2 - T - 6). Terelya bör utfrågas om huruvida han i något läger, och i så fall vilket, någon gång 1986-87 berättat för vittnet Janis Rozkalns om RW.

Cabinet

1999-03-30

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114

Delges:

Kabs

Magnusson, Riga

Hirdman, Moskva

Carlsson, Budapest

Grundberg, EC


Åhlander, EC

Gullgren, EC

Olson, ESEK

Guy von Dardel

Nina Lagergren



Samtal i Budapest om Raoul Wallenberg

Under besök i Budapest vecka 12 hade jag ett antal samtal om Raoul Wallenberg.

1. Tillsammans med Staffan Carlsson besökte jag statssekreteraren i UM **János Herrman** för att ge en redogörelse för ärendets läge på svensk sida och hemställa om de ungerska myndigheternas bistånd i vårt fortsatta forskningsarbete. På den senare punkten nämnde jag särskilt frågan om identifiering av de olika ungerska fångar vars väg i de sovjetiska fängelserna korsat Wallenbergs. Herrman utlovade beredvilligt allt stöd för våra ansträngningar som från ungersk sida kunde ges.
2. Jag sammanträffade också med chefen för enheten för den forna Sovjetunionen, förre Moskvaambassadören **György Nanofvszky**, som på sin tid lyckades klarlägga omständigheterna rörande olika ungrares död i sovjetiska fängelser, däribland f d premiärministern István Bethlen och generalen László Deseö. Nanofvszky har i samtal med såväl Sven Hirdman som Staffan Carlsson redogjort för detta arbete och uttryckt sin övertygelse att Raoul Wallenberg gått samma öde till mötes, dvs likvidering under fingerad identitet. Eftersom den rika kunskapsfond som Nanofvszky besitter svärigen låter sig uttömmas under besök på tjänsterummet hos en upptagen enhetschef, och en fruktbar diskussion dessutom förutsätter mycket ingående kunskaper om det material vi själva fått fram, vill jag föreslå att Nanofvszky inbjudes till Sverige för dels en grundlig genomgång med den svenska RW-expertisen med Hans Magnusson i spetsen, eventuellt inkluderande även Susan Mesinai, dels

1999-03-30

överläggningar med EC om läget i Ryssland. Såväl Herrman som Nanofvszky själv lät förstå att en sådan inbjudan skulle välkomnas.

3. Vid samtalet med Herrman deltog även Nordenchefen, förre Stockholmsambassadören **László Deseö**, son till den ovannämnde generalen, med vilken jag även fick tillfälle till ett enskilt samtal om faderns öde. Deseö överlämnade därvid en omfattande samling sovjetiska fängelsedokument, vilka jag ännu ej hunnit närmare granska närmare.

4. I samtal med Canadas ambassadör **Susan Cartwright** respektive den påvliga nuntien mgr **Karl-Josef Rauber** redovisade jag läget inklusive vår tidsplanering. Cartwright har sedermera återkommit och berättat att hon som reaktion på sin rapport om vårt samtal erhållit en försäkran från UM i Ottawa om att man där hade full förståelse för vår uppläggning och inte ville företa sig något som kunde verka störande. Man skulle därför invänta vår rapport innan beslut togs i frågan om anslag till advokaten Matas' forskningsprojekt.

Rauber lovade höra sig för i Vatikanen om det i arkiven där skulle finnas något material om Raoul Wallenberg. Mina ungerska kontakter bedömde det dock som föga troligt att Vatikanens arkivarier skulle släppa ifrån sig något.

5. I Ungerns judiska centralorganisation uttryckte den för utrikeskontakterna ansvarige professor **Ernö Lazarovits** sitt varma stöd för våra strävanden och lovade att i organisationens tidning *Új Élet* införa en vädjan till dem som räddats av Raoul Wallenberg och av någon orsak ännu inte hört av sig om sina erfarenheter att snarast göra detta.

6. Ett möte med historiker på den ungerska vetenskapsakademiens historiska institut under ledning av professor **Attila Pók** tog en något oväntad vändning då de närvarande gång på gång hänvisade till Raoul Wallenbergarkivet vid Uppsala universitet, resultatet av ett svensk-amerikansk-ungerskt forskningsprojekt i början av 1990-talet omfattande ca 10.000 sidor (se närslutna informationsblad), och jag tvingades medge att det var något jag inte uppmärksammat. I UD:s dokumentation har jag inte funnit någon hänvisning till detta av allt att döma värdefulla material. Under alla omständigheter uttryckte de närvarande historikerna stor beredvillighet att bistå med ytterligare uppgifter eller t o m forskningsinsatser på de punkter vi behövde hjälp. Jag lovade återkomma efter en genomgång av materialet i Uppsala.

7. I ett samtal med Raoul Wallenbergforskaren **Mária Ember** framkom att hon av Budapests stad fått i uppdrag att skriva en bok om Raoul Wallenbergs insatser i Budapest. Tanken hade varit att den skulle utges i samband med återuppförandet på dess ursprungliga plats i replikans form

1999-03-30

av det minnesmärke över Raoul Wallenberg som kort efter kriget försvann omedelbart före avtäckningen och sedan i anonymt skick återfanns framför en läkemedelsfabrik i Debrecen. Nu kommer minnesmärket att avtäckas redan nästa månad och boken blir färdig först senare i år. Den kommer att inledas, berättade Ember, med legationens telegram om att Raoul Wallenberg inträtt i tjänst, och avslutas med hans avresa från Pest med rysk militäreskort. Det mesta av innehållet är naturligtvis välkänt, sade hon vidare, men en del nya rön kommer att kunna framläggas.

8. Spaniens ambassadör **Fernando Perpiña-Robert** ställde till förfogande material om spanska legationens insatser för räddande av judiska liv parallellt med svenska legationen. Professor **Iván Harsányi**, som räddats till livet av spanjorerna, hade mycket att berätta därom men var också mycket välorienterad om Raoul Wallenbergs och Valdemar Langlets insatser. Tiden medgav tyvärr inte att gå på djupet. De spanska räddningsinsatserna hade ursprungligen varit orienterade mot judar av sefardiskt ursprung, om man så vill en senkommen gottgörelse för fördrivningen av judarna från Spanien nästan 500 år tidigare, och hade mot slutet tagit en oväntad vändning. Den officiella spanska personalen hade lämnat Budapest för att inte falla i ryssarnas händer, och legationen hade övertagits av en italiensk äventyrare Giorgio Perlasca, som utan minsta form av officiell status eller bemyndigande hade fortsatt och t o m intensifierat arbetet att rädda judar. Han hade undgått ryssarna av den enkla anledningen att han inte existerade i några officiella handlingar. Enligt Harsányi hade Sanz-Briz vid avresan bett Sverige agera skyddsmakt. Han sade också att den enda tillgängliga källan i Ungern om Langlets verksamhet var Nina Langlets bok, vilken översatts till ungerska.

9. Musikern och radiohistorikern **János Sebestyén** förklarade på min fråga att radiosändningarna från Debrecen under namnet Kossuth Radio vintern 1945 inte varit ungerska utan en del av den sovjetiska militärradion. Sändningar i ungersk regi inleddes först den 3 juni 1945. Eventuella uppgifter om innehållet i sändningarna från Debrecen, däribland påståendet att Raoul Wallenberg omkommit på väg till Debrecen, måste därför sökas hos ryssarna. Sebestyén överlämnade en samling fotokopior av en tidning som utkom i Debrecen vid denna tid, vilka jag skall gå igenom så snart tiden medger.


10. En i USA bosatt ungersk fysikprofessor vid namn **Balás** berättade att han en gång som pojke 1943 eller 1944 träffat Raoul Wallenberg, då denne var på besök hos Balás' far, som var tjänsteman i de ungerska

1999-03-30

statsjärnvägarna. Vad syftet med besöket varit visste inte Balás, som först långt senare fått klart för sig vem Wallenberg var. Balás nämnde också att de ungerska järnvägarna några år tidigare genomfört en stor och komplicerad logistisk uppgift i form av transiteringen genom Ungern av de många polska soldater som flytt till Ungern efter det polska sammanbrottet och av ungrarna slussades vidare. Denna upplysning är av intresse genom att Mária Ember helt oberoende av detta nämnde att hon fått fram uppgifter om att Raoul Wallenberg skulle ha hunnit med att också intressera sig för de polska flyktingarna.

11. Susanne Berger hade bett mig försöka få fram material om en viss **Bálint Arany**, involverad i motståndsrörelsen, anställd vid SKF i Ungern och senare ställd inför folktol. Det visade sig föreligga en hel bok om denna rättegång, den första av de stora skenrättegångarna, under titeln *Koncepció per 1947 (Skenrättegång 1947)*, i vilken Arany framstår som en av huvudpersonerna. Syftet med rättegången var att som ett led i den kommunistiska skalamitaktiken diskreditera småbrukarpartiet, i vilket Arany spelade en ledande roll. Jag har boken med mig och skall gå igenom den.

Jag nämner detta som ett exempel på den mycket rikhaltiga litteratur om 1940-talets politik som numera finns tillgänglig på ungerska. Genom denna jämte arkivmaterialet i Uppsala öppnar sig ett nytt forskningsfält för gemensamma svensk-ungerska ansträngningar, och frågan är om vi inte för detta ändamål till arbetsgruppen borde knyta en svensk historiker. Därigenom skulle också övergången till historisk forskning efter offentliggörandet av arbetsgruppens rapport underlättas.



Jan Lundvik

rally with Sweden's or other neutral nations' humanitarian efforts. A prominent category in this regard are those who were children at the time. Several people interviewed worked very closely with Wallenberg. Representatives of other neutral diplomatic missions or relief agencies, as well as some former officials in the Hungarian government, were also interviewed.

Document Collection

The Project has obtained photocopies (facsimiles) of large numbers of documents relating to the Swedish wartime rescue and relief efforts from archives in Sweden, Israel, the U.S. and Hungary. Many of the Hungarian collections are available to researchers for the first time, having been released in conjunction with the recent political changes in Hungary. Among the recently released collections are those from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the National Police. Many of the United States War Refugee Board's documents relating to Sweden are also available. In addition, a number of people were interviewed by mail and their written recollections are also part of the collection. All document collections are available to researchers at the Project Archive in Uppsala.

Research

The Raoul Wallenberg Project Archive is now open to researchers. To obtain additional information on the Archive, research, or interview summaries, questionnaires and indexes, please write to Thomas Aurelius, Head Archivist, University Archives, Box 256, S-751 05 Uppsala, Sweden, or call (+46 18) 18 17 16.

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Project Personnel

Sweden:

Project Director	Karl Molin
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Research Director	Anders Berge
Assistant Researcher & Administrator	Paul A. Levine
Assistant Researcher	Richard Holm
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Secretary	Lilisa A. Melton
Responsible for data bases & indexing	Janne Backlund György Nováky
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Head Administrator & Interviewer	Tamás Stark
Administrator & Interviewer	Péter Bajtay

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Head Administrator & interviewer	Iris Berlatzky
Interviewers	Roni Porát Tikvah Petel

Russia:


Head Administrator & Interviewer	Helene Carlbäck-Isotalo
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USA:

Interviewers	Richard Holm Paul A. Levine
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Uppsala, August 18, 1992

THE RAOUL WALLENBERG PROJECT ARCHIVE



UPPSALA UNIVERSITY
SWEDEN

A unique historical archive created by the Raoul Wallenberg Project at Uppsala University is now open to researchers.


The Raoul Wallenberg Project

The world-wide interest directed towards the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg has often concerned his fate after being taken into custody by Soviet troops as they entered Budapest, Hungary in January 1945. The Raoul Wallenberg Project at Uppsala University, however, has primarily investigated the efforts of Wallenberg and other Swedish diplomats as they attempted to rescue the Jews of Budapest from destruction at the hands of the Nazis between March 1944 and January 1945. Wallenberg's humanitarian achievement has been the stimulus for the Project's research and documentation collection, but not the exclusive focus. Thus the Project has conducted interviews and collected documents which shed new light on the rescue and relief work organized by Wallenberg at the Swedish Legation in Budapest as well as on Jewish society and culture in pre-war and wartime Hungary. The results of the Project's research and collection efforts comprise the now completed archive.

The Project's Origins

The Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States in New York originated the idea for this oral history project. The Project was funded by grants from the Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Memorial Fund and the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, both in Stockholm, Sweden. Project activities commenced in January 1989 at the Swedish Institute for North American Studies (SINAS), Uppsala University, with three primary tasks outlined: first, to conduct interviews with people who came into contact with the rescue efforts of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish Legation in Budapest during 1944-45; second, to locate and collect documentation relating to the Legation's work; third, to support research on rescue and relief efforts during World War II.

Outline of the rescue organization in Budapest set up by Raoul Wallenberg.



Interview Processing

In little over two years Project researchers conducted over 200 original, in-depth interviews in six languages and in eight countries. The majority were done in the U.S., Hungary and Israel. Interviews were also conducted in Sweden, Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy. To facilitate their use by international researchers, all interviews done in Hungarian and Hebrew have been translated into English. The interviews have been transcribed and indexed according to subject. The transcripts and indexes amount to approximately 10,000 typed pages. Each interview was recorded on audio cassette tape, with security copies transferred onto large-reel polyester tape now in climate controlled storage. The audio collection represents approximately 500 hours of recordings.

Interview Methodology

The interviews followed a standardized questionnaire developed at the Project. The questionnaire stressed questions concerning wartime experiences and contacts with the Swedish rescue and relief efforts. The individual respondent's entire life within the culture and society of pre-war Budapest was also of interest. These inquiries regarding education, religious and family life, anti-semitism, social and economic class, and professional life make many of the interviews of particular interest to social historians.

Rather than asking each respondent to independently relate the story of his or her survival, as they generally remember it, the interviews were guided by the highly detailed questionnaire. This method proved successful in stimulating not only the ad hoc anecdotes most often related in an unstructured telling, but also chains of memories often long buried and repressed. Many respondents said they had never told their story before in such detail.

Most of those interviewed were in some way saved by Raoul Wallenberg or had come into contact more gene-